“Internal infiltration?” Following the EU Money Through Northern Cyprus’ NGO's

Background

“AB DESTEK OFİSİ'ni bir 5. KOL KARARGAHI olarak kullanarak istediği örgüt, kişi, üretici ve firmalara, on milyonlarca euro dağıttı, dağıtıyor.” Sabahattin İsmail, Facebook post (accessed 9 September 2025)

The attached EU-funded grants ledger for the Turkish Cypriot community is not just a spreadsheet, it is an X-ray of power. Read plainly, it shows hundreds of projects and tens of millions of euros moving into a dense web of associations, chambers, platforms and companies across the north. The European Commission is blunt about its strategic intent: its “Aid Programme for the Turkish Cypriot community aims to facilitate the reunification of Cyprus … supports confidence-building measures, civil society, and several projects to bring the Turkish Cypriot community closer to the EU.”

From a Turkish Cypriot perspective, this is precisely the point. If the policy goal is reunification under a federation that Turkish Cypriots have repeatedly and democratically rejected in recent cycles, then channeling money at scale into groups and networks that advocate or normalize that outcome amounts to an economic information operation. This investigation lays out the money, the recipients, the overlaps with openly federalist unions and platforms, and the legal shield under which this system operates.

What the file shows us, by numbers

We have exhaustively parsed the attached PDF at the bottom of this article. Here is what emerges:

Total projects listed: 357

• Unique named recipients (organisations/companies/consortia): 335.

• Project date span in the file: 11 November 2009 – 31 May 2026.

Sector split of recipients with explicit grant amounts (by total value in this file):

• Civil society associations (dernek/association): ~€13.20m (50 recipients)
• Municipalities: ~€8.02m (20)
• Private companies/SMEs: ~€6.70m (7)
• Chambers/Unions/Professional bodies: ~€5.38m (19)
• Cooperatives: ~€2.03m (2)
• Foundations: ~€0.86m (4)
• Platforms/coalitions: ~€0.70m (1)

Highest payments recorded in the file:

• Mehmetçik Oil Production and Marketing Ltd — €2,386,827.89 (multiple tranches).
• BTDAYS Kıbrıs Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd — €1,626,114.56.
• Büyükkonuk Zeytin Üreticileri Tarım Kooperatifi — €1,405,543.89.
• Patates İşleme Fabrikası / Soğuk Oda — €1,357,880.40.
• Balıkçılar Birliği — €952,212.00.
• Lefkoşa Türk Belediyesi — €748,763.00.
• Kıbrıs Türk Esnaf ve Zanaatkarlar Odası (KTEZO) — €745,017.00.

Among civil society organisations that feature at the upper end of the scale:

• İnsan Hakları Platformu (Human Rights Platform) — €700,000.00.
• SOS Çocukköyü Derneği — €663,836.00.
• Kuir Kıbrıs Derneği (Queer Cyprus) — €657,919.22 (including a €300,512.69 tranche and others).
• Mülteci Hakları Derneği (Refugee Rights) — €501,994.27.
• Kıbrıs Türk Mimar ve Mühendis Odaları Birliği (KTMMOB) — €572,368.61.
• Lefke Turizm Derneği — €561,309.88.

Scale matters. In a polity of roughly a few hundred thousand, this is a startling density: 335 named entities receiving funds across 357 projects. The sums for some single NGOs  (€500k–€700k) dwarf typical local civil-society budgets and rival public-sector programme lines, shaping agendas and voices for years.

Are the largest recipients predominantly federalist?

There are two layers to this question: (1) the EU’s stated programme logic; (2) the recipients’ posture.

1) The EU’s policy logic is without doubt reunification-oriented

Brussels repeats this every year. In its 2024 programme, the Commission “adopted … allocating €39.5 million … to facilitate Cyprus’ reunification … to build confidence … and facilitate the important work of civil society,” Commissioner Elisa Ferreira said. > “Focusing on flagship initiatives … this year’s Action Programme seeks to make a tangible contribution to paving the way towards the resumption of reunification talks within the UN framework.” (European Commission press communication, 3 September 2024).

2) The recipients’ posture: case-based indicators

Not every funded CSO proclaims a constitutional vision; many do service delivery. But a significant subset operate explicitly in bi-communal “reconciliation” frames and/or align publicly with a federal settlement:

• Queer Cyprus Association (Kuir Kıbrıs) — runs a “Queer Reconciliation Project” and describes cross-community reconciliation work in English on its site. The association’s public materials consistently frame bi-communal rights and reconciliation as core programming, dovetailing with the EU’s reunification logic.

• Visual Voices — a bicommunal arts-for-peace group headquartered in Nicosia, self-described as focused on “arts-based peacebuilding” and “responding to the division on the island of Cyprus.”

Union & platform ecosystem explicitly calling for federation. On 24 September 2024, at an event hosted in the KTÖS (teachers’ union) local, a broad coalition of sendikalar, odalar, dernekler ve partiler issued a joint declaration:

“İrademiz Federasyon … Federal çözüm romantik bir hayal değil, Kıbrıslı Türklerin geleceği için olmazsa olmaz bir çözümdür.” 

Signatories include KTMMOB and KTEZO — both funded recipients in this file — along with KTÖS, KTAMS, KOOP-SEN, DAÜ-SEN, DEV-İŞ and others.

(Bugün Kıbrıs, 24 Sep 2024).

Teachers’ unions amplify the same line in 2025:

“Birleşmiş Milletler kararlarına dayalı, siyasi eşitlik temelinde iki toplumlu, iki bölgeli federasyon çözümü … yegâne yoludur.” KTÖS Genel Sekreteri Burak Maviş, 9 January 2025.

Bottom line: The programme logic is reunification, and a material slice of higher-earning CSOs and professional bodies in the file are embedded in pro-federalist coalitions or run bi-communal “reconciliation” projects. That doesn’t make every euro “propaganda,” but it does tilt public space, conferences, trainings, media, youth work, rights advocacy, toward a federalist narrative.

 

Are unions part of the pipeline?

Direct teachers’/public-sector unions (KTÖS, KTOEÖS, KTAMS, etc.) do not appear as top direct grantees in this PDF. However, we identify 19 “Chamber/Union/Professional body” recipients with explicit amounts, KTMMOB, KTEZO, Kıbrıs Türk Barolar Birliği, Kıbrıs Türk Sanayi Odası, Kıbrıs Türk Ticaret Odası, sectoral producer unions (e.g., Balıkçılar Birliği) and others. Several of these signed the 24 September 2024 “İrademiz Federasyon” declaration above.

This reveals indirect coupling: EU-funded bodies + union platforms + bi-communal NGOs often operate in the same coalitions, events and advocacy cycles, the infrastructure for a federalist civic consensus.

“Diplomatic immunity”: how the shield works

A recurring grievance in Sabahattin İsmail’s post is that EU staff enjoy “tek yanlı olarak diplomatik dokunulmazlık”. The legal architecture is straightforward:

• The European Commission implements the Aid Programme through its Programme Support Office for the Turkish Cypriot community in Nicosia.
• EU officials posted in Member States (the Republic of Cyprus) enjoy privileges and immunities under Protocol (No 7):

  “Officials and other servants of the Union shall be immune from legal proceedings in respect of acts performed by them in their official capacity, including words spoken or written.” (Protocol No 7, Art. 11).

This is not a bespoke “north” arrangement; it’s EU-wide law. Practically, it means the EU’s Programme Support Office and contractors operate with legal insulation for official acts, while the programme’s purpose, per the Commission, is to “facilitate reunification”. Taken together, that feels to many like unaccountable influence on the TRNC’s internal civic life.

On the Greek Cypriot side, President Nikos Christodoulides restated in March 2025:

“Our goal is one: to resume talks … on the basis of the agreed (U.N.) framework. We are not discussing anything else.” Christodoulides, Reuters, 5 March 2025.

And the EU continues to announce annual packages structured to “pave the way … within the UN framework.”

Translation: The EU is financing the civic scaffolding for a federal settlement that Turkish Cypriot leadership does not accept, using officials shielded by immunity and a grants machine that animates hundreds of organisations.

Why this matters — the strategic effect at home

• Narrative capture: With hundreds of beneficiaries and grant-dependent media, culture and youth ecosystems, a permanent constituency grows around federalist framing (bi-communal, reconciliation, EU-harmonisation).
• Economic leverage: In a sanctioned, isolated economy, €300k–€700k cheques to NGOs are transformational, expanding staffing, content and outreach far beyond what local donors can match.
• Institutional entrenchment: Chambers and professional bodies — some of which signed explicit pro-federation declarations, are funded actors in this ecosystem.

None of this condemns service work like anti-trafficking or refugee assistance; indeed, those are vital. But programming framed to “prepare” society for a UN-federal model is political by design. When the aid administrator is simultaneously advancing a constitutional outcome we do not consent to, Turkish Cypriots are entitled to call this what it is: a money-backed attempt to steer our public square.

What reforms would protect our democracy while respecting reality?

1. Name it: The Commission should label federal-preparatory projects as political programmes and segregate them from neutral service delivery (health, environment, safety), which should be run at arm’s length from any constitutional framing.

2. Parity & transparency: Publish a full, machine-readable registry of recipients, amounts, project aims and subcontractors in Turkish and English. The attached file is a start; make it official and annual.

3. Domestic oversight: The TRNC should establish a register of foreign-funded political activities, with reporting and disclaimers for content funded to promote constitutional outcomes (any outcome).

4. Immunity doesn’t mean impunity: The Protocol No 7 immunity covers official acts, but the EU should consent to independent auditing and impact assessments by mixed panels (academia, unions, municipalities) in the north, not only in the south.

5. Balance with Türkiye cooperation funds: Ankara and the TRNC should expand counter-cyclical funding for non-political civic capacity (disaster preparedness, STEM education, mental health) to neutralise dependency on EU-politicised lines.

TCE Final word: accountability is not hostility

This article uses the EU’s own words and a granular reading of the grants ledger file. Yes, we need funding. But aid with a constitutional steering wheel is politics by other means. As Sabahattin İsmail warned, the field is being ploughed. We are within our rights to fence off the crops that belong to our people, our State, and our future.