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August 15, 1974

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

TURKISH INTENTIONS TOWARD CYPRUS:
WHERE WILL THEY STOP?Pressures on Ecevit

1. In formulating policy toward Cyprus, the Turkish government is moved by a number of considerations. In the first place, Prime Minister Ecevit sees the Cyprus dispute as a way to strengthen his hand on the domestic political scene. He anticipates that achievement of a striking victory in Cyprus would boost his stock with the Turkish voters to the point where he could turn his present parliamentary plurality into a majority in early elections. This would enable his party to govern without sharing power with the erratic National Salvation Party (NSP), a partner that Ecevit has found increasingly frustrating.

2. There is broad support within Turkey for a firm line on Cyprus. Indeed, the Ecevit coalition has been under considerable public pressure from the opposition to take a stronger stance toward Cyprus and to secure at Geneva more than merely a freeze of the cease-fire lines. For its part, the NSP has advocated geographic partition as the basis for any Cyprus settlement. This political consensus reinforced Ecevit's own inclination not to give away anything at the bargaining table which had been, or could be, won on the battlefield; the course of the Geneva talks did not promise to satisfy the common Turkish desire.

3. Ecevit also has had to contend with pressure from the military establishment for more decisive action. There are some within the armed forces who have been eager for a chance to make up for the slowness with which the initial invasion

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proceeded. It is hard to tell just how much heat Ecevit has felt from this quarter. His standing with the military has visibly risen as a result of his performance in the Cyprus crisis thus far. And Ecevit's references to military pressures may be to some extent a tactic to increase his international bargaining position. We have no evidence to suggest that Ecevit is not in the final analysis calling the shots in Turkish policy, but there are limits on his room for maneuver.

4. Ecevit and his generals may also have been encouraged to precipitate action by fears that Greece and the UK would reduce Turkey's military edge on the island by introducing troops. Undoubtedly recalling the infiltration of 10,000 Greek troops between 1964 and 1967, the Turks have already alleged that sizable Greek forces have made their way to Cyprus in the past few weeks.

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Turkish Intentions

5. Thus Turkish demands in a Cyprus settlement have grown with each succeeding stage of the confrontation. Once the Turks landed, the pressures for fundamental change in the status of the island became overwhelming. Having paid the price of landing men and materiel, the Turks were determined to achieve a solution that would insure once and for all the security of the Turkish minority in Cyprus. At Geneva they were willing to consider this in the context of a federated state providing local autonomy for the Turkish enclaves guaranteed by mainland troops. But as this did not meet the full desires of many Turks, the Ecevit government had little compunction about reopening military operations to achieve a stronger position.

6. The Turks have announced that the aim of their current military campaign is to place a "fair share" of the island under Turkish control.

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7. It is highly likely that once the Turks have secured this territory they will stop military action and seek to re-open negotiations with the Greeks. Ankara recognizes that broader military action would severely strain Turkish logistical capacity. Moreover, Ecevit realizes that military operations are turning world opinion against Turkey and that to grab the bulk of all of the island would trigger strong international objections to the extinction of a UN member state.

8. Occupation of the northern third of the island would give the Turks strong leverage to insist on the geographic separation of population that is at the heart of their demands for a settlement. While the Turks have not renounced the concept of a federated Cyprus state, the logic of events seems to be flowing toward de facto partition of the island with the major portion of the Turkish occupied area linked directly to Turkey. The Turks will base their territorial demands on the central core area of the Kyrenia-Nicosia axis. They will want assured commercial air access to the island, either by complete control of Nicosia international airport or by some sharing arrangement with the Greeks. Ankara may not insist ultimately on controlling all of the territory it occupies when a cease-fire eventually takes effect. But the case for extensive population resettlement is gaining urgency in light of Greek over-running of outlying Turkish Cypriot enclaves. And Ankara undoubtedly wants sufficient territory to accommodate all of the Turkish community who wish to move to the safety of the main Turkish sector. Further, the Turks will insist that in any settlement the Greeks abandon the right to have comparable military forces on Cyprus. No Turkish government can surrender the advantage afforded by possession of superior military force on the island.

The Possibilities of Broader Hostilities

9. Although the Turks probably do not intend to go beyond occupying more than the northern part of Cyprus, the momentum of their move might carry them further in some circumstances. The troops on the ground may prove, as they did

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in the first round of fighting, difficult to restrain by Ankara. They may attempt to relieve additional Turkish enclaves. Should the Turks at Paphos, for example, appear in danger of massacre, the pressure to send an armored column there would be great. Of course, should the Greeks prove unwilling to recognize the military realities on the island in a political settlement after a cease-fire takes effect, Ankara would be tempted to open another round on Cyprus.

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