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**Contact**

Phone: +31 (0) 30 820 05 40

Fax: +31 (0) 30 820 05 41

E-mail: info@turksestudies.org

Website: www.turksestudies.org

Postal address

Institute for Turkish Studies

Laan van Chartroise 174

3552 EZ Utrecht

The Netherlands

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Institute for Turkish Studies

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Laan van Chartroise 174
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Telephone number: +31 (0) 30 820 05 40
Fax number: +31 (0) 30 820 05 41
E-mail: IRTS@turksestudies.org
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Editorial Foreword

Armand Sag¹

Third edition of the year

We are nearing the end of the year 2012, a very innovative year in which International Review of Turkish Studies (IRTS) had put forth its seventh issue.

Content IRTS 2.3

The first article of this edition is written by Dr. Salim Aydüz who is lecturer at Fatih University in İstanbul, Turkey as well as a senior researcher at the Foundation for Science, Technology and Civilisation in Great-Britain. His article deals with Naşir al-Din al-Ṭūsī and its influence on the interest of Ottoman scholars from the earliest days until the last period. The works of Naşir al-Din al-Ṭūsī were even used as textbooks in Ottoman madrasas. This article examines al-Ṭūsī's work on scientific fields such as mathematics, astronomy, or mineralogy and demonstrates how important he was to the Ottoman world.

The second article is written by Dr. Tamer Balci, an assistant professor of Middle East history at University of Texas-Pan American. This article focuses on the independence of Cyprus in 1960 and the various policies that were applied during the crucial years from 1960 to 1975. Like professor Balci puts it: the overall examination of the British, Turkish, Greek, American and the Soviet policies on Cyprus show that Greece was the only side that did not change its stance. Greece aimed for enosis, union between Cyprus and Greece. The unaccommodating approach of Greece on the Cyprus issue not only paved the road for the end of Greek junta (1967-1974) but also for the eventual collapse of southern flank of NATO in 1975.

The third article was written by Ph.D.-candidate Çiğdem Billur and Assistant Professor Dr. Emre İşeri who is affiliated with the Department of International Relations at Kadir Has University in İstanbul, Turkey. In their article they deal with the states in the Black Sea region which have been facing security challenges with roots going back to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this process, Turkey as a NATO-member and EU-candidate is becoming a regional power and it is argued it needs to play a significant role in transforming the region. Against this backdrop, the paper argues that EU-anchor is critical for Turkey to enhance peace and stability in the region by assisting region states to materialize their transformation process through democratization.

¹ Drs. Armand Sag is editor-in-chief of International Review of Turkish Studies and also works as a senior researcher at Institute for Turkish Studies, where he is chairman of the board.

The last article is from Betül Açıkgöz who is a lecturer in the Department of the History of Atatürk's Principles and Revolution at Fatih University in İstanbul, Turkey as well as a Ph.D.-candidate at the Institute for Modern Turkish History of Bosporus University in İstanbul, Turkey. The increasing exploitation of child labor led the Turkish state to make a new legislation to prevent it. This paper intends to seek for the validity and coherence of the law issued in 2001, which allows the traditional way of apprentice training to continue in the context of modern industry and businesses. The comparison to EU-countries will also be a part of the paper to shed light on the issue on an international scope.

Closing word

With these articles and talented scholars, the staff of IRTS sincerely hopes to have served the academic world. This having been said, the staff is proud to present the seventh issue of International Review of Turkish Studies.

Fall 2012 (September 20th, 2012)

The logo consists of the letters 'TCE' in a white, serif font, with a small 'TM' trademark symbol to the upper right of the 'E'. This text is centered within a solid red rectangular background.

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The Impact of Al-Ṭūsī on the Ottomon Science

Salim Aydüz¹

Abstract: Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's works have always attracted the interest of Ottoman scholars from the earliest days until the last period. Some of his works were translated into Turkish and various annotations or commentaries were written upon them. The fact that some of his books were introduced in the madrasas as textbooks shows the importance of his work. It is important to note that most of al-Ṭūsī's works are being displayed in many libraries of Turkey, especially Istanbul, and in many countries previously governed by the Ottomans in order to understand the broader aspects of his influence. This article examines al-Ṭūsī's work on scientific fields such as mathematics, astronomy, or mineralogy and demonstrates how important he was to the Ottoman world.

Keywords: Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Influence on Ottoman Scientific Literature, Sultan Muhammad II, Hulagu, Alamūt, Maragha, *Sī Fasl*, Marāgha Observatory, *Tadhkira fī 'ilm al-hay'a*.

Introduction

Naṣīr al-Dīn Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Muḥammad ibn Muhammad b. Ḥasan Abū Bakr al-Ṭūsī (1201–1274) was a polymath scholar of science and philosophy who wrote many books in diverse areas of learning such as astronomy, mathematics, medicine, music, logic, physiology, philosophy, literature, geography, theology and the occult sciences. He also founded and directed the famous Marāgha observatory, one of the largest astronomical observatories in the Islamic world.²

Born in 1201 in the city of Tus, where he spent his childhood and early youth, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī received his primary education in Arabic, Qur'an, and Hadīth from his father Wadīh al-Dīn Muhammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Ṭūsī. He continued his studies at Nīshāpūr, between 1213 and 1221, learning mathematics, natural sciences, Ibn Sīnā's philosophy and medicine from such well-known scholars of the era as Kutb al-Dīn al-Misrī and Farīd Dāmād. Al-Ṭūsī then went to Iraq, where he studied jurisprudence with Mu'īn al-Dīn Sālim b. Badrān al-Māzinī. Later he studied at Mawsil with the mathematician and astronomer

¹ Lecturer at Fatih University, Turkey and Senior Researcher at the Foundation for Science, Technology and Civilisation, UK.

² Salim Aydüz, "Rasathane," in İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 34 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 2007), 456-458.

Kamāl al-Dīn ibn Yūnus (1156-1242).³ We have the impression that al-Ṭūsī was a passionate, freethinking researcher with an expansive wisdom, wide imagination and sharp memory even at a young age.⁴

After completing his education, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī arrived in Kūhistan at the invitation of Naṣīr Muhtasham, the Ismāʿīlī governor, and gained a great deal of respect among the Ismāʿīlīs, also influencing them with his ideas. Their relationship, however, soured with time, and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī was then kept under surveillance in the castle of Alamut under the control of the Ismāʿīlīs for twenty-two years. There, despite his harsh living conditions, he produced his most important works on astronomy, philosophy, logic and related areas of science.

In 1256, when the Ismāʿīlīs were defeated by Hūlāgū, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī regained his freedom and became advisor to the Moghol ruler. In 1258, he obtained permission from Hūlāgū to build the Marāgha observatory and began to make observations after its completion in 1259. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī remained in his position there during the regency of Abaka Khān, Hūlāgū's

3 Abu'l-Faṭḥ Kamal al-Dīn Mūsā ibn Yunis ibn Muḥammad ibn Manṣūr al-Shāfiʿī (1156-1242), born in Mosul, pupil in Baghdad, taught in Mosul; mathematician, physician, and theologian. He died in Mosul. He became famous for solving a problem on the quadrature of segment of a circle that was proposed by the ambassador of Emperor Frederick II. B. A. Rosenfeld and E. İhsanoğlu, *Mathematicians, Astronomers, and Other Scholars of Islamic Civilization and Their Works (7th–19th c.)* (İstanbul: IRCICA, 2003), no. 576.

4 Salih Zeki, *Asar-ı Bakiye*, vol. 1, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1329), 178–183; G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 2/2, (Baltimore: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1931), 1001–1013; Aydın Sayılı, *The Observatory in Islam* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1960), 28; Hamit Dilgan, *Büyük Türk Alimi Nasireddin Tusi* (İstanbul: İstanbul Teknik Üniversitesi Mimarlık Fakültesi, 1968); C. A. Storey, *Persian Literature: A Bio-Bibliographical Survey* (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1972), 52–60; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "al-Ṭūsī, Muhammad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hasan," in *Dictionary of Scientific Bibliography*, vol. 13 (New York, 1981), 508–514; J. Ruska and R. Strothmann, "ḥūsī," *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 12 (İstanbul: MEB, 1988), 132–134; Cevat İzgi, *Osmanlı Medreselerinde İlim*, vol. 1, (İstanbul: İz Yayınları, 1997), 288; F. Jamil Ragep, "Al-Ṭūsī, Naṣīr al-Dīn: As scientist," In *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., vol. 10 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2000), 750–752; F. Jamil Ragep, "Ṭūsī: Abū Ja'far Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn al-ḥasan Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī," in *Biographical Encyclopaedia of Astronomers*, ed. Thomas Hockey, vol. 2, (New York: Springer, 2007), 1153–1155; Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, *op. cit.*, 606.

successor, and died in Bagdad in 1274.⁵ He was a great figure in the Islamic scientific tradition and a key contributor to both political and intellectual life during a century that witnessed enormous changes in the world.

His Works

*Works of al-Ṭūsī on Science*⁶

- *Sharḥ al-Muḥaṣṣal* (Commentary on “Results”).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb usūl al-handasa li-Uqlīdis* (Exposition of the Book “Elements of Geometry” of Euclid) = *Taḥrīr Usūl Uqlīdis* (Exposition of Euclid’s “Elements”) = *Taḥrīr Uqlīdis fi ʿilm al-handasa* (Exposition of Euclid on the Science of Geometry).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb al-muʿayyāt li-Uqlīdis* (Exposition of the Book “Data” of Euclid).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb taksīr al-dāʾira li Arshimīdis* (Exposition of the Book “On Measuring Circle” of Archimedes).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb al-kura waʾl-usṣuwāna li Arshimīdis* (Exposition of the “Book on Sphere and Cylinder” of Archimedes).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb al-maʾkhūdhāt li Arshimīdis* (Exposition of the “Book of Lemmas” of Archimedes).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb al-kura al-mutaḥarrrika li Uṣūlūqus* (Exposition of the «Book on Moving Sphere» of Autolycus).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb al-ukar li Thawdhūsyūs* (Exposition of the Book “Spherics” of Theodosius).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb al-kuriyyāt li Mā-nālāwus* (Exposition of the Book “Spherics” of Menelaus).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb maʾrifa misāḥa al-ashkāl al-basīṭa waʾl-kurriyya li Banu Mūsā* (Exposition of the “Book of Knowledge on Measuring Plane and Spherical Figures” of Banu Musa).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb al-Mafrāḍāt li Thābit ibn Qurra* (Exposition of the “Book of Assumptions” of Thabit ibn Qurra).
- *Taḥrīr Kitāb al-Makhrūṭat li Abulūniyūs* (Exposition of the Book “Conic Sections” of Apollonius).
- *Fī muqaddimāt Kitāb al-Makhrūṭāt* (On Premises of the Work «Conic Sections»).

5 Nihat Keklik, “Türk Asıllı Filozoflar,” *Yeni Düşünce Dergisi* 172 (1983), 2-4; B. Spuler, *İran Moğolları Siyaset, İdare ve Kültür İhtanlılar Devri, 1220-1350* trans. C. Köprülü (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1987), 478-479; Ziya Bunyatov, “Azerbaycan,” in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4 (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1991), 321; Tüten Özkaya, “Sovyetler Birliği’nde Nasiruddin-i Tusî’nin Ahlak-i Nasiri Eseri Üzerine Çalışmalar,” *Erdem* 4/10 (1998), 273; S. J. Badakhchani, “Nasir al-Din al-Tusi,” in *Contemplation and Action: The Spiritual Autobiography of a Muslim scholar* = *Sayr wa sulūk* trans. S. J. Badakhchani (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998); Agababa Rizayev, *Nasreddin Tusi: Hayatı, İlmi, Dünya Görüşü* (Baku: 1996), 11.

6 Based on Rosenfeld-Ihsanoglu’s (2003) book, No. 606.

- Kashf al-qinā' 'an asrār al-qattā (Removal of the Veil from Mysteries of [Figure of] Secants).
- Kashf al-qinā' 'an asrār al-Shakl al-qattā' (Removal of the veil from the mysteries of the secants figure).
- al-Risāla al-shāfiya 'an shakk fi'l-khuṭūf al-mutawāziyya (Treatise on Salvation from Doubts about Parallel Lines) = Bayān al-muṣādara al-mashhūra li'l-ḥukamā' (Proof of the Postulate Known to Scientists) - Sharḥ al-muṣādara al-mashhūra fī Kitāb al-Uṣūl ma" dhikr al-barāhīn allatī uqīmat "alayhā (Explanation of the Known Postulate of the Work «Elements» with Exposition of its Established Proof).
- Talkhīṣ al-Shāfi' (Abridgement of" al-Shafi ").
- Jāmi' (Jawāmi') al-ḥisāb bi'l-takht wa'l-turāb (Collection of Arithmetic by Means of Board and Dust).
- Kitāb al-ḍarb wa'l-qisma (Book on Multiplication and Division).
- Risāla fi'l-masāil al-ḥisābiyya fi'l-jabr wa'l-muqābala (Treatise on Arithmetic Problems and Algebra and Almucabala) - Treatise in 2 chapters: 1) on arithmetic, 2) on algebra.
- Risāla fi'l-ḥisāb wa'l-jabr wa'l-muqābala (Treatise on Arithmetic and Algebra and Almucabala).
- Fawā'id-i Ṭūsī dar jabru mūqābala (Uses of al-TusT in Algebra and Almucabala).
- Risāla fī (bayān annahū) lā yumkinu an yajtami'a min "adadayn murabba'ayn 'adad murabba' (Treatise on Proving the Impossibility of a Square Number being the Sum of two Odd Square Numbers to be a Square Number).
- Mi'at mas'ala wa khamisa min Uṣūl Uqlīdis (Hundred and Five Problems from Euclid's «Elements»).
- Sharḥ-i Ashkāl al-ta'sīs (Commentary on "Propositions of Substantiation").
- Answer to al-Hanafi - Answer to al-Hanafi's letter.
- Ḥawāshī "alā Uqlīdis (Comments to Euclid).
- Kitāb al-zafar fi'l-jabr wa'l-muqābala (Book of Victory in Algebra and Almucabala).
- Fī ḥarakāt al-daḥraja wa'l-nisba bayna mustawī wa munḥanī (On Motion of Rolling and Ratio between Straight and Curved Lines).
- Tasfīḥ al-kura (Projecting the Sphere onto a Plane).
- al-Farā'id "alā madhhab ahl al-bayt (Inheritance According to the Opinion of Ahl al-Bayl).
- Taḥrīr al-Majisī (Exposition of «Almagest»).
- Taḥrīr Kitāb Ṣāhirāt al-falak li Uqlīdis (Exposition of the Book "Celestial Phenomena" of Euclid).
- Taḥrīr Kitāb al-tulū' wa'l-ghurūb li Uṣūlūqus (Exposition of the «Book of Risings and Settings» of Autolycus).
- Taḥrīr Kitāb fī jirmay al-nayyirayn wa'l-bu'd baynahumā li Arisṭarkhus (Exposition of "Book on the Sizes of the Sun and the Moon and the Distance between Them"

- by Aristarchus).
- Taḥrīr Kitāb al-Ayām wa'l-layālī li Thawdhūsyus (Exposition of the "Books of Days and Nights" by Theodosius).
 - Taḥrīr Kitāb al-Masākin li Thawdhūsyus (Exposition of the "Book of Settlements" of Theodosius).
 - Taḥrīr Kitāb fi'l-Maḡālī li Ibsiqlāus (Exposition of the «Book of Ascensions" of Hypsicles).
 - Zīj-i İlkhānī (Ilkhanid Zij).
 - al-Risāla al-Mu'īniyya fi 'ilm al-hay'a (Treatise on astronomy for Mu'in al-Dīn).
 - Al-Tadhkira al-Nāṣiriyya fi 'ilm al-hay'a (Naṣīr [al-Dīn]'s Memoir on Science of Astronomy).
 - Zubdat al-idrak fi hay'at al-aflāk (Essence of Knowledge of Astronomy of Celestial Spheres).
 - Pursish u pāsukh (Question and Answer).
 - Risāla-yi Nāṣiriyya (Treatise of Nasir al-Din).
 - Risāla-yi bīst bāb dar ma'rifat-i asṭurlāb (Treatise in Twenty Chapters on Knowledge of Astrolabe).
 - Risāla fi kayfiyyāt-i isti'lām istifā'-i asṭurlāb (Treatise on Properties of Knowledge on the Use of the Astrolabe).
 - Sī faṣl dar ma'rifat-i taqwīm (Thirty Chapters on Knowledge of the Calendar).
 - Mukhtaṣar fi 'ilm al-tanjīm wa ma'rifat al-taqwīm (Concise [Book] on the Science of Astrology and Knowledge of the Calendar).
 - Risāla rub" mujayyab (Treatise on the Sine-Quadrant).
 - Risāla muta'allaqa Risāla Mu'īniyya (Treatise to Be Added to the Treatise for Mu'in al-Dīn).
 - Ḥall-i mushkilāt-i Mu'īniyya (Resolution of Difficulties [in the Treatise] for Mu'in al-Dīn).
 - Sharḥ-i Risāla-yi Mu'īniyya (Commentary on Treatise for Mu'in al-Dīn).
 - Qā'ida (The Rule).
 - Risāla fi awā'il faṣl al-qamar (Treatise on Principles of Phases of the Moon).
 - Zubdat al-hay'a Essence of Astronomy).
 - Risāla-yi dar usṭurlāb (Treatise on the Astrolabe).
 - Ikhtiyārāt al-nujūm (Selections on Stars).
 - Ikhtiyārāt-i qamar fi burūj-i ithnay "ashara (Selections on the Moon in Twelve Zodiacal Signs) = Ikhtiyārāt-i masīr al-qamar (Selections on the Movement of the Moon).
 - Madkhal-i manzūm (Introduction [to Astronomy and Astrology] in Verses).
 - Risālat samt al-Qibla (Treatise on Determining the Azimuth of Qibla).
 - Risālat samt al-Qibla Tabrīz (Treatise on Determining the Azimuth of Qibla in Tabriz).
 - Kitāb Uqlīdis fi'l-thikl wa'l-khiffa wa qiyās al-ajrām ba'ḍuhā ilā ba'ḍin ([Exposition of] the Book of Euclid on Gravity and Lightness and Comparison of Some Bodies with Others).

- *Taḥrīr Kitāb al-Manāẓir li Uqlīdis* (Exposition of the “Book of Optics” of Euclid).
- *Risāla fī in’ikās al-shu’ā’āt wa in’iḥāfiḥā* (Treatise on Reflection and Refraction of Light Rays).
- *Qaws-i quzaḥ* (Rainbow).
- *Risāla fī l-ḥarr wa l-burūda* (Treatise on Hot and Cold).
- *Tuḥfat al-nāẓirīn* (Gift to Observers).
- *Kitāb fīl-musīqa* (Book on Music).
- *Tansūq-nāma-yi ilkhānī* (Ilkhanid Mineralogy). = *Jawāhir-nāma* (Book on Precious Stones).

The Impact of al-Ṭūsī on the Ottoman World

Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī was one of the most prolific authors of the Islamic medieval period, writing, in Persian and Arabic, over 150 works (excluding his poetry) on both religious and secular topics. In the Islamic world, he was a well-recognized scholar whose important place in the Ottoman scientific literature is attested by the facts that his books were used in the madrasas as textbooks and multiple copies were kept in many Ottoman libraries⁷.

Utilized and translated into Turkish by numerous Ottoman scholars from the time of the formation of the State, his works, including annotations, were copied and became the source for several works based upon them. In addition, some observational tools that Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s had developed in the Marāgha observatory were copied and updated by Tāqī al-Dīn Rasīd in İstanbul in the late sixteenth century,⁸ demonstrating that al-Ṭūsī was influential not only in the literature of the Ottoman world, but also in developing astronomical devices. Besides commentaries and translations, direct copies of al-Ṭūsī’s works were made, including copies of the so-called *Kitāb al-Mutawassitat bain al-handasa wa l-hay’a* (The middle-books between geometry and astronomy) redacted by al-Ṭūsī, a collection of Greek and Arabic classics in astronomy, mechanics and music⁹ which one had to study, along with the *Elements* and the *Almagest*, to become an accomplished mathematician.¹⁰ One such copy was produced at

7 According to Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu (2003), there are 300 copies of al-Ṭūsī’s manuscripts in the Turkish libraries. Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, op. cit., no. 606.

8 Sevīm Tekeli, “Nasiruddin, Takiyuddin ve Tycho Brahe’nin Rasat Aletlerinin Mukayesesi,” Ankara Üniversitesi, Dil, Tarih ve Coğrafya Dergisi, 16 (1958), 301-393.

9 There are nineteen manuscripts named *Ta’likāt* about al-Ṭūsī’s book in İstanbul Harbiye Military Museum (Askeri Müze, nr. 82).

10 Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 2/2, 1001-2.

the request of the Ottoman Sultan Muhammad II in 1477–1478.¹¹

The works that influenced Ottoman astronomy and Ottoman astronomical literature were those of scholars belonging to the Marāgha, the Samarkand and the Egyptian astronomy-mathematics schools, most notably Naşir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī, the head of the Marāgha school. In fact, Ottoman astronomers considered Al-Ṭūsī's al-Tadhkira and its commentaries so important that most theoretical books written on astronomy in the Ottoman world were based on these studies. The Ottoman astronomical tradition was clearly heavily dependent upon the earlier traditions of Iran and Central Asia, in which the influence of the "Marāgha School" and especially of Naşir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī is most evident. For example, Muhammad Shāh al-Fanārī's Unmūdhaj al-'Ulūm, 'Alā al-Dīn 'Alī al-Qushjī's al-Fathiyya fī 'ilm al-hay'a, Sīdī 'Alī's Hulāsat al-hay'a and many other books on astronomy were based mainly on his al-Tadhkira. Apart from the scientific works of al-Ṭūsī, many of his writings on philosophy and religious matters also commonly circulated among Ottoman scholars for centuries, including al-Tadhkira al-Nāsiriyya, Sī Fasl, Bist Bāb and Tahrīr al-Majistī etc.

Sī Fasl dar Ma'rifat-i Taqwīm

The title of Sī Fasl dar Ma'rifat-i Taqwīm (Thirty chapters on the knowledge of the calendar), which was written initially in Persian, shows its subject and purpose.¹² Also known as Risāla-i Sī Fasl and one of the most widely known works of Naşir al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī on calendar making, the work was written in the State of Assassins.¹³ Its chapter 1 concerns literal numeration; chapters 2-6 discuss calendars and eras, including the Jalali calendar of Khayyām (1048–1131); chapters 7-16 treat the Sun, the Moon, and the planets; and chapters 17-30 take up astrological problems.

The book was translated into Turkish by Ahmed-i Dāi of Germiyan¹⁴ (d. after 1421) and used by Ottoman scholars in the madrasas as a textbook on astronomy and calendar making. The number of annotations from both the pre-and post-

11 İhsan Fazlıoğlu, "Osmanlı Döneminde Geometri," accessed June 22, 2011, <http://www.ihsanfazlioglu.net/yayinlar/makaleler/1.php?id=134>.

12 Nasir Al-Din Ṭūsī, Sī Fasl dar Ma'rifat-i Taqwīm, Topkapı Palace Museum Library, III Ahmed, nr. 3455, folios 57b-67b. Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, op. cit., no. 606.

13 The State of Assassins was an order founded by Hasan-i Şabbāh in Persia and Syria that existed from around 1090 to 1256. Azim Nanji, "Nizāriyya," in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, new edition, vol. 8, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 84.

14 Yaşar Akdoğan, "Ahmed-i Dāi," in Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi, vol. 1, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 169–171.

Ottoman eras and the relatively high number of translations made during the Ottoman era indicate how frequently it was used. Between 1649 and 1650, for example, Hajji Khālifa advised his students to read *Sī Fasl*.¹⁵ Twenty-six surviving copies are on display in various libraries throughout Turkey. Ibrahim Hakki of Erzurum also mentions *Tartīb al-Ulūm* in his book *Ma'rifatnāmā*, showing how common this work was at madrasas in the eighteenth century. Among the commentaries on '*Sī Fasl*' during the Ottoman period were *Sharhu Sī Fasl* (in Arabic), written by 'Abd al-Wācid b. Muhammad al-Kutahī (d. 1435) and translated later on into Turkish by Ahmed-i Rācī;¹⁶ *Muvaddhhih al-Rusūm fī 'ilm al-Nujūm* (in Persian), with a commentary by Dellakoğlu (d. 1495) in 1478 and dedicated to Sultan Muhammad II (1451-1481);¹⁷ and *Mukhtasar dar Ma'rifat Taqwīm* (in Persian), written by Hızır-Shah al-Mantashavī (d. 1449).¹⁸

*Tarjama-i Sī Fasl*¹⁹ is the translation of *Sī Fasl* into Turkish by Ahmed-i Dāī of Germiyan.²⁰ The introduction indicates that it was a textbook in the Ottoman madrasas²¹ and dedicates the translation to Sultan Celebi Muhammad (1413-1421).²² There are two different editions of this translation.²³ I. H. Ertaylan first published the translation with Turkish transliteration as *Eşkāl-i Nāsir-i Tūsī Tercumesi* (İstanbul 1952). Later, it was published again by Muammer Dizer

15 İzgi, op. cit., vol. 1, 260–70.

16 E. İhsanoğlu et al., *History of Astronomical Literature during the Ottoman Period (OALT)*, vol. 1, (İstanbul: IRCICA, 1997), 22–24.

17 In the copy of manuscript in the Süleymaniye Library (Ayasofya, MS 2709), the commentator added sixty-eight tables and figures to show how to use it. See OALT, vol. 1, 63–64.

18 OALT, vol. 1, 25.

19 There are five copies of the translation by Ahmed-i Dai in Bosphorus University, Kandilli Observatory Library: 132/6; 388/2; 371/2; 478; 64/9. See Günay Kut, *Kandilli Rasathanesi El Yazmaları 1: Türkçe Yazmalar* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2007), nos. 84–88.

20 Ahmed-i Dāī also translated al-Ṭūsī's book *Jamasbnāma* into Turkish. This book mentions the life of Jamasb, son of the Prophet Daniel. There is only one copy of this MS: İstanbul University, Literature Faculty, Türk Dili ve Edebiyatı, Seminer Library, MS 4028. This translation was published by I. H. Ertaylan as a facsimile (İstanbul, 1952).

21 In the prologue, it says in Turkish: "... Ba'zı muhtedilere müşkil oldugıycun Türkī dile tercume eyleduk." See Bayezid Umumi, MS 4604/1. İzgi, op. cit., vol. 2, 421–425; OALT, vol. 1, 3–4; Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, op. cit., No. 809.

22 OALT, vol. 1, 2–5.

23 See the other manuscript copies of the translation in these libraries: İstanbul University Library, TY, MS 9807/1, 15 folios; Nuruosmaniye Library, MS 4912; idem, MS 4921 and idem, MS 4971/17.

and T. N. Gencan with Turkish transliteration, footnotes and explanations.²⁴ *Tarjama-i Mukhtasar dar Ma'rifat-i Taqwīm*, a translation of Naşır al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's book on calendar making, has seven chapters, so it might actually be an abridged version of *Si Fasl*. It is the first book on calendar making during the Ottoman period. The only known copy of the book contains the year 1397.²⁵ *Tarjama-i Sharh-i Sī Fasl*,²⁶ the Turkish translation of Abd al-Wācid Kutāhī's (d. 1435) commentary on *Sī Fasl* (*Sharh Sī Fasl*), was made by Ahmed-i Rācī (c. 1621) with the encouragement of Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha (d. 1622) son of Grand Vizier Sokullu Mehmed Pasha (1506 - 1579).²⁷ In the Ottoman world, al-Ṭūsī's tables were also extensively used for calendar making and other activities related to astronomy and astrology. In the book *Istikhrāj Dustūr* by Osman Efendizāde Abdullah Efendi (d. 1780), for instance, there are ru'yat al-ahilla's (crescents observation) tables for the year 1754–55 according to al-Ṭūsī's tables for İstanbul's longitude.²⁸

Tahrīr Kitāb usūl al-Handasa li-Uqlīdis

This very important treatise in the Arabic Euclidean tradition of geometry is the recension (*tahrir*) in Arabic by al-Ṭūsī of the *Elements* of Euclid. Known in general under the title *Tahrīr Kitāb usūl al-Handasa li-Uqlīdis* (Recension of the book *Elements* of Geometry of Euclid), it also had the title *Tahrīr Uqlīdis fī 'ilm al-Handasa* (Recension or exposition of Euclid on the science of geometry") in some copies.²⁹ Although Euclid's *Elements* (*Kitāb al-Usūl*) and commentaries on it were extensively used in the Islamic world, Naşır al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Tahrīr Usūl al-Handasa*, completed in 1248, was the most successful

24 For the Turkish translation in the Latin alphabet, see Muammer Dizer and T. N. Gencan, *Muhtasar fī 'ilm El-tenjim ve Ma'rifet El-Takvim* (*Risale-i Si Fasl*), trans. Ahmed-i Dai, transliteration M. Dizer-T. N. Gencan (İstanbul: Kandilli Rasathanesi Yayınları, 1984).

25 Süleymaniye Library, Reisulkuttab, MS 582/3, folios 22b-28a; OALT, vol. 1, 4–5; İzgi op. cit., vol. 1, 260–270.

26 Süleymaniye Library, Hacı Mahmud, MS 4229/2; Carullah, MS 2108.

27 This book was registered at the library of Süleyman Sudi Efendi as *Tusi'nin Si Fasl nam Risalesi*, but the translator's name was cited only as Ahmed with the date 1769. See Süleyman Sudi, *Tabakatu'l-Müneccimin* ed. Salim Aydüz (İstanbul: Fatih Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), 160–170; Salim Aydüz, "Süleyman Sudi Efendi'nin Kütüphanesi," in *Essays in Honour of Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu*, compiled by M. Kaçar and Zeynep Durukal (İstanbul: IRCICA, 2006), 775–812; OALT, vol. 1, 266–7.

28 Osman Efendizāde Abdullah Efendi, *Istikhrāj-i Dustūr*, Bosphorus University, Kandilli Observatory Library, MS 427, folio 10a.

29 Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, op. cit., no. 606.

and valuable of the works on Euclidean geometry.³⁰

According to Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Tahrīr* and the commentaries of al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (1340-1413) were used after the thirteenth century as the main course book for geometry in the madrasas in both the Islamic world and the Ottoman State.³¹ Theoretical studies on geometry during Ottoman times also were based mainly on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's *Tahrīr* and on Ibn Sartāk's *al-Iqmāl fī al-Handasa*.³² Kawakib-i Sab'a reports that students were taught "Euclid's Book" (*Tahrīr Kitāb usūl al-Handasa li-Uqlīdis*) ranking at *istikṣā*, after *Sharhu Ashkāl al-Ta'sīs* ranking at *iktisar*.³³

In the geometry section of his *De La Littérature des Turcs*, Abbé Toderini describes geometry instruction in the Ottoman madrasas:

Geometry falls under the group of Turkish studies. In academies (madrasa), there are professors (mudarris) for teaching it [geometry] to young people. The period between mathematics and rhetoric classes is allocated to this mathematical branch... This science is taught in a special manner. I have been to the Valide Madrasa twice, during which time students had gathered to listen to the geometry class. They used an Arabic translation of Euclid. There are many versions as well as commentaries of this book. Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's commentary, which is regarded as the best of these, has already become popular thanks to the Medicis Publishing House. This copy contains a copy of the Turkish license granted by Sultan Murad III (1574-1595) in İstanbul in 1587.³⁴ He has granted permission for the sale of this book without any tax or

30 Gregg de Young, "The *Tahrīr Kitāb Usūl Uqlīdis* of Naṣīr al-Dīn Tusi: Its sources," in *Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Arabisch- Islamischen Wissenschaften*. Band 18, 2008–2009 (Frankfurt am Main: Institut für Geschichte der Arabisch-Islamischen Wissenschaften), 1-72.

31 Aydın Sayılı, "Turkish Contributions to and Reform in Higher Education and Huseyin Rifki and His Work in Geometry," *Ankara Üniversitesi Yıllığı* 12 (1972), 89-98; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Modern Dünyada Geleneksel İslam* trans. Savaş Şafak Barkçın and Hüsamettin Arslan (İstanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 1989), 189.

32 İhsan Fazlıoğlu, "İlhâf'tan Enmüze'ce Fetih'ten önce Osmanlı Ülkesi'nde Matematik İlimler," in *International Symposium on Molla Fanari* (4-6 December 2009 Bursa) ed. T. Yücedoğru et. al., (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi: 2010), 131-176.

33 *Tahrir Usul li-Uqlīdis* was printed in Matbaa-i Amire in İstanbul in 1216 H (1801) in 222 pages; it was later printed in 1824 in Calcuta, in 1876 in Fez in two volumes, and in Iran at an unknown date.

34 This book was printed in Roma: *Kitab Tahrir Usul li-Uqlīdis min ta'lif khwaja Nasir al-Din al-Tusi. Euclidis elementorum geometricorum libri tredecim. Ex traditione doctissimi Nasiridini Tusini. Nunc primum Arabice impressi* (Romae: in Typographia Medicea, 1594).

liability within the entire Ottoman territory...³⁵

Other records confirm that the *Tahrîr Kitâb usûl al-Handasa li-Uqlîdis* was used in the Ottoman teaching of geometry. For example, Munajjimhashi Mustafa Zeki al-İstanbulî (d. 1739) was tutored with the book in 1712 by La'lîzâde 'Abdulbâkî b. Muhammad b. Ibrâhim (d. 1746), Yanyalı As'ad Efendi with Usûl-i Uqlîdis by Munajjimash Muhammad Efendi (d. 1668), and Hasan al-Jabartî (d. 1774) at his home with Tahrîr Uqlîdis by Husâm al-Dîn al-Hindî in 1731.³⁶

As to the commentaries on Tahrîr Usûl al-Handasa li-Uqlîdis, Hajji Khâlîfa reports that the Ottomans scholars al-Sayyid al-Sharîf al-Jurjânî and Kadîzâde-i Rûmî had written one commentary each and that Kadîzâde's commentary went as far as the seventh treatise.³⁷ During the Ottoman period, the first study on the Tahrîr, İlkhâku Abu Ishâq, by Abû Ishâq Abdullah al-Kirmânî in the fifteenth century, meticulously annotated the first four treatises of the Tahrîr.³⁸ A later study on the Tahrîr by the chief astronomer Munajjimhashi Darwish Ahmed Dede b. Lutfullah (d. 1702), titled Tahrîr al-Fawâ'id (in Arabic), is referred to as Ta'lîkât 'alâ Uqlîdis (Notes on Euclid) in some sources.³⁹ Darwish Ahmed compiled this study from the original notes al-Ṭūsî made on the manuscripts on which he worked. An additional work on the Tahrîr, the Sharh Ba'd al-Makalât al-Uklîdisiyya (in Arabic) by Bedruddin Muhammad b. As'ad b. Alî b. 'Osmân b. Mustafâ al-Yanyavî al-Islambolî (d. 1733), son of Yanyalı As'ad Efendi,⁴⁰ is not covered in the literature. Containing some problems on Euclidian geometry, this book is, however, one of the most important works on Euclidian geometry produced during the Ottoman period.⁴¹

35 M. L'Abbè Toderini, de la Litterature des Turcs, Traduit de l'Italien en Francois par Tournant trans. M. L'abbé De Cournand, vol. 1, (Paris: Poincot, 1789), 100-105.

36 İzgi, op. cit., vol. 1, 190-200.

37 Salih Zeki, Kâmûs-i Riyâziyyât, vol. 1, (İstanbul: Karabet Matbaası, 1315), 139.

38 E. İhsanoğlu et al., History of Mathematical Literature during the Ottoman Period (OMLT), vol. 1, (İstanbul: IRCICA, 1999), 31-32; OALT, vol. 1, 222-3.

39 OMLT, vol. 1, 161-165. Darwish Ahmed Dede b. Lutfullah provides very important information in the prologue of the MS and explains how he managed to write this book. The only copy of the MS is at Bayezid State Library, Umumi, MS 4590/1, folios. 1-29.

40 Bursalı Mehmed Tahir, Osmanlı Müellifleri, vol. 3, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Âmire, 1342), 257.

41 In the introduction of this MS, Bedruddin Muhammad mentions the names of Sultan Ahmed III, Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha and Shaikh al-Islam Ebezâde Abdullah Efendi. In the introduction to his work, he claims to have spent some time working on geometry, that he trisected angles, divided circles in seven and arcs in six parts and solved many problems which had not been solved until his time. The figures were given on the sides of the book. The only copy of the book is at Bayezid State Library, Umumi, MS 9787.

Risālat-i bīst bāb dar maʿrifat-i asturlāb

Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's work in the field of the astrolabe was one of the books most used, studied and taught in Ottoman *madrasas*,⁴² and fifty-two copies survive in Turkish libraries. Its Persian title *Risālat-i bīst bāb dar maʿrifat-i asturlāb*, translates as *Treatise in twenty chapters on the knowledge of the astrolabe*.⁴³ In his *Tartīb-i Ulūm*, Erzurumlu İbrāhīm Hakkı recommended this book to *madrasa* students: "regard the astrolabe as one of the applied sciences / Fly with *Bīst Bāb* to watch the solar system." It also was taught by Hajji Khālifa to many students between 1649 and 1650.⁴⁴

The commentariy on *Bīst bāb*, *Sharh-i bīst bāb dar maʿrifat-i asturlāb* (in Persian), was written by Muhammad b. Hacı b. Süleymān al-Bursavī (d. c. 1495), also known as Efezāde, and was presented to Sultan Bayezid II (1481-1512).⁴⁵ *Sharh-i bīst bāb dar maʿrifat-i ʿamal-i asturlāb* (in Persian) by al-Birjandī (d. c. 1528-9) in 1494 was taught at *madrasas*. There exist approximately thirty copies of it.⁴⁶ The translation of *Bīst Bāb* into Turkish, *Tarjama-i bīst bāb*, was made by an anonymous translator who explains in the introduction that it was done for Ayaz Aga, a member of the entourage of the sultan. This person is probably Ayaz Pasha, who served as Janissary Aga and Grand Vizier in the time of Yavuz Sultan Selim (1512-1520) and Süleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566).⁴⁷ *Nuzhat al-Tullāb fī ʿilm al-asturlāb* (in Arabic) was translated from the Persian by Haydar b. ʿAbdurrahmān al-Husaynī al-Jazarī (d. c. 1689). There are currently forty-three known copies of this book.⁴⁸ *Risāla-i fī maʿrifat-i sihhat al-Asturlāb* (in Arabic) was translated in 1716 by an unknown person.⁴⁹ It includes chapters on whether the astrolabe was built accurately and showing fixed stars in the constellation of the Spider. In addition, part of *Bīst Bāb* was translated into Turkish by İbrāhīm b. Halīl al-Erzurumī al-Haddādī, also known as "Yakdast," who translated the section on "Signs of Twenty-Seven Stars" at the end of *Bīst Bāb*.⁵⁰

42 Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 2/2, 1006.

43 Al-Ṭūsī, *Bīst Bāb der Maʿrifet-i Usturlāb*, Süleymaniye Library, Veliyyuddin, MS 2269/2, folios 24a-44b; Ayasofya, MS 2620 [see figure 2]. Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, op. cit., no. 606.

44 Kātip Çelebi, *Mizān al-Haqq fī ihtiyār al-ahaqq*, ed. O. Ş. Gökyay (İstanbul: Tercüman Gazetesi, 1980), 120.

45 Süleymaniye Library, Ayasofya, nr. 2641 [see figure 3].

46 OALT, vol. 1, 107-8.

47 OALT, vol. 1, 788.

48 OALT, vol. 1, 351-3.

49 Süleymaniye Library, Yahya Tevfik, MS 244/3.

50 Süleymaniye Library, Selimiye, MS 1001/2, folios 8b-10b.

Al-Tadhkira al-Nasīriyya fī ‘ilm al-hay’a

Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s four-chapter *Al-Tadhkira al-Nasīriyya fī ‘ilm al-hay’a* (Naṣīr al-Dīn’s memoir on the science of astronomy),⁵¹ one of the most original and influential Arabic works in astronomy, is intended to disclose the principles of astronomy to the general reader, hence its title as *Tadhkira* (Memoir). Describing Ptolemaic concepts, such as the epicycle theory, and introducing new planetary models, it is placed at the heart of the Islamic astronomical tradition. *Al-Tadhkira* was one of the two books that the Samarkand school of mathematics/astronomy studied, read, taught, discussed and commented on the most, and it was also used as a textbook at Samarkand Madrasa.⁵²

Among the Ottoman madrasas, the most common version of *Al-Tadhkira* was Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī’s commentary. The most famous of the many in the Muslim world, however, is that of al-Birjandī, which was used in Iranian madrasas and remains popular today. Another widespread commentary on *Al-Tadhkira* was produced under the name *Tavdhīh al-Tadhkira* by Nizām al-Dīn A’raj al-Nishābūrī.⁵³ While Taşköprülüzāde places this work in the group of compendia, Hajjī Khālifa puts it under the heading *Al-Tadhkira al-Nasīriyya fī ‘ilm al-hay’a*, explaining that it is a compendium containing issues and certain findings in astronomy. Twenty copies are found in Turkish libraries.

Fathullah Shirwānī (d. 1486) first wrote commentaries on the works of his mentor Kadızāde-i Rūmī before he penned additional commentaries on Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī’s *Al-Tadhkira al-Nasīriyya fī ‘ilm al-hay’a*. Building on the earlier commentaries by al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī and Nizām al-Dīn al-A’raj al-Nishābūrī, Shirwānī wrote *Sharh al-Tadhkira fī ‘ilm al-hay’a*⁵⁴ (in Arabic), completed in 1475, to offer a complete textbook to his students.⁵⁵ Some of its chapters also tell the reader about the Ulugh Beg Madrasa and his own student years there, and a 54-page appendix following the first chapter is almost an individual book on optics. *Sharh al-Tadhkira fī ‘ilm al-hay’a* (in

51 Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 2/2, 1007; Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, *op. cit.*, no. 606. F. Jamil Ragep studied this work in his PhD dissertation at Harvard University. F. Jamil Ragep, “Comography in the ‘Tadhkira’ of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī,” (PhD diss., Harvard University), 1-2.

52 İhsan Fazlıoğlu, “Osmanlı felsefe-biliminin arkaplanı: Semerkand matematik-astronomi okulu,” *Dīvān İlmî Araştırmalar Dergisi* 14 (2003), 1-66; İhsan Fazlıoğlu, “The Samarqand Mathematical-Astronomical School: A Basis for Ottoman Philosophy and Science,” *Journal for the History of Arabic Science* 14 (2008), 3-68.

53 Süleymaniye Library, Ragıp Pasa, MS 922.

54 OALT, vol. 1, 44-45.

55 Topkapı Palace Library, Ahmed III, MS 3314, folio 368.

Arabic), authored by al-Birjandi in 1507-8,⁵⁶ was the second most common commentary in the Ottoman world after that of Fathullah Shirwanī. There are more than ten copies of the manuscript in the libraries.⁵⁷

Besides these works, most of Muhammad Shāh al-Fanārī's Unmūdhaj al-'Ulūm closely follows book 1, chapter 3 of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's al-Tadhkira and refers many times to al-Ṭūsī's statements.⁵⁸

Tansuq-nāma-yi İlhānī

One of the most widely used books in mineralogy was Tansugnāme-i İlhānī or Jawāhir-nāma (Book on precious stones) by Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī.⁵⁹ Written in Persian in Marāgha and dedicated it to Hülāgū Khān,⁶⁰ it was known and used in the Ottoman world from the earliest period. Taşköprülüzāde Ahmed Efendi described it as "the most useful and compact text on mineralogy."⁶¹

Unabridged, the book contains seven treatises, each of which is called a Maqāl.⁶² The first treatise contains information about ancient Chinese and Turkish medicine. Others deal with pearl, ruby, emerald, diamond and turquoise, and the seventh provides information on musk, zebād, anbar, sandal, ūd (various perfumes) and camphor as well as on eccentric and bizarre stones.⁶³

According to the summary of Hajji Khālifa, who referred to it as Tansugnāme-i ilhānī, "It is a compendium. It is organized into four treatises; on minerals,

56 Süleymaniye Library, Rasi Efendi, MS 11300, folios 95b-169a.

57 Salih Zeki, Kāmūs-i Riyāziyyāt, vol. 1, 392; İhsan Fazlıoğlu, «Abdulâlî Bircendî," in Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi, vol. 1, (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), 33-34.

58 F. Jamil Ragep, "Astronomy in the Fanārī-Circle: The Critical Background for Qāḍizāde al-Rūmī and the Samarqand School," in International Symposium on Molla Fanari (4-6 December 2009 Bursa) ed. T. Yücedoğru et al. (Bursa: Bursa Büyükşehir Belediyesi, 2010), 165-176.

59 The other most common books in this field are al-Bīrūnī's al-Jamāhir fī Ma'rifat al-Jawāhir and Muhammad b. Mansūr's Jawāhirnāma.

60 Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, op. cit., no. 606.

61 Taşköprülüzāde Ahmed İsmāmeddin, Miftāhu's-Sa'āde ve Misbāhu's-Siyāde, vol. 1, (Haydarābād 1328), 272.

62 E. İhsanoğlu et al., History of the Literature of Natural and Applied Sciences during the Ottoman Period (OTTBLT), vol. 1, (İstanbul: IRCICA, 2006), 18-19.

63 F. Sabih Kutlar studied the translation of the book at Beyazıd Library, MS 614: See F. Sabih Kutlar, "İki Türkçe Cevāhir-Nāme ve Cevherlerin Etkilerine Dair," Yeni Tıp Tarihi Araştırmaları 7 (2001), 17-26. For other copies of the manuscript, see Beyazıd State Library, Veliyuddin, MS 2542: Türk Dili Semineri, MS 4464/1; Amasya, MS 614; Talat, Mecami-Türkī, MS 36; Süleymaniye Library, Laleli, MS 2044/4: Muallim Cevdet, MS K 489. For other copies, see Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, op. cit., no. 606.

precious stones, ores, and fragrant plants.”⁶⁴

This work was translated by Mustafa b. Seydī⁶⁵ for Beylerbeyi Karacabey in the time of Sultan Murad II (1421–1451)⁶⁶ with the title *Tarjama-i Tansugnâme-i Ilhānī* or *Jawāhirnāma-i Sultan Murādī*.⁶⁷ On the cover of the translation, the title is *Tarjama-i Kitāb al-Jawāhir al-Musammā bi-Tansīkh-i Ilhānī*.⁶⁸ This reorganized and abridged adaptation of *Tansugnâme-i Ilhānī* lacks the first, third and fourth treatises of the original text and includes only the second treatise on the characteristics of mineral ores.⁶⁹

That this book was translated into Turkish in the time of Sultan Murad II and that it was included in the bibliography of the book *Yāk'tat al-Mahāzīn fī Jawāhīr al-Ma'ādīn*, written by Yahyā b. Muhammad al-Gaffārī in the name of Prince Korkut, suggest that it was in demand among the Ottomans.⁷⁰

Tahrīr al-Majistī

Just as the *Almagest* was Ptolemy's most influential work in the Islamic world, the *Tahrīr al-Majistī* (*Exposition of the Almagest*)⁷¹ by al-Ṭūsī (in Arabic) was also very popular in the Islamic world. The author states he wrote it with the encouragement of Husām al-Dīn al-Ḥasan b. Muhammad al-Sivāsī, whom al-Ṭūsī calls *sayf al-munādhīrīn* (sword of the debaters). Almost all theoretical astronomy books written in the Ottoman lands referred Al-Ṭūsī's *Tahrīr* as a main reference book, and there are twenty-two known copies of the work in Turkish libraries.

64 Kātip Çelebi, *Kashf al-Zunūn 'an asāmi al-Kutub wa'l-Funūn* ed. M. Serefeddin Yaltkaya and Kilisli Rifat Bilge (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 1941), 495.

65 Ramazan Şeşen, "On beşinci Yüzyılda Türkçeye Tercümeleler," *Mimar Sinan Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi Dergisi*, 1/1 (1991), 228.

66 Mahmud Shirwānī wrote another *Jawharnama* book named *Tuhfa-i Murādī fī asnāf al-jawāhir* for Sultan Murad II in 1428. There are many copies of this book in the libraries. See Süleymaniye Library, Bagdatlı Vehbi, MS 1465; Süleymaniye Library, Ayasofya, MS 3577. For more information about the manuscript, see OTTBLT, 1, 5-9: Muhammad b. Mahmud Şirvanî, *Tuhfe-i Murādī: inceleme-Metin-Dizin*, ed. Mustafa Argunsah (Ankara: Türk Dil Kurumu, 1999).

67 The copy of the manuscript at the Süleymaniye Library is in the collection Laleli, MS 2044/4, folios 56b-66b, written in Diwani calligraphy with vowel points. See OTTBLT, 2, 1264-5.

68 Süleymaniye Library, Laleli, MS 2044/4, folio 56b.

69 Remzi Demir and Mutlu Kılıç, "Cevahirnameler ve Osmanlı Döneminde Yazılmış İki Cevahirname," *Otam, Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi* 14 (2003), 1-64.

70 İzgi, op. cit., vol. 1, 393.

71 Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, op. cit., no. 606.

Nizām al-Dīn al-Nishabūrī wrote a commentary on the work titled Ta'bīr al-Tahrīr. Later, in his Hāshiya 'alā Kitāb al-Majastī (in Arabic) Kadızāde-i Rūmī explained certain sections of the commentary by al-Nishabūrī.⁷² Kashf al-qinā' 'an asrār al-Shakl al-qattā'

The treatise Kashf al-qinā' 'an asrār al-Shakl al-qattā' (Removal of the veil from the mysteries of the secants figure) sometimes bears the titles al-Risālat al-qattā' fī 'ilm al-Handasa (Treatise on secants in the science of geometry) and Kitāb al-shakl al-qattā' (The book on the secant figure). In all manuscripts, it is in Arabic.

According to Sarton, al-Ṭūsī's most original contribution was this treatise on geometry and trigonometry, the very first in which trigonometry was not considered simply a prolegomena to astronomy but for its own sake. The greatest work of its kind until the *De Triangulis omnimodus* (1464) of Regiomontanus (1436-1476) two centuries later, al-Ṭūsī's work was the first systematic trigonometry text in Muslim civilization.⁷³ Hajji Khālifa proposes that it is related to the first figure in the first chapter of Menelaus of Alexandria's (c. 70-140 CE) Kitāb al-Ukar's (*Sphaerica*). It was first written in Arabic and then translated into Persian by the author himself as a five-chapter book.⁷⁴ The number of copies of the Kashf al-qinā' in libraries indicates how commonly and frequently it has been used by scholars.⁷⁵

72 OALT, vol. 1, 7-8.

73 G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 2/1, (Baltimore: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1931), 12; Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 2/2, 754, 1003-4.

74 Salih Zeki, *Kāmūs-i Riyāziyyāt*, vol. 1, 1493.

75 Ramazan Şeşen, *Nawādir al-makhtūtāt al-Arabiyya fī maktabati Turkiyā*, vol. 3, (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Jadid, 1982), 40. There are eighteen copies of the MS of which four are in Süleymaniye Library, Ayasofya, MS 2760, folios 191b-239a; Beşir Ağa MS 440; Carullah MS 1502; Selim MS 743.

Alexandr Carathéodory published an Arabic edition of the text accompanied by a French translation,⁷⁶ and it was translated into Turkish by Celal Saygın (d. 1954),⁷⁷ demonstrating how long the Ottomans remained interested al-Ṭūsī's work.⁷⁸

Tarjama-i al-Bāh al-Shāhiyya wa al-tarkībāt al-Sultaniyya

Kitāb al-bāb al-bāhiya fī al-tarākib al-sultāniya or Bāhnāma-i Pādishāhī or al-Bāh al-Shāhiyya,⁷⁹ written in Persian, is attributed to al-Ṭūsī.⁸⁰ A regimen for the ailing son of the sultan of Qāzān, it is divided into three parts of which the first two deal with dietetics and health rules and the third with sexual intercourse. It was translated from Persian into Turkish for the Ottoman Sultan Murad II by a certain Mūsā b. Mas'ūd,⁸¹ about whom nothing is known.⁸² Consisting of seventeen chapters, the work takes up subjects such as the temperament of humans, aphrodisiacs, sorbets, pastes and healing drugs.⁸³

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76 *Traité du quadrilatère attribué à Nassiruddīn el-Toussy, d'après un manuscrit tiré de la Bibliothèque de S. A. Edhem Pacha (İstanbul, 1891). It was reprinted by Fuat Sezgin: Caratheodory, Alexandre Pacha [Transl.]: Traité du Quadrilatère, attribué à Nassiruddin-El-Toussy (Frankfurt am Main: Institute for the History of Arabic-Islamic Science at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, 1998), (Islamic Mathematics and Astronomy, vol. 47). OMLT, vol. 2, 412–3; Remzi Demir, "Çağdaş Matematiğin Türkiye'ye Girişi (Halifezāde İsmā'īl Efendi'den Sālih Zekī Bey'e Kadar Yapılan Çalışmalara Genel Bir Bakış)," in Sālih Zekī, *Āsār-i Bākiye, Bilginlerin Yaşamları ve Yapıtları*, ed. Melek Dosay Gökdoğan et al., vol. 3 (Ankara: Ebabil Yayıncılık, 2004), 1–45.*

77 *Tarjama-i Kashf al-qīnā' 'an asrār al-Shakl al-qattā'.* There is only one copy of this unpublished manuscript: İzmir National Library, Dolap 32, sıra 39; Dolap 14, sıra 430, Dolap 26, sıra 383. OMLT, vol. 2, 512–4.

78 Rosenfeld and İhsanoğlu, op. cit., No. 606, M13-M14.

79 About Bahnama the book and area of research, see Abdülkadir Özcan, "Bahnāma," in *İslām Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4, (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1991), 489–490.

80 According to İlter Uzel, this book most probably was written by Abu Zayd Mudhaffar. See Mustafa Ebu'l-Feyz, *Tuhfetu'l-Muteehhilin-Evlilik Armağanı*, published and simplified by İlter Uzel (Ankara: Kebikeç Yayınları, 2005), 13–15.

81 According to Sarton, the name of the book is *Kitāb al-bāb al-bāhiyā fī al-tarākib al-sultaniya* or *Bāh-nāma-i shāhī*. It was translated by Salāh al-Dīn of Ankara into Turkish. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 2/2, 1010; G. Sarton, *Introduction to the History of Science*, vol. 3/2, (Baltimore: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1948), 1077, 1215, 1464.

82 Ramazan Şeşen et al., *Fihrisu mahtutat al-tibbi al-islami fī maktabati Turkiya* ed. E. İhsanoğlu. (İstanbul: IRCICA. 1984), 378–380. For other copies of the manuscript, see *Türkiye Kütüphaneleri İslami Tıp Yazmaları Kataloğu* (İstanbul, 1984), 378.

83 For more information about the MS, see Bedii N. Şehsuvaroğlu, "Osmanlı Padişahları ve Bahnāmeler," in *VI. Türk Tarih Kongresi (Bildiriler)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1967), 426–428.

Conclusion

Works of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī have attracted the interest of Ottoman scholars since the earliest days. Some were translated into Turkish, and various annotations or commentaries were written upon them. The fact that some also were used in the madrasas as textbooks shows the importance of his work. A large number of Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's books and the written annotations have lasted until today, most of them on display in Turkish libraries, especially in İstanbul, as well as in many countries previously governed by the Ottomans. Even today, his works hold the center point in Turkish-Islamic history of science and philosophical studies. In fact, historians of science in the Ottoman world, such as Salih Zeki, consider them their main reference books. While this study examining al-Ṭūsī's work in the fields of mathematics, astronomy, and mineralogy has demonstrated how important he was to Ottoman scientific thought, carefully considering his additional works on religion, faith, philosophy and the social sciences will reveal Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's full contribution to European philosophy and science via the Ottoman world.

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The Cyprus Crisis and the Southern Flank of NATO (1960-1975)¹

Tamer Balci²

Abstract: Independence of Cyprus in 1960 ended neither the Greek demand to annex the island to Greece, nor the Turkish demand to divide the island along the ethnic lines. This paper analyzes the policies of major actors on the Cyprus problem in its crucial years from 1960 to 1975. An overall examination of the British, Turkish, Greek, American and the Soviet policies on Cyprus along with the policies of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in this period reveals that all sides except Greece developed alternative policies and proposals to solve the problem. Greece was the only side that did not abandon its Cyprus policy of enosis, union with Greece. The unaccommodating approach of Greece on the Cyprus issue not only paved the road for the end of Greek junta (1967-1974) but also for the eventual collapse of southern flank of NATO in 1975. By 1975, Greece left NATO and Turkey suffered the arms embargo of its NATO ally, the United States of America and in response it shut down the majority of American military bases in Turkey and further weakened the southern flank of NATO.

Keywords: Cyprus, NATO, Cypriots, Turkey, Greece, Enosis, Akritas plan, AKEL,

Introduction

The island of Cyprus occupies one of the most strategically significant locations in the Eastern Mediterranean. As the age of decolonization started, after a five-year negotiation process the former British colony of Cyprus became an independent state in 1960 alas the conflict was not resolved. Considering Greece's long-standing demand for enosis, union of Cyprus with Greece, on the one side, and Turkey's concerns for the security of the Turkish population on the island, on the other, brought two NATO allies to the threshold of a war during the Cold War. This paper examines the Cyprus problem from 1960 to 1975 and the policies of major powers on the problem. I argue that from 1960 to 1975 Turkey, Britain, and two superpowers United States and the Soviet Union as well as the Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders developed various

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Cold War Cultures Conference at the University of Texas-Austin, Austin, TX, on September 30-October 3, 2010.

2 Tamer Balci, Assistant Professor of History, University of Texas-Pan American, Department of History and Philosophy

policies on Cyprus that served the best of their as well as the Cypriots' interests. In this time period, Greece was the only side that never adopted a different policy than enosis. Greece neither considered an alternative policy on Cyprus nor offered an accommodating solution to address the concerns of the Turkish Cypriots, such as granting equal citizenship rights to Turks on the island instead of minority rights.

Initially, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots opposed the Greek enosis proposal and alternatively proposed taksim, division of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece. Turkish policy changed after 1964 as Turkey and Turkish Cypriots regarded a federal state as a viable solution to the problem. Nevertheless, the Greek Cypriot unwillingness to grant equal citizenship rights to the Turks on the island left this offer futile despite the explicit Soviet support for a federal solution. While Greece insisted on enosis, by the mid-1960s the Greek Cypriot leadership favored an independent Cyprus instead of enosis and thus was targeted by Greece. After securing a military base in south Cyprus, Britain gradually left the burden of diplomatic meddling to the US despite the American reluctance for engagement.

The primary concern for the US was the security of the southern flank of NATO. New Cyprus republic took its place among the non-aligned countries. This situation created a fertile atmosphere for the Soviet influence on the island. In order to prevent any Soviet involvement on the island, the US initially stayed aside and expected Britain to resolve the issue diplomatically. The US intervened in 1964 when the problem turned into a direct threat to the security of NATO. By 1964 the constitutional authority of Cyprus republic was dissolved. The foundation treaties of Cyprus allowed Turkey, Greece and Britain to intervene militarily in case the agreed terms were altered without the consent of the signatories. Appealing to this clause, Turkey planned to intervene on the island in 1964 but the US strongly warned Turkey not to do so. In his letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, US President Lyndon B. Johnson stated that if a Turkish intervention into Cyprus caused a Soviet attack against Turkey, Turkey's NATO allies might not come to its aid. Also, Johnson warned İnönü that Turkey was not allowed to use US arms for non-NATO purposes. The letter turned Turkish-American relations upside down and marked the beginning of an unfriendly era between two countries. Taking advantage of this political climate, the Turkish left successfully rallied masses toward anti-Americanism in Turkey.

It is against this background that the role of the US in the Cyprus issue took on a new significance. The US policy on Cyprus failed because of three main reasons: first amid all the turmoil of Cold War, the US intervened only after the conflict became a direct threat to the unity of NATO but it was too late

too little. Second, the US policy makers ignored the democratic voice of the people in Greece and Turkey by supporting military regimes. Third, the US policy was under the heavy influence of a Greek lobby that prioritized the Greek interests over the US interests. Consequently, the same policies caused the collapse of the southern flank of NATO.

As opposed to the US, the Soviets took their steps cautiously and reached their objectives by 1975. The best organized party in Cyprus was the communist party. The Soviets let the Cyprus Communist Party (AKEL) voice the communist agenda. The Soviets were open to any solution that left Cyprus an independent state so that Cyprus did not become a NATO entity. Thus, the Soviets were against both Greek enosis, union with Greece, and Turkish taksim, division, policy.

Next time another crisis started in Cyprus in 1974, resented Turks ignored the US and launched a unilateral military operation. Turkey reached its goal of preventing enosis and gained an upper hand in the conflict. As a result, the pro-American Greek junta fell in Greece and Greece pulled out of NATO alas the enosis policy of Greece on Cyprus remained unchanged. Soon Turkey faced a US arms embargo and it retaliated by shutting down non-NATO US military bases in Turkey. By 1975, the southern flank of NATO was weaker than ever.

The Roots of the Cyprus Conflict

The Cyprus problem started in the mid 1950s when Cyprus was a British colony. Cyprus was under British control since 1878. Britain rented the island from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 and annexed it in November 1914 when the Ottoman Empire joined WWI on the side of Germany. After the war, the article 16 of the Lausanne Treaty (1923), stated that should Britain decide to leave Cyprus, the future of the island would be determined by Turkey and Britain.³ The article 16 allowed Turkey to have a voice in the future of Cyprus.

As the decolonization started after WWII, Britain was initially willing to leave Cyprus. As the Cold War brought a new communist threat to the Middle East and Israel gained independence in 1948, Britain reevaluated the evacuation of Cyprus as it desperately needed a strategic military base in the Middle East. Consequently, in the 1950s Britain made Cyprus its military center in the region. The only problem was that the island lacked a natural port. Since building a port would be too expensive, Britain first built only a military airport and a base on Cyprus. During the Suez Crisis in 1956, Britain understood the

3 Ahmet Yavuz, TC'nin Andlaşmaları I, (Ankara: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1992) 23.

strategic significance of Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. Since Cyprus did not have a port, Britain had to receive support from Malta, 1,000 miles away from the Suez Canal.

During the British colonial administration, Greece several times asked Britain to allow Greece to annex Cyprus. The United Nations' declaration supporting the right to self-determination for every nation was a great opportunity for the Greek population of Cyprus. But Greeks were not the only nation on the island. Turkish Cypriots, who made up 30 percent of the island population, formed another nation in Cyprus. The British unwillingness to give up Cyprus attracted the fury of the Greek militant organization (EOKA)⁴, which targeted not only the British authorities but also Turkish Cypriots because of their support for the British. The Greek Cypriot violence pushed Britain to the negotiation table after 1955. As agreed in the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey became one of the parties in the negotiations. During the negotiations Greece and Greek Cypriot policy was enosis, annexation of island to Greece, while Turkey pursued a taksim, partition policy that aimed to divide the island between Turkey and Greece.

Eventually Cyprus achieved its independence on August 16, 1960 and it became a joint state of Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The London and Zurich Treaties,⁵ which served as the basis of Cyprus constitution, created a shared governance of Greek and Turkish Cypriots with Turkish and Greek as official languages. According to the foundation treaties, president and vice president of the Cyprus Republic were to be a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot respectively. Both president and vice president were granted veto rights over the decisions of Ministers of Council that included seven Greek and three Turkish Cypriots. Similarly seventy percent of the parliament seats were reserved for Greek Cypriots while Turkish Cypriots were to receive the thirty percent of parliament seats. Likewise, civil service positions as well as security forces were to be divided proportionally. Furthermore, a constitutional court was created for the disputes. The court had to have a Greek, a Turkish and a neutral member. The neutral member had to be the president of the constitutional court. Furthermore, the article 22 of the treaties clearly prohibited both the Greek goal of enosis and Turkish goal of taksim, partition. In the agreement, Britain secured two military bases on the island. Together with Britain, Greece and Turkey became guarantor powers of the new Cyprus Republic. They were authorized to intervene in the island in case the agreed constitutional

4 Ethniki Organosis Kiprion Agoniston (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters).

5 Murat Metin Hakki, ed., The Cyprus Issue, A Documentary History, 1878-2007, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007) 31-39.

authority was disrupted. The 1960 Cyprus Constitution was drafted based on the outlines listed in the foundation treaties⁶ Greek Cypriots considered the independence as a step toward enosis.⁷ The independence removed the British obstacle. The next target was the Turkish community. The Greek Cypriots were not satisfied with the Cyprus constitution. The constitution, according to the Greek president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios⁸, gave too many rights to the Turkish population. Makarios was not willing to give more than minority rights to the Turkish Cypriots. By violating the constitution, he refused to give civil service positions to Turkish Cypriots and subdued the Constitutional Court. Under the pressure and threats from Greek Cypriots, on May 21, 1963, the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Ernst Forsthoef and his assistant resigned from their posts.⁹

Makarios presented a thirteen-point constitutional amendment proposal to Turkish vice president Fazıl Küçük on November 30, 1963. Makarios proposed to remove the veto power of Turkish vice president, proportional representation of civil officers and security forces.¹⁰ He also wanted to remove the guarantee agreements from the constitution. Since these changes would reduce the Turkish Cypriots to a minority position, both Küçük and the Turkish government refused them. In December 1963, Makarios declared that he did not recognize the guarantee treaties.

Soon after Makarios' declaration, organized attacks against the Turkish Cypriots started. Despite the pleas of the Turkish vice president, Fazıl Küçük, there was no Cypriot state attempt to stop the violence against the Turkish civilians. In fact, the attacks against Turkish Cypriots were organized by Greek Cypriot authorities. Thus, Turkish Cypriots organized in the (TMT) Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı, Turkish Resistance Organization. The atrocities against Turkish Cypriots turned into a massacre on December 24, 1963. In the last

6 Ibid., 41-87.

7 Abdulhaluk Çay, Kıbrıs'ta Kanlı Noel-1963, (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1989) 44-45.

8 On March 9, 1956, Cyprus' British Governor Harding exiled Makarios to the Schelles islands in the Indian Ocean because of his active role in EOKA activities. In fact, the Orthodox Archbishop played important role in organizing EOKA. He even had a code name, Haris, in EOKA. Kıbrıs Gerçeği'nin Bilinmeyen Yönleri, (İstanbul: INAF 1992) 46.

9 Pierre Oberling, The Road to Bellapais: The Turkish Cypriot Exodus to Northern Cyprus, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982) 79.

10 For the full text of Makarios' 13-point proposal see Hakki, 89-90.

week of December 1963, more than 300 Turkish Cypriots were killed.¹¹ The annihilation plan took its name from a nineteenth century Byzantium legend, Akritas. The engineer of the Akritas plan¹² was the interior minister of the Cyprus Republic, Polikarpos Yorgacis. At the end of the Akritas plan, Yorgacis used the name Akritas instead of his name.

*"It is estimated that we have better chances of succeeding in our efforts to influence international public opinion in our favor if we present our demand, as we did during the struggle, as a demand to exercise the right of self-determination, rather than as a demand for union with Greece (Enosis)....In the event of instinctive violent Turkish reactions, if our counter attacks are not immediate, we run the risk effacing panic in the Greeks in the towns and thus losing substantial vital areas, while, on the other hand, an immediate show of our strength may bring the Turks to their senses and confine their actions to sporadic insignificant acts, ...effective use of force dealing with the Turks will facilitate to a great extent our subsequent actions for further amendments. It would then be possible for unilateral amendments to be made, without any Turkish reaction, because they will know that their reaction will be weak or seriously harmful for their community."*¹³

Some parts of the Akritas plan were omitted in the publication. It is suspected that these parts included the annihilation plans against the Turkish Cypriot community.

Under these circumstances Turkey considered all the options to protect the Turkish community on the island. Initial step was diplomatic. Turkish president Cemal Gürsel sent a letter to US president Lyndon B. Johnson on December 25, 1963 and requested him to stop the violence and massacres

11 George W. Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs*, (New York: Norton and Company, 1982) 338.

12 The Akritas plan became known to public on April 21, 1966 when it was published in *Patris*, a right wing Greek newspaper controlled by the EOKA B leader General Grivas. Since Grivas turned against Makarios after the 1964 crisis, he had the Akritas plan published to diminish Makarios' authority in Cyprus. Çay, 57.

13 For the full text of Akritas plan see, Hakki, 90- 97. The Akritas plan was published as a UN Document A/33/115, s/12722 of 30 May 1978. Parts of the Akritas plan is available http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/akritas_plan.html [accessed 11 January 2012].

against Turkish civilians.¹⁴ On the same day, Turkish jets flew over Cyprus as a warning to the Cyprus government. In response, Makarios appealed to the UN to ensure his grip on Cyprus but he was not able to get a protectorate from the UN.

On December 27, British troops on the island restored order in Nicosia, creating a line between the Turkish and Greek sides of Nicosia. Later on, Turkey and Greece joined the British peacekeeping force. The joint peacekeeping force established a green line between the two sides. This action reduced the tension in Nicosia but the violence did not end in the countryside.

The representatives of Turkish and Greek Cypriots, Greece, Turkey and Britain met at the London conference to discuss the issue on January 15, 1964. During the conference, Greek Cypriots insisted that the constitution be amended, while Turkish Cypriots offered their pre-1960 plan, partition. The main issue was the security of the Turkish population on the island. Turkey, Greece, and Britain agreed to a deployment of a NATO peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots accepted this plan but Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios refused. Makarios' refusal to allow the deployment of a NATO force was motivated by several factors. Makarios' primary goal was to amend the Cyprus constitution. A NATO force, which would have protected the guaranteed treaties, the constitution, and the security of Turks, would not help him to achieve his goal of enosis.¹⁵ The deployment of NATO forces on the island would also have provoked a Soviet reaction and strengthened the political left in Cyprus. Makarios had to consider the upcoming elections in 1965. AKEL, the Cyprus Communist Party, was the most organized party on the island and it was strongly against NATO existence on the island. Archbishop Makarios did not mind flirting with AKEL. He kicked Turkish Cypriot deputies out of the Cyprus parliament and appointed AKEL members in their places.

Makarios, therefore, would only agree to a United Nations peacekeeping force. Neither Turkey, Greece, Britain, nor the US were initially willing to accept the UN peacekeeping force because if responsibility for the Cyprus issue were transferred to the UN, the Soviets would have an opportunity to play a role in finding a solution. The Soviets had already condemned the attempts of Britain, Greece, and Turkey to deploy a NATO force on the island.¹⁶ Eventually, it was

14 American Foreign Policy, Current Documents 1963, (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967) 470.

15 Oberling, *Road to Bellapais*, 103.

16 Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Tarafların Tutum ve Tezleri Açısından Kıbrıs Sorunu (1945-1986)*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1991) 69.

agreed that a UNFICYP (UN peace keeping force in Cyprus) should take an active role in Cyprus. However, the UNFICYP could not prevent the continuing violence in Cyprus either.

Subsequently, the US started playing a major role in the Cyprus issue. The American approach toward the Cyprus issue was different than that of Britain. While Britain tried to maintain its own interests in the Middle East using Cyprus as a military base, the US evaluated the issue as a security problem at the southern flank of NATO and in the eastern Mediterranean.¹⁷ The Cyprus problem brought two NATO allies, Turkey and Greece, to the threshold of a war.

As a result of the crisis, Turkish Cypriots lost their power in the ruling circles of the Cyprus Republic. Since then, the Greek Cypriot authorities have been accepted as the legitimate government of Cyprus, although they violated the Cyprus constitution and the international treaties that founded the Cyprus Republic. The crisis also separated the previously integrated population. In order to protect themselves, Turkish Cypriots gathered in a small territory. Greek scholars claim that the TMT “forced” Turkish Cypriots to separate themselves from Greek neighborhoods in order to set the foundations for partition.¹⁸ In reality, the Turks squeezed into a small area consisting of only 4.96 percent of the island.¹⁹ Thus, the exodus of the Turks cannot be considered as an integral part towards realizing their partition plan.

Turkey would not accept the ambiguous situation in Cyprus. Turkey’s primary concern was the security of Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, Cyprus had a strategic significance for Turkey. Although Turkey and Greece were allies in NATO, they have never trusted each other. Had Cyprus been controlled by Greece, Turkey would have been surrounded by Greece from three sides. Under these political circumstances, and in order to force Makarios to stop the violence against the Turkish Cypriots on the island, the Turkish parliament authorized its government on March 16, 1964 to intervene militarily. Despite this authorization, the Turkish government did not have any intention of using its intervention right as a guarantor power largely because of lack of military equipment.

The Turkish parliament hoped that the intervention decision would be a

17 S. Şükrü Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi II (1878-1960)*, (Istanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1985) 44-49.

18 Theodore A. Coulombis, *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Alliance*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983) 62.

19 Sabahattin Egeli, *1960 Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Nasıl Yıkıldı*, (Istanbul: Kastan A.S: 1991) 35.

warning to stop Makarios to carry on enosis. Instead, Makarios invited more Greek troops to the island and mobilized the Cypriot Greeks. The new government in Greece, led by Georgios Papandreu, had both nationalist and anti-American tendencies. Cooperation between Makarios and Papandreu brought 10,000 Greek soldiers to Cyprus. According to the Zurich and London Treaties, Greece was only authorized to have 950 soldiers on the island, while Turkey was allowed to keep only 650 soldiers.²⁰

The Johnson Letter and Its Impact

Despite pressures from both the Turkish public and authorization from the Turkish parliament, the Turkish government was dragging its feet for a military operation in Cyprus. The Turkish army's shortcoming could not be revealed. In May 1964, the Cyprus parliament, whose Turkish members had been sacked, passed a bill to establish a strong army and purchase heavy weapons for the Cyprus National Guard.²¹ Makarios' last step forced the Turkish government to reconsider its decision to intervene in Cyprus. The mutual demonstration of force brought two NATO allies to the threshold of a war. The Turkish government decided to intervene in Cyprus on June 7, 1964. Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü informed US President Lyndon B. Johnson of Turkish plans with a hope that an American involvement would stop the Greek military movement on the island and make a risky Turkish military intervention unnecessary.²²

"As İnönü expected, a warning letter from US President Lyndon B. Johnson on June 5 caused the Turkish government to cancel its plan. Nevertheless, the negative tone of Johnson letter made Turkish leaders worry about not only Cyprus but also about the reliability of NATO and US in Turkey's security. In his letter to Turkish Prime Minister İsmet İnönü, Johnson wrote that Turkey had decided to intervene in Cyprus without consulting the other guarantor powers. In addition, Johnson warned Turkey that it might be left alone in a military struggle against the USSR if Turkey's actions cause Soviet involvement:

...a military intervention in Cyprus by Turkey could lead to a direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand that your NATO Allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without

²⁰ Couloumbis, 46.

²¹ Fahir Armaoğlu, 20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi (1914-1990), (V.1, Ankara: İş Bankası Yayınları, 1992), 788.

²² Hakki, 97.

the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies.”²³

The Johnson letter shocked Turkish authorities because until then the US had not played a very active role in seeking a solution to the Cyprus problem. Even on December 15, 1963, the US secretary of state, Dean Rusk, said to Turkish Foreign Minister Erkin that “[the] US took position that guarantor powers were the ones which could best resolve the Cyprus problem. [The] US already had enough problems on its agenda without taking on the Cyprus dispute.”²⁴ As Rusk revealed, the US had its own problems in this period and Cyprus was not considered as a primarily significant problem. The former US Secretary of State George W. Ball stated that Britain expected US diplomatic support, but the US was struggling with many problems around the world. Besides Vietnam, which was the US’ biggest problem at that time, the US was faced with trouble in Panama and Congo. Also, the chilly relations with the USSR, because of the Berlin question, and the problems with Indonesia were on the US agenda. Therefore, the American government watched the Cyprus crisis from afar until it became a Cold War issue. The rising tensions between Turkey and Greece were jeopardizing the security of the southern flank of NATO. In this case, the US felt the necessity to intervene in the issue diplomatically.

The US, according to Ball, became involved in the Cyprus problem after the London Conference ended without a solution. In this period, President Johnson assigned Ball to bring about a solution for the Cyprus problem. Ball asserts that Duncan Sandy, the British Secretary of State for the Commonwealth and Colonies, informed Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou about the Anglo-American plan for a NATO force. This proposal was refused by Makarios immediately. Ball implies that had the Cypriot authorities been approached with a coordinated plan, it would have been more successful.²⁵

Johnson, despite the pleas from Turkish authorities, reprimanded neither the Greek government, who sent 10,000 soldiers to the island violating the London and Zurich agreements it signed, nor the Cyprus government, who violated both the international treaties and the Cyprus constitution. One of the most important reasons why Johnson never warned Greece not to violate the treaties was the heavy influence of the Greek lobby in the United States. In 1964, many Greek-American organizations worked to gain the support of US authorities on the side of Greece. Greek-Americans pressured Johnson

23 Ibid., 99. For the full text of the correspondence between Johnson and İnönü see Hakki, 98-100.

24 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, V.16, (Washington: US Printing Office 1994) 767.

25 Ball, 341.

by sending telegrams and letters to the White House. President J.F. Kennedy and later Johnson were worried about Makarios-AKEL collaboration,²⁶ but still American policy makers became a victim of one-sided propaganda of the Greek-American lobby.²⁷ Turkey's efforts were, however, limited to diplomacy. In his response to Johnson, on June 13, 1964, Turkish PM İnönü revealed his disappointment about the words and content of Johnson's letter. İnönü explained that Turkey had always consulted with the US and the guarantor powers, but no agreement had been reached. İnönü also complained that the US warned Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus, although intervention is one of Turkey's legal rights as a guarantor, but the US never warned the Greek government, who openly violated the international treaties that Greece itself had signed. The main issue İnönü mentioned in his letter was the role of NATO.

*"Our understanding is that the North Atlantic Treaty imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression. The only point left to the discretion of the member states is the nature and the scale of this assistance. If NATO members should start discussing the right and wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression, whether this aggression was provoked or not and if the decision on whether they have an obligation to assist the member should be made to depend on the issue of such a discussion, the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning. An obligation of assistance, if it is to carry any weight, should come into being immediately upon the observance of aggression."*²⁸

İnönü's visit to the US on June 22-23 gave hope that relations could be mended. The US spent more efforts to bring a solution to Cyprus. Former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson submitted a proposal to Turkey and Greece. According to Acheson's plan, Turks would get local autonomy in the predominantly Turkish areas. In other parts of the island, they would be given minority rights. Also, Turkey would have a military base in northern Cyprus. The rest of the island would be left to Greece. Greek delegates objected to

26 Suha Bolukbasi, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, (New York: University Press of America, 1988), 54.

27 For a detailed account of Greek lobbying see Jacob M. Landau, *Johnson's 1964 Letter to İnönü and Greek Lobbying of the White House*, (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1979).

28 Halil Ibrahim Salih, *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*, (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1978), 150.

this plan; instead, they offered a smaller portion for the Turks and the Turkish military base would remain only for 25 years.

While the negotiations were going on in Geneva, Greek Cypriot forces attacked Turkish villages on August 6, 1964. As soon as Makarios learned about Acheson's proposal, he moved to sabotage negotiations. Had the Acheson plan been accepted, Makarios would have lost his presidency in Cyprus. The area that Greek Cypriots invaded was a strategic location through which TMT, the Turkish Resistance Organization, could get aid from Turkey. Thus, this time Turkish reaction was harsher. Turkey first demanded that the Greek Cypriot forces end the invasion of land that TMT controlled. Once it was not done, Turkish jets bombed the Greek military bases in Cyprus. The US' silence during Turkey's bombing campaign put political pressure on Makarios. The Turkish bombing campaign did not cause a negative US reaction, even though Turkey used US made jets and supplies. The first Greek demand for an arms embargo against Turkey started after Turkey's strike,²⁹ but the US did not want to add fuel to the fire. The US relations with Turkey were already tense because of the Johnson letter. It seems that the US authorities understood Turkey's sentiment; thus, they did not want to pressure Turkey once more.

Despite the Makarios' sabotage attempt, the negotiations in Geneva carried on. Acheson prepared a second proposal. He offered Turkey a military base in Cyprus for 50 years. In fact, the Greek delegation's main objection was against giving local autonomy to Turkish Cypriots. Neither Makarios nor Greece was willing to give any autonomy to Turks. Also, Turkey wanted a larger portion of land for the military base than Greece would accept.

Turkish negotiator Nihat Erim claimed that Acheson told him and his military consultant Turgut Sunalp that if Turkey invades the territory, as proposed in the first proposal, the US would not interfere. When Erim passed the message to İnönü, İnönü demanded a formal written promise.³⁰ The formal promise never came and the Geneva Conference ended without a solution. As a result of the 1963-64 crises, the constitutional authority of Cyprus Republic collapsed. Makarios illegitimately controlled the Cyprus Republic. Turkish deputies were kicked out of the Cyprus parliament. Previously mixed Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities were separated. The impact of the crisis on Turkish-American relations escalated even further.

29 Suha Bolukbasioglu, *The United States-Turkey Influence Relationship during the Cyprus Crises*, Unpublished Dissertation, (University of Virginia: 1987), 158.

30 Ibid., 148-149.

The Impact of Johnson Letter and the Rise of Anti-Americanism

The unsuccessful result of the Geneva Conference crushed Turkey's hopes of a peaceful resolution to the Cyprus problem. Turkish frustration turned into anti-American demonstrations. İnönü's Cyprus adviser, Nihat Erim, who later became Turkish Prime Minister in 1971, said that "until then there was only one country in the world [Turkey], in which Americans were never told to 'Go home' ".³¹ The Johnson letter incident changed that. The Turkish left was successful at exploiting the problem for its own gains. Since President Johnson openly opposed Turkish military intervention, the primary target of Turkish media and demonstrations was the US instead of Greece or Greek Cypriot leader Makarios.

The point in Johnson's letter regarding NATO's position worried Turkey. Turkey joined NATO only to protect itself from the Soviet threat but Johnson made clear that if Turkey provokes the Soviets, NATO would not defend Turkey against a Soviet attack. Johnson's approach to NATO's role brought the reliability of NATO and the US into question in Turkey. The US and NATO were declared unreliable and untrustworthy. Anti-American demonstrations intensified in August 1964. Demonstrators included many Turkish military officers including Cemal Tural, the Commander of the Turkish Ground Forces. Protestors shouted "Down with America".³²

After the demonstrations, the US declared that the US would come to Turkey's aid in case of an attack by the Soviets, even if the attack happens while Turkey acts on its right to intervene in Cyprus³³ but this statement changed nothing. Although the Turkish government had no serious intention to intervene in Cyprus, the Turkish public was convinced that the US prevented Turkey from saving Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, American policy makers reconsidered US Cyprus policy after the crisis by setting two basic principles in approaching the problem. Primarily, the struggle between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots should not cause a war between Greece and Turkey. Secondly, the Cyprus conflict should not jeopardize US relations with Greece or Turkey.³⁴ This shift and policy reevaluation was too late. Anti-Americanism was already widely spread in Turkey.

31 Armaoğlu, 20.yy..., 790.

32 Bolukbasi, 154.

33 George S. Harris, *Troubled Alliance: Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective, 1945-1971*, (Washington D.C.: Hoover Policy Study, 1972) 120.

34 Thomas W. Adams & Alvin J. Cottrell, *Cyprus Between East and West*, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968) 69.

Former US Secretary of State George W. Ball regarded Johnson's letter as "the diplomatic equivalent of an atomic bomb".³⁵ In fact, the magnitude of the impact on Turkish politics was equivalent to the impact of an atomic bomb. Johnson's letter had shaken the roots of Turkish domestic politics and changed the Turkish political fault lines. Previously the dominant Turkish political groups were mainly defined as two groups: the Turkish military-judiciary bureaucracy and the Republican Public Party (RPP) have traditionally declared themselves as the guardians of progressive Kemalism and framed the rest either as religious or communist reactionaries. The Johnson letter incident destroyed this traditional progressive-reactionary frame by forcing Turkish politicians to seek alternatives to US.

In less than a month after the Johnson letter incident İsmet İnönü's government barely survived a vote of confidence in the Turkish parliament in June 1964.³⁶ Seasoned politician İnönü, who had served in many state posts including presidency and prime ministry, did not have a clean record dealing with Turkey's socialists. He had previously exiled or jailed socialist intellectuals. Nevertheless, he now did not hesitate to tilt the RPP to the left. The RPP, the first political party of the Turkish Republic, had previously did not identify itself either as a left wing or a right wing party but only as a Kemalist party. A month later İnönü declared the RPP as a 'left of center' party. This new policy was basically a soft socialism. İnönü's new adviser Bülent Ecevit had socialist leanings. The RPP entered the 1965 elections with a new executive committee dominated by socialists. This step was perhaps one of the strongest warnings to the US. Turkey's flagship party was becoming socialist. As the party turned to the left, the conservative wing of RPP, led by Turhan Feyzioğlu left the RPP leaving the party mainly to socialists.

Despite the public protests, the main opposition, the center right Justice Party (JP), did not openly target the US. Instead the JP blamed İnönü for the diplomatic failure. The JP leader Saadettin Bilgiç stated that the US had to prevent the breakout of a war between Greece and Turkey. In order to do that the US had to give the political pressure on the country that cared most about the US.³⁷ His soft message was certainly noted by the US policy makers.

The RPP's new 'left of center' policy did not help the party in elections. The JP won both the 1965 and the 1969 elections. Despite the victories of the conservatives in the elections, socialists broadened their influence in

35 Ball, 350.

36 Harris, 116.

37 Bolukbasi, 153.

intellectual circles. Turkish intellectuals with diverse political views all agreed that Turkey should not rely on the US anymore. While the conservatives proposed closer ties with the Islamic countries, the socialists proposed Turkey to leave NATO and join the non-alignment pact. Indeed, this was a strategic move. The majority of socialists desired for the improvement of Turkish-Soviet relations.³⁸

In the mid-1960s, socialist ideas spread among university students, professors, and labor union members. Using the Johnson letter as a base of criticism, the Turkish media, which was overwhelmingly controlled by socialists, demanded Turkey's withdrawal from NATO. The demands in the media turned into an anti-American student movement in the universities. The socialists organized into the Turkish Labor Party (TLP). The TLP could not get a large sum of vote in the elections but its socialist voice was strong in the media. The protests in some occasions turned into leftist activism and by the late 1960s, Turkey witnessed political violations. The rise of political tensions and violence across Turkey led to a military coup in Turkey in 1971. After socialist TLP was shut down in 1971, socialists found refuge in the RPP, pushing it further to the left. In the 1972 congress, Bülent Ecevit defeated the legendary party leader İsmet İnönü and socialists eventually gained the total control of the RPP.

The Turkish government's policy changes also encouraged the socialists. Because of chilly relations with the US, the new conservative JP government did not hesitate to flirt with the USSR after the 1963-64 crisis. Turkish and Soviet parliamentary delegations exchanged visits after 1964. Furthermore, the Turkish government revised its 54 military treaties with the US. The 1969 treaty replaced all previous 54 treaties and it restricted the US military and personnel activities in Turkey.³⁹ During the Lebanon crisis in 1958, the US had used its military bases in Turkey.⁴⁰ After 1965, the US was no longer allowed to use its bases for non-NATO purposes. During the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the Lebanon crisis of 1969, the Turkish government did not allow the use of American bases in Turkey.⁴¹

New Policy Formations

After the 1963-64 crises, Turkey proposed a federal state in Cyprus. Turkey's

38 Ibid., 154.

39 Fahir Armaoğlu, *Belgelerle Türk-Amerikan Münasebetleri*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), 277-285.

40 Harris, 66-68.

41 Ibid., 166.

new proposal attracted the Soviet support in the UN in December 1964.⁴² The Soviets did not miss any opportunity to pull Turkey to their side. Nevertheless, the Soviets still supported Makarios' proposal to cancel the guarantee treaties that authorized Britain, Greece and Turkey to intervene in Cyprus. The main Soviet goal was to prevent the NATO control of Cyprus. Thus, the Soviets supported the independence of the non-aligned Cyprus Republic. The Soviets were against enosis, which would have given the control of island to Greece and taksim, the initial Turkish plan to divide the island between Turkey and Greece. A federal Cyprus state without guarantee treaties was acceptable to the Soviets.

The Turkish government was not the only side that sought the Soviet support. Greek Cypriot leader Makarios did what he could to keep the Communist Party of Cyprus AKEL happy and at bay⁴³ so that he could attract the Soviet support. AKEL was the sole organized party in Cyprus until 1969. Makarios rewarded communists with five seats in the parliament after he had kicked out Turkish parliament members.⁴⁴ In order to keep communists at bay Makarios had to abandon or postpone his enosis goal. Following the communist strategy of Soviets, AKEL was against enosis. It favored an independent Cyprus. Thus, when the Soviets supported the Turkish federation proposal for Cyprus, AKEL had a hard time on the island. Eventually, AKEL declared its objection to the federal state proposal.⁴⁵

Nevertheless, Cyprus policy of Greece remained the same. Greece was afraid that the full independence of Cyprus would cause the abandonment of enosis. The US was also concerned that full independence would prevent the NATO control of Cyprus. The Acheson plan, therefore, suggested Turkey's taksim thesis together with Greece's enosis plan but it did not suggest the independence of Cyprus.

The 1967 Crisis

After the 1963-64 crises, Greece had to deal with the political instability as well. Greek Prime Minister Georgios Papandreu's visit to the US at the same time as Turkish Prime Minister's visit in June 1964 did not result in a solution to the Cyprus issue. As soon as Papandreu returned to Greece, he publicly declared that he was proud of rejecting American political pressure. In less

42 Ömer Taşlı, Ortadoğu'ya Süper Güçlerin Etkileri, (İstanbul: Fikir Yayınları, 1991) 93.

43 Thomas W. Adams, AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971) 5-7.

44 Adams, & Cottrell, 23-24.

45 Sönmezoğlu, 69.

than a month, on July 15, 1964 King Konstantin II removed Papandreu from power. A provisional government was set to carry the country to the elections on May 28, 1967. Papandreu was expected to win the elections but a military coup on April 21 by Colonel George Papadopoulos halted the democracy in Greece. Apparently, the US played a significant role in both the dismissal of Papandreu⁴⁶ and making of the military coup.⁴⁷

Not surprisingly, the colonel's junta took a strong pro-American position in foreign policy. One of the major goals of junta was to bring Cyprus to Greek control by reaching enosis. The junta increased its support to pro-enosis groups in Cyprus. Eventually, the Cyprus National Guard led by General Grivas, who was sent by Greece, attacked some Turkish villages on November 15, 1967.

Turkey's determined stance and decision to intervene militarily in Cyprus ended this crisis shortly before it escalated into a war. Turkey first warned Greece⁴⁸ and asked Greece that unless the Turkish demands are satisfied a military intervention was inevitable. Turkey demanded the demobilization of 20,000 men in the Greek National Guard, the removal of 12,000 Greek soldiers and General Grivas from Cyprus, and the removal of the Greek National Guard from the area it invaded. President Johnson appointed the former Deputy of the Defense Secretary Cyrus Vance for mediation. The US diplomatically made it clear that it had no intention to stop Turkish intervention by military force.⁴⁹ In this case, Greece had two options: to defend Cyprus or to accept Turkey's conditions. Greece chose the second one. Turkey's conditions were carried out by Greece and the 1967 crisis did not turn into a war.

From the 1963-64 crises to 1968, the Greek Cypriot Government considered Turks as "insurgents" and did not engage in negotiations. In 1968, after the Greek troops left the island, Makarios agreed to join bilateral negotiations with Turkish Cypriots. Secret negotiations took place in Beirut from June 1968 to October 1971. During the negotiations, Turkish Cypriot representative

46 Couloumbis, 49.

47 Ibid., 50-51. Also, for the detailed information about the US role in the coup see Laurance Stern, *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*, (New York: Times Books, 1977), 41-51.

48 Although many scholars write that Turkey sent a note to Greece, it was later clarified that Turkey did not send a written note, instead Turkish Foreign Minister İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil orally informed the Greek ambassador about Turkey's conditions to cancel the military intervention. Özer Eskiuyurt, Erdoğan Teziç, Murat Sarıca, *Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1975) 144-145.

49 Adams and Cottrell, 71.

Rauf Denktaş focused on two points: equal political rights for Turks and the continuation of Turkey's guarantor status. Makarios, however, offered only minority rights to Turkish Cypriots.⁵⁰

Makarios did not have friendly relations with the Greek colonel's junta, either. The junta regarded Makarios as a big obstacle in front of enosis. The junta sponsored a terrorist organization in Cyprus, Aspida, to get rid of Makarios. Aspida several times attempted assassinations of Makarios but each time Makarios managed to escape. Makarios' relations with the Greek junta became chilly after an assassination attempt against Makarios on March 8, 1970. His only supporter was the Soviets so Makarios visited Moscow in the spring of 1971.⁵¹ His visit, undoubtedly, angered the pro-American Greek junta more.

Greece responded to Makarios' actions by secretly sending General Grivas, the former leader of the Cyprus National Guard, back to Cyprus in September 1971.⁵² Grivas founded the EOKA-B, an anti-Makarios terrorist organization in Cyprus. This was the junta's second attempt to get rid of Makarios so that enosis could be reached. EOKA-B had the same intentions as Aspida had had. EOKA-B arranged a terrorist campaign against Cyprus government authorities.⁵³ Despite these attacks, Makarios was still strong in Cyprus in the early 1970s.

While Greece was struggling under the rule of colonel's junta, Turkey was dealing with its domestic problems in the late 1960s. The Turkish army staged a coup by forcing the elected government of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel to resign on March 12, 1971. A provisional government then controlled Turkey until the elections in October 1973. After the elections a strange coalition government of the leftist RPP the Political Islamic NSP (National Salvation Party) was established. The RPP and the NSP had different policies toward Cyprus. While the RPP defended the federal solution, the latter insisted on taksim, partition. The RPP leader and new Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, and the Vice PM, the NSP leader, Necmettin Erbakan, both took an explicit anti-American stance. The coalition government's decision to rescind the poppy cultivation ban on July 1, 1974 increased the tension between Turkey and the US. Since the previous government's decision was made under US pressure, the new government viewed the issue as a question of self-determination.

50 Rauf R. Denktaş, *Kıbrıs Davamız*, (Ankara: Koksav, 1991) 8-9.

51 P.N. Vanezis, *Cyprus: The Unfinished Agony*, (London: Abelard-Schuman, 1977) 45.

52 Ibid., 49.

53 Çay, 90-92.

New developments in Cyprus now brought the attention of the US back to Cyprus.

The 1974 Crisis

The sudden death of General Grivas in January 1974 changed the rules of political game in Cyprus. Makarios used this opportunity to finish off EOKA-B. He first declared EOKA-B illegal then asked Greece to withdraw its 650 Greek army officers from the Cyprus National Guard.⁵⁴ The Greek junta had a new leader. In November 1973 General Dimitrios Ioannidis ended the rule of George Papadopoulos with a military coup. The hardliner Ioannidis responded Makarios militarily. The Greek officers in the Cyprus National Guard overthrew Makarios government on July 15, 1974. Makarios barely escaped to London. The coup plotters declared a new state: the "Hellenic Republic of Cyprus." In order to legitimize their position, the coup leaders had to find a Greek Cypriot for their new state's presidency. Eventually, they found Nikos Sampson, whose political slogan was "Death to the Turks" when he was elected to the Greek House of Representatives in 1969.⁵⁵

On July 16, the Turkish government invited Britain to participate in a joint military operation in Cyprus. The next day, the Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit visited London to talk about the issue. Britain was not willing to use its right to intervene but declared Makarios as the only legitimate president of Cyprus.⁵⁶ Primary goal of Britain and the US was to prevent a military conflict between Greece and Turkey. The US also had its own agenda: it was the last phase of the Watergate crisis in the US and President Nixon was planning his resignation from office. Thus, Turkey prepared for a unilateral military action. American diplomats worked hard to prevent Turkey's military intervention. Joseph Sisco, the Deputy Secretary of State, visited London, Ankara, and Athens. He brought a letter from President Nixon to Turkish President Fahri Korutürk. In his letter, Nixon openly warned that should Turkey start a military operation it might result in an American arms embargo against Turkey. Unlike the Johnson letter, the Nixon letter was clear and diplomatic. The earlier poppy cultivation decision of Turkish coalition government indicated that the Turkish government would carry on as it desired to protect the Turkish interests. Indeed, the US policy makers were aware of Greece's coup plans and did nothing to prevent it. In June 1974, William Fulbright, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, warned Secretary of State Henry Kissinger about Greece's plan for a coup. Kissinger told him that "the US

54 Pierre Oberling, *Kıbrıs Faciası*, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Yay., 1990) 16-17.

55 Oberling, *The Road to...*, 160.

56 Sönmezoğlu, 102.

should not interfere in the internal affairs of the Greeks".⁵⁷ Kissinger already considered Cyprus as part of Greece. Thus, the US policy was designed to stop Turkey.

Sisco carried Turkey's conditions to Greece. Turkey demanded the resignation of Nikos Sampson and the removal of the 650 Greek officers from the Cyprus National Guard. Greece, however, did not even admit to having played a role in the coup. When diplomacy did not work Turkey decided to carry on a unilateral military intervention to prevent the annexation of Cyprus to Greece and to provide security for Turkish Cypriots.

Turkey launched its attack on July 20, 1974. This time Turkey was not alone. The communist bloc, which was against a total NATO control on Cyprus, strategically supported Turkey. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria deployed troops on their borders with Greece.⁵⁸ Under this military pressure on its borders, the Greek junta could not initiate an attack against mainland Turkey. On July 22, Turkey achieved its goal and Nikos Sampson left the island. On the same day, conservative leader Constantine Karamanlis overthrew the Greek junta in Greece. The US could not prevent the Turkish intervention but under large diplomatic pressure Turkey was forced to declare a militarily premature cease-fire. The US warned Turkey it may pull back its nuclear weapons from Turkey had Turkey engage in a war against Greece.⁵⁹ The main political goal of the military operation was achieved so quickly that by the time cease-fire was announced the Turkish army controlled only seven percent of the island.⁶⁰ In case of a Greek attack, Turkish forces would not be able to defend their position in such a small area.

The peace negotiations were scheduled for July 25 in Geneva. At the first Geneva Conference, Greece and Turkey agreed that the Greek National Guard would end the invasion of Turkish populated areas and in exchange the Greek National Guard could be allowed to expand the area it controlled. On August 9, 1974 Greek and Turkish representatives met in the second Geneva Conference but there was no progress. Turkey was not satisfied with Greece's delaying tactics and launched the second offensive on August 14. During the second offensive campaign, the Turkish army was able to control 37 percent of the island. Turkey's second operation met with a worldwide criticism and was considered internationally as an invasion, whereas the first one was viewed as the legitimate right of Turkey.

57 Bolukbasi, 272.

58 Taşlı, 101.

59 Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1982) 1192.

60 Bolukbasi, 311.

On the day of the second Turkish offensive, Greece declared its withdrawal from NATO. Despite its support for Turkey in the first operation, the USSR suddenly turned against Turkey after the Greek decision to leave NATO.⁶¹ The 1974 crisis certainly brought many satisfactory results for the communist bloc. The pro-American Greek junta fell, a possible total NATO control of Cyprus was averted and Greece pulled out of NATO. As if the Greek government's decision to leave NATO was not enough to crumble the southern flank of NATO, the US initiated an awkward arms embargo against its other NATO ally because Turkey used American weapons during the Cyprus operation despite earlier American warnings. According to the military aid treaties between Turkey and the US, Turkey was supposed to use American weapons only for security purposes. The Cyprus crisis was seen by Turkey as a security issue. The lives of Turks on the island were threatened. The control of the island by Greece would have threatened the security of the Turkish mainland because by controlling Cyprus, Greece would surround Turkey from the south, west, and north.

American arms embargo, which started on February 5, 1975, further alienated Turkey. Turkey's immediate reaction was the declaration of Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) in the Turkish controlled northern Cyprus on February 13. Turkey was still pursuing a federal solution in Cyprus. Once President Gerald Ford's political attempt to end the arms embargo failed Turkey took a step to cancel its 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement with the US in July. The Turkish decision allowed only NATO related duties of American military in Turkey. All other military bases were controlled by the Turkish army.⁶² The Soviets finally reached their goal of achieving the collapse of the southern flank of NATO. The self-inflicted wounds of NATO took some time to heal. Eventually, the US arms embargo was removed in September 1978 but no new military treaty was signed with Turkey until March 1980.

61 Armaoğlu, 20.yy...,805-807.

62 Armaoğlu, Belgelerle..., 286-287.

Conclusion

From 1960 to 1975, three major crises erupted in Cyprus: the 1964, the 1967 and the 1974 crises. Ironically, although the major actors of the problem, Britain, Greece, Turkey and the US as well as Greek and Turkish Cypriots were largely pro-West, the real winner out of this fiasco was the Soviet Union. The Soviets' indirect involvement on the problem through their local voice Cyprus Communist Party (AKEL) proved a lot more productive by 1975. The Soviets avoided getting a direct negative reaction from the public in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus while the US became a target of demonstrations in both Turkey and Greece. The Soviets had a clear and solid Cyprus policy. They wanted an independent Cyprus state without NATO influence on it.

Furthermore, although US traditionally presented itself as the defender of democracy and freedom of expression, American political decisions made in this period contradicted this traditional belief. American administrations worked closely with authoritarian military regimes and bypassed the voice of people with top-to-down decisions, in Turkey and Greece while the Soviets and their communist outlets voiced their opinions through media, grassroots organizations or political parties. Not surprisingly the democratic steps of authoritarian communists prevailed over the authoritarian practices of democrats.

After 1960, Britain preferred to remain on the side and expected US to intervene diplomatically. British and American policy goal on Cyprus was not different. Both aimed to put the island under NATO control, either through partition between Greece and Turkey or through the annexation of the island by Turkey or Greece. The first option, partition, was opposed by Greece. The second option, annexation, brought about the question of whether Greece or Turkey should control the island. The influence of a strong Greek lobby in the US and the pro-US Greek junta's faithfulness to the US, brought the US policy makers to the side of Greece. The annexation of the island by Greece could have ended the communist influence in Cyprus, but Turkey's threat to intervene and the Cypriot leader Makarios' determination to keep Cyprus as an independent state were serious obstacles in front of that goal.

American policy makers' attempts to provide a peaceful solution to the problem by trying to satisfy both parties simultaneously only served to undermine its credibility as an ally to either side. In the post-Johnson letter incident Turkey's consequential reevaluation of its foreign policy damaged US interests because Turkey now looked to the Soviet Union for support. Turkey was able to obtain Soviet support in both the 1967 and 1974 crises. The US reevaluated its Cyprus policy after 1964. When Turkey bombed the Greek National Guard's bases with US-made jets and supplies in 1967, the US did

not show the same reaction as it did in 1964. This in turn angered Greece. Turkey's post-1964 federal state proposal would have created two separate states run by one center but neither the US nor Greece was willing to accept an independent Cyprus state. Greece proposed no solution other than enosis. Pro-American Greek military junta targeted Makarios because he became an obstacle in front of enosis and cooperated with the communists on the island. From the American policy-makers' point of view, once Cyprus was freed from Makarios, Turkey had to be stopped through negotiations. The last step of the plan did not work because in 1974 Turkey intervened militarily. At the end of the 1974 crisis, the Greek junta fell and Greece left NATO. The US put an arms embargo on Turkey and in response Turkey shut down the US military bases in Turkey, except one. In an attempt to keep both Turkey and Greece peacefully in NATO, the US almost lost them both creating instability in the southern flank of NATO.

The previously mixed Turkish and Greek neighborhoods of Cyprus divided up after 1964. The Turkish military intervention brought thirty seven percent of island under Turkish control. From 1955 to present for over sixty years Turkey, US, Britain, Soviet Union and later Russia along with the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and United Nations developed various policy proposals on Cyprus. Greece remained as the only side that consistently kept one policy goal, enosis. This goal was partially achieved as Cyprus joined the European Union in 2004 alas without the Turkish side on the north.

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TCETM

Turkey as a Transformative Regional Power in the Wider Black Sea Region: Prospects and Challenges

Çiğdem Billur & Emre İşeri¹

Abstract: Over the past years, a range of developments (i.e. NATO and EU enlargement schemes, NATO's expanding role in the region, European acknowledgement of Caspian energy basin as a significant alternative to Russian resources, Turkey's plea to become an EU member, rose revolution in Georgia) has attracted increasing attention to the emergence of the Wider Black Sea as a "new hub of security". The states in the region have been facing security challenges whose roots go back to the collapse of the Soviet Union in the form of several unresolved frozen conflicts. Along with that loose state structures have been providing fertile ground for terrorist groups to flourish. In this regard, the reality that the problems in the region might affect its members, the EU initiated the European Neighbourhood Policy with a Black Sea dimension. At this point, NATO member and EU candidate ascending regional power Turkey has a significant role to play or cause a "demonstrative effect" in transforming the region. Against this backdrop, the paper argues that EU anchor is critical for Turkey to enhance peace and stability in the region by assisting region states to materialize their transformation process through democratization.

Keywords: European security, Turkey, Black Sea Region, frozen conflicts, terrorism, regional cooperation, Black sea synergy

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the former Soviet states of the Black Sea region have experienced several problems in their transition process and the region has had balance problems during the integration process with the West. This transition process and the lack of balance have caused several social, economic and political concerns. One of these problems has been the security concerns in regional members which have not yet established their regional identity and have several problems in their bilateral relations. These concerns basically erupting from 'frozen' and current protracted conflicts has affected the security dynamics of either regional states or the European Union (EU) which has considered the Black Sea dimension to her European

¹ Emre İşeri is an Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations of Kadir Has University in İstanbul, Turkey while Çiğdem Billur is currently pursuing her Ph.D. in the Netherlands as a graduate student.

Neighbourhood Policy. Apart from that, terrorist actions which enhance the political instability in this region can be noted as a security threat.

The states which have not yet constructed their regional identity and not governed by central governance have caused security threats over the others. Particularly, along with the enlargement of the EU with the membership of Romania and Bulgaria, the Black Sea Region became a significant part of the EU foreign policy. Considering the possible membership of Turkey, the EU would turn out be neighboring with more than 50% of the Black Sea maritime territory. In this context, it became a serious fact that the European Neighbourhood Policy should to incorporate the Black Sea dimension in terms of security concerns. In this context, the support of the European Union has become significant to accomplish these security concerns. Particularly after 2000s, the European Union has changed its focus from the Eastern Europe to the 'Wider' Black Sea region and it may be explained by European Neighbourhood policy with the enlargement in 2007 as stated above. Furthermore, it may also explain with the growing energy diversification policies of the EU and the strategic location of the member states may enhance the possibility of these policies.

Against this backdrop, the establishment of the Black Sea dimension of the European Union has came into prominence within the aims of regional security and stability. However, the consensus on the dimensions in the neighbourhood policy has not yet established. For instance, Finland has noticed on the Northern dimension while Italy has interested in the Mediterranean dimension. Therefore, the consensus in the application of the European Neighbourhood Policy has not yet materlized.

For accomplishing the security issues under the neighbourhood policy and the solution of the problems, the support of improvement in the democratic reforms and enhancing the dialogue between the regional states in terms of regional cooperations may be significant fort he European Union. In this period, Turkey can be an important regional actor in the regional states due to its Western based politics and the democratic structure. Apart from the other region members, Turkey has never had communist experience and its policies have been towards the democratic transformation. Besides, considering the internal dynamics, it can be noted that Turkey has been the only state in the region which is democratic, secular, a NATO member and the candidate member of the European Union. Therefore, Turkey might be an important example or, to use the term of S. Huntington (1991), cause a "demonstrative effect" – which simply means democratization in one country encourages democratization in other countries - on the regional states in their democratic transition process. Furthermore, Turkey has had tendency

on the regional cooperations such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. Besides, Turkey has never been isolated from the internal and regional security problems and has confronted several of them. First, ongoing terrorist actions have been one of the major issues since 1980s and military expenses have affected the major parts of the state budget. Second, Turkey has involved in one of the frozen conflicts as Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Third, in bilateral relations Turkey has had problems with Armenia due to the bilateral security concerns. Therefore, Turkey has involved several regional security problems. However, the policies of Turkey towards the solution of the security problems and its place in democratic transformation process may make this state more significant than the other regional members.

In this article, the approach of the EU to the Black Sea region and role of Turkey in this region will be examined and the two results will be achieved. First, the support of the EU to the regional cooperations might have serious effects on the regional members which have had several security concerns. Second, Turkey may be a model state for the Black Sea dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy and can support the regional cooperations. Whether Turkey will be supported, Turkey may be a significant actor for the solution of the security problems and might be an example to the regional states in their democratic transition process in the Black Sea region.

Conceptualizing a region

Before defining the European Union's security approach on the Black Sea region, the concept of region and regionalism should be explained briefly. Region is defined as 'an area, especially part of a country or the world having definable characteristics but not always fixed boundaries' in Oxford Dictionary as a main meaning. In International Relations, although a common definition has not yet clarified, this definition can underline some of the dynamics of the contemporary politics on the Black Sea Region as well. Since, region is a complex structure that most of the times it cannot be defined with common characteristics, especially with the territorial boundaries. Therefore, the establishment of the region might be shaped with perceptual frameworks of national and international actors situated at the international system, which will be applied to the concept.

In widespread manner, the concept of region may have connections with geographic ties, however interaction between regional states can be also contained (King 2008: 3) underlined the importance of regional connections and identities of the regional members. Therefore, social and cultural interactions may be effective to establish a region. Besides, cultural ties and identities may bring about the sense of belonging to develop regional identity and set the cultural boundaries. Neo-constructivists argued that

common decision-making mechanism may bring regional states together. For instance, Mansfield and Milner (1999: 599) pointed out to the significance of common foreign policy goals to establish a region. However, it is common to observe disagreements and disputes in a particular region, such as Arab-Israeli conflict in the Middle East. Therefore, before identifying the common regional identity, decision-making mechanism cannot ensure the complete explanation of the concept 'region'.

To define 'region' as a concept, the concept of dependence may also come to prominence. Joseph Nye (1968) described 'region' as 'a limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence' and bring about mutuality in the regional relations. Hence, states may be dependent on each other in political and economic relations due to geopolitical, geostrategic, economic and demographic position inside the region. This assumption means to situate regional states according to their positions. However, Buzan (1998) has a different perspective to locate region, he pointed out that regional members may establish a region by locating this region in common ground by 'the common security concerns', therefore regional members may get together in accordance with the same security threats.

Black Sea as a region?

The Black Sea area is possibly not defined as a region due to the several reasons that will be explained in this chapter (Triantaphyllou 2009: 227). First, Black Sea region has not yet been consolidated in the same ground by homogeneity. It might be said that 'connections' of the region have no common ground in the same way (King 2008: 5). One can say that it is not the dynamics of the region that shape region, it is mainly the external dynamics or actors have affected this region. In Triantaphyllou's words, the regional states could not situate themselves as 'distinct self-aware entity' (Triantaphyllou 2009: 227). The 'awareness' of the region might be formed by the perception of the external actors.

Considering the dynamics of the Black Sea region, one can say that it is almost impossible for the states of the region to meet at the same ground by possessing common characteristics, as argued by many approaches. For instance, there is no common language, religion or culture existing in the region. Even though, the majority of the members of the region concerned had the same imperial and communist experience, it is not sufficient to construct a fully-fledged region. For instance, Turkey has never experienced a communist regime in comparison to the other member states. Likewise, current member states were not the part of a unique empire unlike the nation states that were formed after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and Russian

empire (King 2008: 5). Therefore, the common culture, historical and political experience cannot be identified as these factors form the obstacles before the Black Sea Region to consolidate.

King pointed out that there are three ways to consolidate regions as regional identities, territorial bonds and regionalism itself (King 2008: 3). As stated above, it is possibly not convenient to define Black Sea region according to the first two ways. Hence, a consolidated common structure has not existed (Triantaphyllou 2009: 227). However, as seen in contemporary politics, consolidation can be defined by regionalism. Emerson defined the common ground of all the types of regionalism as a mechanism on which the states are dependent to ensure the common problems of the states (Emerson 2008: 254). This approach can be applied to the Black Sea region as the establishment of a structure to avoid security issues that the other states can posit themselves according to this structure (Emerson 2008: 255, Buzan 1998: 29). However, for defining a region and consolidating a structure, both dynamics of the region should involve the definition concerned. As Buzan's approach demonstrates that security has been a complex structure which should be investigated, taking into consideration all the dynamics and factors, especially the regional security concerns.

Significance of the Black Sea Region

Despite the imagined formation of the Black Sea Region as stated above, its significance due to the geostrategic location can be identified. First, the region may become one of the important trade routes of the world because the region is at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Besides, along with its labor market, the region may be one of the significant trade markets of the world. For instance, Black Sea Economic Cooperation which is one of the significant regional cooperation organizations of the region has estimated 'foreign trade capacity of over 300 billion US dollars annually' (Organisation of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Introduction).

Second, the region is also at the crossroads of the important energy routes, which provides particularly European energy demand such as Yamal-Europe pipeline (Margott and Westphal 2008: 169) Besides, owing to the asymmetric energy dependence to Russia, the European Union has had tendency on applying to other energy resources and possible energy routes and may support these type of projects such as the Nabucco pipeline. Therefore, the region can be an alternative route for the future pipelines to Europe in terms of energy diversification.

Third, in terms of security, the region can be defined as 'zone of conflict and confrontation' in global security manner (Aydın 2004: 6). These conflicts

may be divided into two parts as current conflicts and 'frozen' conflicts. For instance Nagorno-Kababakh conflict has had an international problem and the disagreement on territories in Nagorno-Kababakh might be one of the reasons not to have stabile and close relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Similar to this conflict, disagreement on the territories of Abkhazia provoked the ethnical and political problems in the region and caused Russia-Georgia War in 2008 (Matveeva 2008: 178). After the 2007 enlargement the European Union was presumably concerned with these current or 'frozen' conflicts within the new neighbourhood policy, which may affect the significance of the region even more.

In addition, particularly after September 11 attacks, the numbers of the radicalized religious groups such as radical Salafi groups in Azerbaijan have increased in the Black Sea Region. The research indicates that Islamism in the Black Sea region is rising (NATO Committee Reports: 2007). Islamism as a significant factor in the region may cause the security concerns in international arena due to the situation of both the Muslim minorities in Western countries and Muslims in international arena.

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'Wider' Black Sea Region and Europe

Before 1990's, utilization of the concept 'Eastern Europe' did not only refer to the definition of the region but also had symbolic meaning to describe the Soviet experience of the regional states. After the end of Cold War, the European identity and Europeaness had started to be discussed within the context of the transformation process of the Eastern European countries and the use of the concept 'Central and East Europe' was initiated (Asmus 2006: 20). Two of the 'Central and Eastern European' countries, Bulgaria and Romania brought 'Wider' Black Sea concept to the agenda at first. Hence, the enlargement of NATO and the EU to the shores of the Black Sea was demanded due to their membership requests (Asmus 2006: 16).

The European awareness towards the Black Sea region has started in late 1990's due to the several reasons. First, 2002 NATO enlargement brought 'third wave Euroatlantic enlargement extending from Kyiv to Tbilisi' came to prominence (Asmus 2006: 17). Therefore, the element of the enlargement of European boundaries has not been limited by the common or shared identity and the 'neighbourhood policies' became more significant. Second, the strategic location of the region was set forth in respect to European security. For instance, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis in 2006 which affect the entire European states owing to the energy dependency.

Wider Black Sea Region and the EU

The EU has changed its perception towards the Black sea region like the other

actors in international politics within the European Neighbourhood Policy framework due to the regional benefits and Challenges. Hence, the EU has possibly required having influence on the Black Sea regional conjuncture within the transition process of the regional states as regards to the democratic integration and collective security after the collapse of the Soviet Union and particularly aftermath of September 2001 attacks (Triantaphyllou 2009: 226).

The EU has endeavoured to achieve the domination over this region and to simultanously obtain common mechanism to tackle the possible problems arisen in the region along with the transition process from bipolar world order to multipolar one. One of the aforementioned problems has been the security issue due to the changing dynamics of the Black Sea region. These dynamics have brought about the clashes coming from the heterogeneity of them. Considering these clashes as domestic and regional ones, it is possible to sepearate them into three ways as conflicts in bilateral relations, inter-regional conflicts and terrorism.

As it will be elaborated below, along with the 2004 enlargement, the EU considered a new wide- ranging neighbourhood policy due to the massive expansion on its borders and growing number of neighbourhood states. In 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) which aimed at enhancing the dialogue between the EU and its neighbours and sustaining security conditions was launched. By 2007, the EU expanded this policy particularly towards the Mediteranian dimension. However, in 2007 with the membership of the Romania and Bulgaria, the significance of the Black Sea region has considerably increased.

One of the reasons for the change in the axis of EU foreign policy towards the Black Sea region may be the growing significance of the security issues in the region. Therefore, the security issues have been linked to the EU due to the location of the neighbourhood after 2007 enlargement. The current and frozen conflicts in the region have been the threats against the regional security and stability priorities of the ENP. Hence, these problems have not only affected the security dynamics of Europe but also had influence on international politics such as the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008 (Arbatova 2009: 297, Aydın 2004: 15).

Second, the growing dependence of the EU on Russia in energy relations and the energy security concerns might have affect on the shift of focus from Eastern Europe to 'Wider' Black sea region and the establishment of new security hub. The EU and Russia have mutual energy relations which would be beneficial for both of them; however the reliability of Russia considering sustainable energy flow has possibly not been provided mainly due to the crisis

in Ukraine in 2006 and the energy cutoff after the Georgian conflict in 2008. Therefore, the EU has been seeking to develop alternative ways to decrease this dependence. Energy diversification has been one of the priorities of the Union in accordance with this quest. The EU has supported the alternative pipeline projects such as Nabucco pipeline Project to diminish the energy dependency (Arbatova 2009: 294). Therefore, one of the concerns of the EU has been the security of the current and prospective pipelines. The energy routes and Caspian energy basin of the Black Sea region has been distinguished by their respective locations. Consequently, it is evident that the achievement of stability in this region is by far significant for energy security as long as the priorities set by the EU has been considered.

Third, after the September 11 attacks, the United States (US) enhanced its commitment to her interests on the Black Sea region to hold it as a base against fundamentalist terrorist groups and gather strength which would facilitate taking full measures against a possible nuclear attack of Iran (Ozdamar 2010: 342). In this process, there is a possibility that the growing power of Russia and the United States may decrease the influence of the EU on the region concerned. Therefore, one can say that the Union has had a tendency to have more influence on this region through the establishment of a new balance of power in the region after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Strategies of the EU towards the Black Sea Region

The interest of the EU in the Black Sea region has been quite apparent and to a large extent increased since the end of 1990s and the beginning of 2000s until when the Eastern European states were the priorities of the the EU in comparison to the Black Sea region. In the 1990s, the Union has embarked on the development of the strategies and policies for the region concerned of which significance increased especially with regards to the security issues due to its geostrategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Besides, several ethnic and political conflicts have existed there, which may affect the EU's relations with her new neighbours and strategies developed by the EU towards them. Since the EU has developed further policies and strategies in the region which has been under the influence of the 'competition between great powers to dominate it' (Aydin 2004: 6). The rising power of the US and Russia within the context of the new international political order noticeably affected the new neighbourhood policy of the EU.

The number of the EU's neighbours has considerably increased due to the expansion of its boundaries after the enlargement processes in 2004 and 2007, which inevitably affected its neighbourhood policy. The EU has previously had a different neighbourhood policy through which the EU had dealt with her neighbours at the state level in the Black Sea region and conducted her

relations with bilateral agreements before the subsequent 2004 and 2007 enlargements. Afterwards, the Union realized the significance of the regional cooperations and had a tendency to support them according to her novel policies. Particularly after 2002 NATO enlargement, an argument on the boundaries of Europe have occurred, which triggered the idea of 'third wave of euroroatlantic enlargement from Kyiv to Tbilisi' (Asmus 2006: 17).

European Neighbourhood Policy

EU has initiated a new process with the so-called European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that was launched in 2004 and took decision on the strategies that the Union would develop and follow. After that, three initiatives were launched within the context of the three different dimensions as the Eastern Partnership, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy. The Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy include several Black Sea states such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine that will be examined in the following section.

The major objective of the EU is possibly either to cooperate with her neighbours which are currently exposed to the financial crisis and economic instability or to set forth the ENP and its following initiatives as a noticeable alternative, diminishing the possibility and expectation of their EU membership in order to overcome the over-extended enlargement with. Aydın (2004) pointed out that this policy can be 'a form of exclusion' to protect the borders of the Union. In addition, on the purpose of increasing its influence on them by 2000s, the EU has aimed at having regionally institutionalized relations with the states which are exposed to the economic instability and security problems. Hence, the ENP can be seen as an example of this policy.

Black Sea Synergy

Black Sea Synergy is an initiative that was launched in 2008 within the context of ENP. There were two joint statements one of which was between the EU and Black Sea Foreign Affairs Ministers. In this joint statement, the EU introduced her support to solve the Black Sea Region's problems. Besides, in the article 14, the EU also declared the support of the regional cooperations as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the future regional organisations would be ensured (Joint Statement: 2008, Article 14).

In the joint statement, it is stated that the full measures would be taken to guarantee the regional security and to establish a 'coordinated action in a regional framework' (Joint Statement, 2008). Besides, the EU underlined the importance of democratic and economic reforms. Moreover, in the context of the article 4 of the statement concerned, it is declared that the ENP and 'other EU policies applied in the relationship with countries of region'

could be utilized by the regional states through which the relations would be enhanced. The EU also underlined the other issues and priorities which would be brought to the agenda and endorsed by Black Sea Synergy in addition to the declaration of her support for the regional markets. Finally, the environmental issues and energy security were among the subjects that were concerned by this initiative.

Eastern Partnership

The Eastern Partnership is one of the initiatives, which aspires to improve political and economic relations with Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova and Belarus within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy. In general, the partnership agreement is focused on the democratic transformation of these post-Soviet states and regulation of the market conditions.

Two major objectives of the Eastern Partnership can be identified. First, the EU possibly had the tendency to have institutionalized relations with these states in order to regulate their democratic reforms and have the opportunity to contain the contribution of the political and economic movements of the related countries which are located in the strategically significant regions. Second, by the Eastern Partnership, the EU aspired to balance the rising domination of Russia on the decision-making mechanisms of these countries. In particular, the participation of Belarus was highly contentious in the Union due to the insufficient political and economic reforms that were expected to prevent the corruption and to ensure the human rights as well as the rule of law in Belarus.

In the light of these initiatives, the main objective of the EU in terms of the European Neighbourhood Policy can by and large be identified. The EU has set her priorities concentrating on security and stability within the context of her neighbourhood policy as the Black Sea Region of which political and territorial problems has eventually risen became one of the significant aspects of this policy. Therefore, the EU has supported the regional cooperations since the beginning of the 2000s in order to overcome these problems (Black Sea Synergy Joint Statement: 2008, Article 14). Besides, it is assumed that these cooperations may have considerable effect on the integration process of the Western institutions within the context of this policy (Aydin 2004: 30), which may affect both the foreign policy of the EU and the transformation process of the regional states.

Turkey in the Wider Black Sea region

Turkey has developed a "new geographic[al] imagination" (Aras & Fidan 2009) and commenced on a "new foreign policy activism" (Onis & Yilmaz 2010) by

playing a much more pro-active role in its eastern immediate neighborhood in the 2000s. In the light of Turkish Foreign Minister Davutoğlu's "strategic depth perspective" and "zero problem policy" with all of Turkey's neighboring countries, Ankara has embarked on transforming those conflict ridden region into peace and stability. Actually, this proactive policy has been the continuation of Turkish foreign policy under the Presidency of Turgut Özal in the early days of the Cold War.

The Ozal period

Situated between Asia and Europe and having connection to the Black Sea shoreline, Turkey is a significant actor at the Black Sea region as regards to its geopolitical location. Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has had a tendency to play a significant role at the Black Sea region, specifically within the period of the president Ozal. Turkey is located at a geostategically vital area which is situated between Caspian, Mediteranian and the Aegean Seas. Therefore it would be convenient to argue that Turkey is geographically the key country which connects the isolated Black Sea region to the West (Baran 2008: 87).

The objectives of Turkey on the Black Sea Region evolved within the post-Soviet area along with the shift in balance of power in the region concerned. In this process, Turkey has conducted its foreign policy based on democratic and economic reforms, which allegedly increased the significance of the regional cooperation. Hence, according to the Turkish foreign policy, the regional organisations can be noticeably effective to integrate the regional states, helping them in terms of the transformation process towards the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey was inclined to have close relations with the former Soviet countries and the president Turgut Ozal considered this period as an opportunity for Turkey to become a mediator between them and the Western countries. In order to improve the relations, Turkey has made use of the religion-based statements towards the Muslim population in the states such as Bulgaria. Besides, the approach of Turkish- Islam syntesis has also been applied to the Turkish foreign policy to some extent in the context of the above-mentioned tranformation.

One of the regions that Turkey interested in was the Black Sea region in this period due to the political and economic potential of the region which has drawn the attention of a number of countries. In this period, the objectives of Turkey required the establishment of the regional organisations according to the Turkish policy-making mechanism. For instance, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) which was attended by Turkey, Russian Federation, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Armenia was launched with the Turkish leadership in 1992 and has been one of the leading

cooperations in the Black Sea Region. The main objective of the BSEC was the economy, commercial and technological cooperation of geographically close Black Sea countries, which intended to stabilize and develop these aspects that the cooperation has concentrated. Furthermore, in the long term, the states aimed to establish a free trade zone by improving their economic relations.

The BSEC could be an alternative in policies regarding the security of the region because the establishment of regional organisations might stabilize the problematic issues and, in long term, could develop further strategies for the resolution of the conflicts in addition to those developed by the states themselves (Aydin 2009: 278). For instance, the BSEC brought Armenia and Azerbaijan together which represented the parties clashing over Nagorno and Karabakh. It is also one of the rare organisations which both Turkey and Armenia joined (Baran 88). Although, the leading role and 'enthusiastic start' of the organisation was quite successful, the BSEC did not perform in accordance with its main objectives (Aydin 2009: 279).

In general, the economic reforms and a rather liberal foreign policy were primarily applied in Ozal era. The political reforms and relations were also significant and on the contrary to the past experiences, the direction of the policy was subscribed to the shift from the Western-dependent foreign policy to an interdependent and multi-directional one. In this context, the relations with the West and Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Central Asian countries and the cultural ties with these states have been simultaneously underlined as well. (Ataman 2003: 53)

After the Ozal Period

After the Ozal period, the policy of Turkey based on endorsing the regional organisations in order to maintain security and to improve relations proceeded. In April 2001, another Black Sea regional cooperation BLACKSEAFOR was launched by the leadership of Turkey with the attendance of Turkey, Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, Russian Federation and Ukraine. However, the main target of the organisation changed within a year due to the September 11 attacks. Therefore, the organisation also identified a mission against terrorism. Especially, arranging risk assessment papers to prevent terrorism can also represent an example of the expansion of the main target (Baran 2008: 89). In 2004, another organisation against security Challenges was launched in Turkey as Black Sea Harmony which Russian Federation, Ukraine, Georgia, Romania and Bulgaria participated with the invitation of Turkey. Black Sea Harmony basically contains 'conducting periodic surveillance missions and sharing information' against security threats (Baran 89). In contrast with Ozal era, Turkey has aimed to balance the NATO's activities in the Black

Sea region by these two organisations. Hence, the dominance of NATO in the Black Sea region is against the Turkish maritime policy based on 1936 Montreux Convention. Therefore, one can say that Turkey does not want to lose its privileged position in the Turkish Straits (Baran 2008: 90, Aydın 2009: 280).

Turkey- EU relations in the Black Sea Region

As stated above, the EU has changed her main aim from democratic reforms to regional security and stability in the Black Sea Region within Euro-Atlantic strategy particularly formed with the 2007 enlargement of the EU and the Russia-Georgia War in 2008 (Ozdamar 2010: 341). Therefore, the EU has been aware of the possible effects of security threats coming from the Black Sea Region and takes the initiative to tackle them under these circumstances. In this context, to improve relations and establish a security hub in the region, the EU should probably be in harmony with the regional members in terms of her regional policies and internal dynamics of the region. Therefore, the EU may have connections inside the region to integrate regional members to her standards. Considering the choice of the EU, the primary partners in the region may be identified as Greece, Bulgaria and Romania which are her own members. However, Turkey might also be an appropriate partner of the EU in terms of the Black Sea region. The reasons for this argument will be examined in this chapter.

Turkey as a strategic partner for the EU in the WBSR ?

During the Cold War era, Turkey had been the only NATO member in the Black Sea region and has been a significant member as a buffer zone in there. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has followed its Western-based policies and continued democratic and economic reforms to integrate to the Western institutions. Along with the Ozal period, the emphasis was particularly put on the regional cooperations in order to apply these standards to the region and Turkey had possibly been pioneer in order to ensure the unity in the region. While the integration of the democratic reforms and improvement in economic relations had been significant in Ozal period, regional security came into prominence in 2000s in terms of global security concerns coming from particularly September 11 attacks. As stated above, Turkey was a pioneer in the establishment of BLACKSEAFOR and the Black Sea Harmony as regards to these concerns. Therefore, one can note that the regional security and stability which the EU also advocated became primary aims in its foreign policy.

However, some authors claimed that, as an EU candidate, Turkey is not following a consistent policy towards the Black Sea Region while endeavoring to be a significant actor in there. Hence, it can be considered not as a consistent policy to conduct the EU-candidacy process and to aim at the regional leadership.

Considering the fact that BSEC and similar regional cooperations in which Turkey has been able to considerably demonstrate her leadership are not yet sufficient, the activities of NATO and the EU were intensified in this region in contrast to Turkey which has no tendency to confront the potential dominance of NATO on such occasions. Hence, in case of the dominance of NATO in the Black Sea Region, Turkish policy on the Turkish Straits may be affected and this can have a considerable impact on Turkey's decision making policy. Therefore, Turkey could alternatively endorse the EU dominance in the region against rise of the influence of NATO towards its influence. In this context, it is not inconsistent to lead the regional cooperations in the Black Sea Region and conduct EU membership process at the same time. On the contrary, it can have an impact on the establishment of the Black Sea Dimension of the EU.

Prospects

The significant role of Turkey in the region may be explained in several reasons. First, during the post-Cold War era, Turkey has attached importance to regional cooperations in its foreign policy. Correspondingly, it has led the regional cooperations as the BSEC, BLACKSEAFOR and the Black Sea Harmony to foster economic relations and political dialogue in the Black Sea region. By this means, it has also led the political dialogue of the some regional members which have political disagreements. In addition, some of these countries such as Armenia are also those which Turkey has previously had problems with. This can be explained that the priorities of the Turkish foreign policy have changed toward political dialogue and economic development although it has had some problems with the regional members.

The political dialogue with the neighbour states has been one of the main elements of the Turkish foreign policy along with the second term of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). In its second term, along with the application of the 'zero problem' policy of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu, political dialogue for the solution of the problems and the improvement of the economic relations with the neighbours of Turkey have been strongly underlined. For instance, the Annan plan for the future of Cyprus was supported in this period for the solution of this problem. Therefore, along with its evolved foreign policy, Turkey endeavoured to foster her relations with its neighbours in 2000s, which might facilitate the aspirations of Turkey to become a more effective and significant actor in the Black Sea Region.

Second, considering the EU's foreign policy in this region under the influence of the ENP and the Partnership and Cooperation agreement with Russia, the EU should cooperate with Russia and ensure the balance of power in the Black Sea Region. However, the replacement agreement for the partnership has not yet been adopted since 2008 due to the Russia-Georgia war. Therefore, it is

necessary to note that the EU-Russian relations has not been strengthened enough to consolidate a new agreement. On the contrary, the Russia-Turkey relations have been improved in a consistent way. Their intensifying economic relations have prompted these two Eurasian geopolitical rivals of the Cold War years to engage in strategic cooperations - particularly in the field of energy - in the new era (İşeri 2010). Along with these economic relations, following the 2008 August war, Ankara and Moscow have begun to work in tandem to promote non-violent solutions to the present disputes and of removing causes of future armed conflicts with the CSCP (Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform). In this context, the enhancement of the Russia-Turkey relations can serve as an important element for the EU to ensure its security in the WBSR.

The EU has had dependence on Russian natural resources in energy trade and these relations might be defined as asymmetric due to the scarcity of the alternative energy resources and routes. Russia and the EU have also challenges on energy security particularly after Russia-Ukraine energy crisis in 2006 and Russia-Georgia War in 2008. Therefore, the EU has had tendency on energy diversification policies which were also conveniently noted in Green Paper in 2006. In terms of the energy diversification, Turkey, as an EU candidate, can be an alternative transit country and a significant partner in alternative energy routes such as the Nabucco pipeline and White Stream pipeline project. Therefore, having enhanced relations with Russia and having been an EU candidate, Turkey can play an effective role in the political dialogue between Russia and the EU, which may also affect the balance in the Black Sea region.

Third, Turkey is the only country which is democratic, secular and mainly Muslim populated in the Black Sea region. This unique position might bring the harmony through the combination of the democratic institutions and the values of Islam, which can also render Turkey a robust model for the Muslim minorities of the Black Sea countries. Hence, along with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regional members have been in transition process toward the Western-based institutions and the conflicts with regards to religion may be an unavoidable challenge that the related countries should have consensus on. Besides, Turkey as an example of Muslim and secular country may also help religious minorities adopt and integrate to the Western-based institutions. In this context, Turkey can be a useful element for the ENP as an example to the Muslim minorities for the Black Sea dimension of the EU.

Fourth, the improvement in Turkish economy which has strong growth more than 6% annually in 2008 can be noted. The economy of Turkey may be considered rapidly developed with the world's 15th largest GDP-PPP and 17th

largest Nominal GDP. Along with the development of the economy of Turkey, its policy to become an effective regional power can be achieved in order to consider the European economic crisis as an opportunity. Therefore, the economy of Turkey may be an important element in the regional cooperation in the Black Sea region.

Challenges

In the establishment process of the Black Sea security, several Challenges can be noted in terms of the role of Turkey in this region. First, in spite of the improvement in the candidacy process of Turkey that indicates the start of candidacy process in 2005, this process may be defined as a stagnation period later because the EU Council halted the opening of eight chapters owing to the Cyprus problem in Turkey-Cyprus-Greece relations. Since that time, a significant improvement in relations with the EU can apparently not be achieved. Besides, since the second quarter of 2005, the shift in the Turkish public opinion can be tangibly observed in terms of the dramatic decline of the support for and the confidence in the EU membership of Turkey in particular and EU in general according to the research Eurobarometer. (Eurobarometer September 2010 Reports, Turkey: 5) The rate of confidence of the Turkish people in the EU has sharply declined from 71% to 42% within 6 years. This decline may affect the candidacy process and might cause mistrust between the EU and Turkey. Therefore, the relations with the EU might not be sufficiently convenient for a possible EU-Turkey cooperation in the context of the Black Sea security.

Second, Turkey has had a contentious disagreement with one of the regional members, Armenia and the relationship between Turkey and Armenia has been exposed to a considerable decline as the Turkish-Armenian border has been closed since 1993 and the political dialogue between the both states has been at the minimum level. Nagorno- Karabakh conflict has been one of the issues that confronted Turkey and Armenia due to the fact that Turkey has supported the view of Azerbaijan. Besides, alleged Armenian genocide is still causing the rise of tension between these states. On the other hand, Turkey has also experienced problems with some EU countries owing to the alleged genocide. For instance, there has been tension between Turkey and France due to the law against the denial of genocide since December 2011 and this situation may affect the EU candidacy process of Turkey. To become a significant regional player, Turkey should solve the problems with the regional members in terms of political dialogue.

Third, Turkey has had a serious internal conflict with its Kurdish citizens and terror of Kurdish Nationalist Party (PKK) and it might affect the establishment of the regional security hub. Besides, this problem may also affect the regional

members, becoming a regional problem that extends beyond the borders of Turkey further. Furthermore, regarding the establishment of the Black Sea dimension of the EU, this problem has possibly been a serious threat for the regional security policies of the EU. Due to these reasons, the transformative role of Turkey in the region might have challenges that place the future of the current regional cooperation at stake as well.

Fourth, the major dependence of Turkey to Russia as regards to energy resources may affect the policies of Turkey on the side of Russia. For instance, the South Stream pipeline project which is the alternative pipeline project of Russia for the Nabucco pipeline was approved by the Turkish government. One can be noted that the South Stream pipeline will possibly affect the sufficiency of the Nabucco pipeline which is supported by the European Union as regards to her energy diversification policy. Therefore, it can be considered that Turkey may not be a significant actor in the energy diversification policy of the European Union as a transit state.

Conclusion

The establishment of the Black Sea dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy is considered after the enlargement of the European Union in 2007. Hence, the EU has placed as a neighbor with more than 50% of the Black Sea shoreline in case of the potential membership of Turkey. Along with the Russia-Georgia war in 2008, the gravity of the EU policies has changed from democratic reforms to the regional security issues in this region. The growing rate of the radicalized Islamic groups has been also increased the importance of the Black Sea region in terms of regional security and stability.

The main objective of this paper was to assess emerging region power Turkey's potential contributions to the EU in its endeavor to transform the Wider Black Sea Region. By considering ongoing instabilities and protracted conflicts in the region mainly due to the clashing agendas of Radical Islamists, the region's smaller states and that of the regional and extra-regional great powers, the paper has argued that as despite its rhetoric of being "central power" or regional power, Turkey still lacks necessary soft-power democratic means to ignite a "demonstrative effect" to transform the region into a zone of peace. At this point, EU anchor with its conditionality on democracy is a significant asset for Turkey not only for strengthening its own democracy (civilian construction, freedom of speech, etc.), but also, bolster its international prestige to transform the region into a zone of peace at a time of 'Arab spring'.

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Problems in Transformation of Apprenticeship in Turkey With Respects to EU Criteria

Betül Açıkgöz¹

Abstract: Traditionally being the indispensable component of the agricultural activities in Turkey, children have also been trained for some certain crafts in small manufacture businesses in the cities. Starting from apprenticeship, they evolve into experts by going through the steps in a certain time period. The advent of the industrial activities has increased the diversity of the jobs offered to children today. Both the nature and conditions of the child labor have deteriorated and exposed the latent drawbacks. Increasing exploitation of child labor led the state to make new legislation to prevent it. The way the conventional system of apprenticeship in this context was incorporated to the modern educational system. In order to improve the workfare of the working children, the government issued several laws and made new regulations, some of which were the requirements of the international agreements. Yet, the legal status and working conditions of the apprentices were largely ignored and the relationship between apprentices and employers were not taken under the control. The lack of state control on apprenticeship, as a living practice still in small and medium-sized enterprises, created new forms of child labor. In addition, since apprenticeship status was not defined by the state until the 1980s, the integration of apprenticeship into the vocational schools has taken a longer and troublesome duration in recent decades. Thus, still, Turkey has to confront the problem of informal apprentices who are called “apprentice” but have no registration in apprenticeship schools. What is more, the two legged legislation about apprenticeship –defining apprenticeship under the Law of Debts issued in 1926 and the Law of Apprenticeship, Journeymen and Mastership issued in 1977 differently- discriminated the apprentices by their branches; and created discord and inequality in terms of basic rights such as insurances for health and accidents. This paper intends to seek for the validity and coherence of the law issued in 2001, which allows the traditional way of apprentice training to continue in the context of modern industry and businesses. The comparison to EU countries and criteria are going to be made part of the paper to shed light on the issue on an international scope.

¹ Betül Açıkgöz is a lecturer in the Department of History of Atatürk’s Principles and Revolution at Fatih University. She is also a PhD candidate in the Institute for Modern Turkish History at Bosphorus University.

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The value imposed on children has always had an economic side. Child labor was, needless to say, a part of the economy in the pre-industrial periods as well as it is in the modern capitalist world. Currently, not only in the undeveloped countries it survives, but it also has an increasing trend in the industrialized countries, though the percentage of child labor in the welfare states is by far lesser than the former.² The difficulty in handling the issue is that there is no such a clear, short cut way of abolishing it by the way of prohibition. Prevention of child labor, being a multi-dimensional issue in economic and social terms, has numerous hindrances for overcoming. First, the fact that the prohibition attempt only transforms the exploitation into an underground issue urges governments to sanction it in certain limits and conditions, at least, to keep the problem visible on the surface so that it becomes possible to keep on controlling and dealing with. In addition to this, another difficulty derives from the very nature of the trouble. The total abolishment cannot secure the situation of the child since children might be driven to be the victim of drug selling and child abuse issues, in addition to being illegal industrial workers in its worst conditions. Unless the reasons that lead children to working areas are erased, the policy towards child labor, as given in a nutshell above, has to be exercised in a gradual and mild way.

As well as the economic reasons such as poverty, child labor is also encouraged by the social and cultural norms. As shown by Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (1982) in a survey conducted on a considerable number of people, the economic value given to children does not change with economic development: "Unexpectedly, we found no relationship positive or negative, between income level and economic values of children."³ What seems to be a significant factor is education. The rates about "the economic or utilitarian" value of children decreases as the education level of respondents meet the high school and university education.⁴ It is noted that especially education creates an important change among women who are more dependent on their children in the old age-time. While dealing with child labor, it is also crucial to recognize the cultural impetus behind it.

The traditional policy against child labor was to formalize it under the system

2 Sanayide Çalışan Çocuklar Raporu. (2000). Hak-İş Konfederasyonu Yayınları. Ankara.

3 Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı, (1982) The Changing Value of Children in Turkey. Papers of East-West Population Institute. Hawaii. p.42

4 ibid. p. 44

called guilds.⁵ Through the guilds, it was possible to restrict the exploitation of child labor, since it was a mutual deal, good for both parts; the employer and the employee. Needless to say, the time they ceased to be efficiently working institutions corresponds to the emergence of the proletariat being the cheap labor. As observed in many countries, the transformation of the guild system in the industrial period was not accomplished very successfully. The economic norms of the capitalist system, technical innovations and industrial changes did not match with the old institutions, and led them to decline unless they were reshaped and reframed. Adam Smith criticizes the apprenticing system on different grounds:

Apprenticeship was claimed by Adam Smith to be part of the 'Policy of Europe', in representing the 'exclusive privileges of corporation' established to prevent any reduction in prices, offering no guarantee of quality and restricting competition through its length and limitations on numbers.⁶

However, S.R. Epstein, in his article (1998), comes up with the argument that highlights the important role of guilds in sustaining and transmitting the skilled labor through ages, without ignoring the argument that they were not open to new development and opposed to technical innovation. Epstein (1998) states that "the economics of preindustrial apprenticeship has been virtually ignored" ever since Smith's judgment that the apprenticing system was a hindrance to the development of labor market. Today, Epstein's argument about the apprenticing guilds can be denied on the basis of some countries where the guild system had no way of surviving in places such as England and America while it can also be confirmed on the example of Germany and Austria.

In England, the system and the customs did not work well with the rapid changing values of economic structure. The market economy and the emergence of instability decreased the incentive of apprentices. Being one of the leading countries of liberal economy, the incessant mobility in jobs left no reasonable pretext for the masters to employ people and face the results of obligations in the contracts. Hilary Steedman, in her comparison of British youth training to German, identifies "employer-based youth training system" in Germany as one point lacking in Britain. Later laws made to devise

5 For a short summary of the apprenticeship and "ahilik" relationship historically, Özlem Ünlühisarcıklioğlu. "Vocational Training through the Apprenticeship System in Turkey." (Eds) Lesley Farrell and Tara Fenwick, World Yearbook of Education 2007: Educating the Global Workforce: Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Knowledge Workers. Routledge. UK. p. 115-125

6 Linda Clarke, "From Craft to Qualified Building Labor in Britain: A Comparative Approach". Labor History Vol. 46, No.4 (November, 2005) p.477

a modern system in England followed the German model “in respect of level of youth wages, duration of training programs and monitoring employer organizations.”⁷ England is still one of the countries in EU leading a quite unqualified training system.⁸

As for the case in the United States, the mutual relationship between masters and the apprentice no more provided benefits for the parts. The increasing number of runaway apprentices was very common. Nonetheless, the employers did not put any force to sustain the system since there was the advantage of cheap child and women labor.⁹ As a result of this, it is stated by Bernard Elbaum that the United States had to face some “social costs because it lacked institutions that could systematically train skilled manual labor.”¹⁰

Austria, Germany, Belgium and Denmark are observed to have a very efficiently running system of vocational training among the EU members. Practice-oriented training is an integrated part of the formal education in these countries. In the reports published by European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 60 % of young people follow a vocational training in Germany, and in Austria, 40 % of the youngsters aged 15-18 are trained in the apprenticeship training system.¹¹ The data show that the vocational training forms a great leg of the education in these countries. Though the systems of these countries vary in certain ways, one of the common points among them is that the age of joining a school of vocational training starts after the compulsory education is completed, which generally corresponds to the age of 15-16. Another noteworthy point extracted from the case of Germany and Austria is that the system of apprenticeship training is very well supplemented and corresponded to the business and industry world. Hence, it successfully caters skilled labor for the world of work. The mutual accord and agreement of the apprenticeship system with the business world makes it persist in a productive way. I would like to specialize more about Germany in this essay, since it sets an example for the Turkish constitution of vocational schooling. Germany, with its well-functioning and old-established guild system, led the way to transform its old system into the vocational training system seemingly

7 Hilary Steedman, “The Economics of the Youth Training in Germany”. The Economic Journal, Vol.103, No. 420.(Sept. 1993) p.1289

8 <http://www.ueapme.com/>

9 Daniel Jacoby, “The Transform of Industrial Apprenticeship in the United States.” The Journal of Economic History, V:51, No.4 (Dec., 1991), p. 888

10 Bernard Elbaum, “Why Apprenticeship Persisted in Britain but Not in the United States.” The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 49 No.2, (Jun., 1989), pp.349

11 <http://www.ueapme.com>

without much serious problem. As shown in the EU guide of apprenticeship, the benchmarking of apprenticeship is seen to be almost perfectly achieved by Germany.¹² The practice-oriented education is based on vocational schools and companies provide apprentice training; the vocational schools enable the theoretical background as well as an initial training at school, the companies train the employee under the apprenticeship program. The apprenticeship certificate is recognized in pay agreements, and the given data in the reports demonstrates that it really works efficiently: "In 1991, between two and four years after the end of apprenticeship, eighty-two percent were working in the occupation for which they had trained and sixty-nine percent were working in their original training firm."¹³ Germany leads an employer-based training system. That is, the companies run the apprenticeship training and its costs. That way, the state ensures apprentice training for a less expensive way and "problems of mismatch of young people's occupational training choice to employer's recruitment needs" are avoided.¹⁴ As a result, although there could be some other economical and social reasons behind, apprenticeship training as a part of old guild system did cherish and became a considerably big part of the education, basically because it continued to be catered by employers in Germany.

Turkey, being one of the countries afflicted by child labor issue seriously in its ongoing industrialization period, had to take some steps against this problem especially after the flow of emigration to the cities, which caused the invisible child labor in agriculture become apparent in the factories or streets of big cities. Actually, the recognition of the problem in Turkey dates back to the Ottoman governments with the decline of the guild system and the emergence of small industrial areas. The guild system, which was already degenerated for some reasons such as the late capitulations on Ottoman Empire, did not transmit its well-established educational and structural experience of raising skilled labor to the new institutions of the Turkish Republic. Having lost their authority in administering the issues concerning craft corporations, guilds were evolved into professional foundations in 1912.¹⁵

¹² <http://www.ueapme.com>

¹³ Hilary Steedman, "The Economics of the Youth Training in Germany". *The Economic Journal*, Vol.103, No. 420.(Sept. 1993) p.1281

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p.1286

¹⁵ Mine Çınar, E., "The Present Day Status of Small-Scale Industries in Bursa, Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.20 (1988), p.291

Turkey had numerous steps, some of which were achieved by the requirements of the international agreements, to improve the workfare of the working children, yet it, largely, ignored the working conditions of the apprentices. Apprenticeship, though not so effectively functioning, was still alive in the society both in practice and in people's mind as a part of the old customs. Considering the fact that people still give their children for the use of masters to ensure their future with a profession, instead of letting them attend schools in Turkish society, it is quite clear that the neglect of the state must have created a considerably big gap in the administration of social and education life during the 1926-1977 years.

The results of the state's neglect led to the emergence of some economic and social problems. First, the existing apprentices, journeymen and even the masters of the old system turned to be cheap labor.¹⁶ Additionally, the lack of state control over the continuing apprentice-employer relationship in small and medium-sized enterprises might have been a factor triggering and increasing the child labor after the growth of industry. What is more, since apprenticeship status was not defined by the state for years, the integration of apprenticeship into the formal education has been a troublesome issue in recent decades. In Hak-İş reports derived from certain industrial areas in Turkey, it is stated that there is still –in 2000- a great lack of knowledge about the social and legal benefits of attending apprenticeship centers. Some of the so-called apprentices do not have a legal apprentice-status, since they have hardly heard about apprenticeship training centers and the rights that go with it.¹⁷ Thus, still, Turkey has to deal with the problem of informal apprentices who are called “apprentice” in the working areas but have no registration in apprenticeship schools. In conclusion, the cost of not devising a modern formal training system has been a lot for Turkey.¹⁸

The national education in the Republican period led the policy of uniformity. This way although vocational schools are established, the training part of the education was not allowed to take place in the working places. This caused two disadvantages for the state. First, it had to finance all costs of vocational education, a very costly education, while employers, who were actually traditionally providers of the training system, took on no responsibilities. Second, the vocational education given in schools became old-fashioned in time since it is impossible for the state to create the atmosphere and conditions of companies in the schools in terms of economic and ergonomic shortages.

16 Kadriye Bakırcı (2004). Çocuk ve Genç İşçilerin Haklarının Korunması. BETA. İstanbul

17 Sanayide Çalışan Çocuklar Raporu. Hak-İş Konfederasyonu Yayınları. Ankara: 2000

18 Kadriye Bakırcı (2004). Çocuk ve Genç İşçilerin Haklarının Korunması. BETA. İstanbul p.9

Hence, the graduates of these schools confronted with unemployment, since their education and branches did not make a good match with the needs of the business sector.¹⁹ The practice-oriented part of education, which could have been implemented in the working places, was totally ignored until 1970s. This neglect of the formal apprenticeship training resulted in the lack of skilled labor after the industrialization started to take its part.²⁰ The only regulation made about the situation of the apprentices existed in Law of Debts as a supplementary part in several articles. In this law, the apprentice-master relationship was considered as a due relationship and it was arranged for the benefit of employers rather than apprentices. "This law (1926 Law of Debts) was far beyond protecting apprentices because it was put into effect under the liberal influence."²¹ "

Law of Apprenticeship, Journeymen and Mastership Number 2089 issued in 1977 can be considered as the first attempt of integrating apprenticeship into the vocational education, though it lacked certain regulations about welfare and workfare of apprentices. The law defined the apprentice as a student and the relationship between a master and an apprentice was described as a kind of due relationship, in contrast to some foreign laws, where it was defined as a kind of service relationship. This student-status caused a controversy in Turkey, since it ignores the fact that apprentices work for the employers and take a considerable part in production as well as doing the most detestable parts of the errands like cleaning.²²

Unfortunately, we could not reach many sources and the discussions held in the Great National Assembly concerning the law of 1977, however, it seems that the academic community and the politicians did not give much attention to this law since they were engaged a lot with political tumultuous in that period in Turkey. The only information we could reach about the background of this law is that it was first prepared and offered to the President in 1972; however, having being rejected by the President, it is overlooked for 5 more years. Knowing the fact that in 1970s there were some attempts in England and some other European countries to follow German patterns by integrating the vocational training with the formal education, it could be articulated that this European trend might also have triggered the attempts in Turkey. Another point that describes the ambience of the 1970s lies in the economic changes: "By 1970, manufacturing accounted for a fifth of GNP, and by 1978 this sector

19 <http://www.aesob.org.tr/calisma/meslekiegitim.aspx>

20 Kadriye Bakırcı (2004). Çocuk ve Genç İşçilerin Haklarının Korunması. BETA. İstanbul p.110

21 Tankut Centel, (1992) Çocuklar ile Gençlerin İş Güvenliği. İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları p. 28

22 Tankut Centel, (1992) Çocuklar ile Gençlerin İş Güvenliği. İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları p. 50

was responsible for a greater share of GNP than agriculture.”²³ Thus, Turkey had to confront the hidden problems of apprentices and working children in the industry.

Second step was taken with Law of Apprenticeship and Vocational Training Number 3308 issued in 1986 and inspired by one of Turgut Özal’s advisors who had his education in Germany. German training and vocational education was taken as the model. This law for the first time combined the vocational education with apprenticeship. The new law guaranteed the compulsory education by obliging the primary school diploma as a condition of being accepted as an apprentice. The apprentice-students are required to get their theoretical education in apprenticeship centers a day a week, and the other days they are trained in the working places of companies. However, the number of the training centers and schools were not enough as well as the variety of branches in every city. Thus, the law did not cover all apprentices working in all branches. Some of them continued to be regulated by the Law of Debts that was made in 1926 and not enough to protect apprentices.

The discrimination of apprentices according to their branches created an inequality in terms of responsibilities and rights. The most important distinction between two laws is that the apprentices of certain branches under the Apprenticeship Law are provided with the insurances of health and accidents and while the others were excluded from these rights since the only return the apprentice can demand from his work is to get the hold of his profession according to Law of Debts. Another difference is that the apprentices who are submitted to Apprenticeship Law are paid one-third of the minimum wage of their age and the employer is exempted from tax, while Law of Debts apprentices are not supposed to be paid or -if paid because of cultural and social norms- less paid since their employers get no support from the state. As a result, the literature about apprenticeship in Turkey is full of conflicting regulations of the two laws not only in the abovementioned major issues, but also in the other working conditions such as their working hours and paid holidays.²⁴

The amendment made in Apprenticeship Law numbered 3308 concerned the problematic parts of the Law of 1986. These rearrangements made accordingly with EU standards in 2001 constituted the third step of reforming the apprenticeship and vocational education. In the first place, Turkey went

23 Ronnie Margulies, “Trade Unions and Turkey’s Working Class”. State Terror in Turkey. MERIP reports, No.121.,(Feb.,1984) p.15

24 Fatih Uşan. “Çıraklık Sözleşmesi”. Master Thesis. Konya. 1994

through a few crucial structural reforms in its education system in 1997. The compulsory education was extended to 8 years. Thus the vocational schools and apprentice training centers were permitted to recruit the students aged 14-15.

Besides, the new law combined the apprenticeship and vocational school under the same regulation and named it only "vocational education". This was one of the qualifications required by EU, as well. The law provides all students in the apprentice training centers and vocational schools with the same certificate at the end of their schools. Their health and accident insurances are covered by the state and their wage is determined compared to minimum wage. Moreover, the new vocational education law comprised all branches of apprentices by developing the infrastructure of the training centers. Thus, the inequality among apprentices is avoided in this way. In addition to the integration of vocational training into formal education, the vocational education was aimed to be a co-operation between schools and companies. The enterprises employing more than 20 employees are obliged to accept certain numbers of trainees. The system aims to overcome problems of costliness and mismatch of labor.

Although the law with the amendment made in 2001 has brought certain accomplishments concerning the structure of education system and vocational education in particular, it was not welcomed so well owing to two concerns. The first concern was that the extension of compulsory education would cause the vocational education declining more, which was argued mostly depending on the cultural philosophy of "You cannot teach old dog new tricks". However, this concern ignored the fact that this reform decreased the number of working children in an economic activity to 4.24 % (511.000) in 1999 from 8.54 % (974.000) in 1994.²⁵ On the other hand, the second concern was related to the abolishment of age limit to start the apprenticeship. Some organizations and academicians opposed to the new regulation on the grounds that it will increase the number of pseudo-apprentices. In the previous form of the Vocational Education law, admission to apprenticeship was limited with the age of 19, which means youngsters older than this age had no chance of becoming an apprentice. The new law abolished this age limit, and did not limit it. The necessity for this change is justified with the employment pretext: It opens the way of getting the mastership certificate for people who finished a high school or university, and thus creates a chance for the unemployed educated people to join the labor market. In fact, it is not so extra-ordinary because the correspondence of this arrangement can be

25 <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/ankara/programme/ipec/government.htm>

found in the apprenticeship regulations of EU members, as well. Although EU standards do not enforce the member countries to have or not to have a certain upper limit of age for apprenticeship, there is not much diversity in this issue. It could be because of the fact that most of these countries renewed their system as taking the German model. Except Spain, which limits apprenticeship by the age of 25, the other countries, to name a few, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, England and Italy have no upper limit while they all have the basic requirement of completing the compulsory education, which corresponds to age of 15-16. Most of them define their target group between 16 and 20 despite the absence of upper limit. However, for Turkish case, the reports attained from the field studies show that the likelihood of the certain manipulations and exploitations is rather high since the number of small and medium-sized enterprises is significantly high in Turkey. It is also well known that particularly the small-scaled industries cannot survive without the help of family work or child labor.

Another type of advantage of small scale firms enjoy over larger firms is the use of family or child labor...Those who do not have access to female family labor due to the nature of the production process (such as metal casting), did not do well when market conditions changed against them.²⁶

This might lead to cheap labor of adults in disguise of apprentices since their insurances are paid by the state and their wages are only one-third of the minimum wage. Bakırcı states the same worries as follows:

The studies conducted in Turkey demonstrate that the apprenticeship system has no more concerns of training apprentices. The low prices and the state protection over insurances cause the exploitation of the system... Although the law aimed to encourage the system, the employers have been using it as a chance of cheap labor.²⁷

She also identifies another important shortage of the law. There are some limitations concerning the conditions of working children such as not allowing children do some dangerous works in the working places. However, the Vocational Education Law does not implement the articles of the Law of Work. Therefore, in the written documents there is no limitation about the dangerous works that apprentices are not allowed to practice. She reminds that the international laws do not need to add it to the Vocational Laws. Yet, in Turkey, this gap can be exploited since the apprentices are not only used for training in the working places, but most of the time their labor is used to

26 Mine Çınar, E., "The Present Day Status of Small-Scale Industries in Bursa, Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol.20 (1988), p. 291-299

27 Kadriye Bakırcı (2004). *Çocuk ve Genç İşçilerin Haklarının Korunması*. BETA. İstanbul p. 150

contribute to the production.²⁸

The bureaucrats in charge of the management of the apprenticeship also recognize the concerns around the upper limit of apprenticeship. Osman Akkuş, -whom we interviewed- in charge of General Directory of Apprenticeship, stated that they have not met a tendency toward the exploitation of adult labor in disguise of apprenticeship so far. He told that the people who took the advantage of the new regulation were mostly the university students planning to establish or run their own businesses by getting a mastership certificate. However, he reserved to ignore the likelihood of such abuses, and said that the community should be open to researches and discussion on this issue.

As a conclusion, Turkey has recently promised to recover some problematic parts in the education system in the context of the EU membership. These are more about the extension of compulsory education to the EU average of 9 years. In addition, some requirements related to the finance and management of apprenticeship training has been on the agenda of Turkey and EU agreement process. Moreover, dealing with child labor is one of the social policy issues that are obliged by EU. It is, without any doubt, for sure that the compulsory education law (1998) and the vocational education law amended in 2001 effaced the shortages of the old regulations, and it should by all means be considered as a significant reform in the education system. It was also a substantial step in the way of agreement with EU quality criteria²⁹, which seems to be accomplished by Turkey in some of the articles including the dual structure of training, criteria about apprenticeship contract, the evaluation and assessment of the apprentices, the integration of apprenticeship into national system etc. However, these arrangements though seem to be all right on the documents, have not been reflected on the practical dimension yet. The numbers of apprentices, journeymen or even masters who work without any insurance are still documented in the reports of the field studies. The reality outside the written laws might teach us that some regulations should be transferred to the Turkish context without ignoring the local framework.

28 Kadriye Bakırcı (2004). Çocuk ve Genç İşçilerin Haklarının Korunması. BETA. İstanbul p.149

29 <http://www.ueapme.com/>

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