

THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
UNIVERSITY OF BAHÇEŞEHİR

**MAINSTREAM TURKISH-CYPRIOI POLITICAL PARTIES' ATTITUDES TOWARDS
CYPRUS PROBLEM**

Master's Thesis

BURAK KARABAY

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ISTANBUL, 2017

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THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY

BAHCESEHIR UNIVERSITY

INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

GLOBAL AFFAIRS PROGRAMME

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MAJOR PROFESSOR: Assistant ProfessorTM YUKSEL ALPER ECEVIT

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ABSTRACT

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Burak Karabay

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With the election of Mustafa Akıncı as the Turkish-Cypriot leader in 2015, a new positive atmosphere emerged for a solution to Cyprus problem. Whatever the leaders agree on, a solution formula will have to be approved by Greek and Turkish-Cypriots in separate referendums, as it was the case in 2004. The attitudes of political parties and their leaderships are among the parameters which will determine the outcome of a referendum. The purpose of this study is to explore mainstream Turkish-Cypriot political parties' approach to Cyprus problem and determine whether there are significant differences between them. In the study, history of mainstream political parties represented in the TRNC parliament as of November 2016 and details of their past and current opinions on a solution are explored. Since their number is significant enough to affect the result of a referendum, we also provide information on Turkish-immigrants who acquired TRNC citizenship and their political behaviours. Moreover, we give a short history of Cyprus and Cyprus conflict.

Keywords: Cyprus Problem, Turkish-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriot Political Parties

ÖZET

ANAAKIM KIBRIS TÜRK SİYASİ PARTİLERİNİN KIBRIS SORUNUNA BAKIŞI

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Mustafa Akıncı'nın 2015 yılında Kıbrıs Türk liderliğine seçilmesiyle birlikte, Kıbrıs sorununun çözümüne ilişkin yeniden olumlu bir hava ortaya çıkmıştır. Liderlerin anlaştıkları formülden bağımsız olarak, bulunacak bir çözüm Kıbrıs Rum ve Kıbrıs Türk toplumları tarafından 2004 yılında olduğu gibi ayrı ayrı referandumlarda onaylanmak zorunda olup, siyasi partilerin ve liderlerinin tutumu bir referandumun sonucunu etkileyecek parametreler arasındadır. Bu çalışma ana akım Kıbrıs Türk siyasi partilerinin Kıbrıs sorununa yaklaşımlarını anlamayı ve bu yaklaşımlar arasında önemli farklılıklar bulunup bulunmadığını ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Çalışmada 2016 Kasım itibariyle KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi'nde temsil edilen partilerin tarihi ile Kıbrıs sorununa ilişkin geçmişteki ve günümüzdeki yaklaşımları incelenmiştir. Sayıları bir referandumun sonucunu etkileyecek kadar önemli olduğundan, KKTC vatandaşlığı elde etmiş Türkiyeli göçmenler ve siyasi davranışları hakkında da bilgi aktarılmaktadır. Buna ek olarak, Kıbrıs ve Kıbrıs sorununun tarihi hakkında kısaca bilgi verilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kıbrıs Sorunu, Kıbrıslı Türkler, Kıbrıs Türk Siyasi Partileri

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKEL	: Progressive Party of The Working People (<i>Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laoú</i>)
AKP	: Justice And Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
ANAP	: Motherland Party (<i>Anavatan Partisi</i>)
BDH	: Peace and Democracy Movement (<i>Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi</i>)
BKP	: United Cyprus Party (<i>Birleşik Kıbrıs Partisi</i>)
CTP	: Republican Turkish Party (<i>Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi</i>)
CTP-BG	: Republican Turkish Party-United Forces (<i>Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi-Birleşik Güçler</i>)
DISI	: Democratic Rally (<i>Dimokratikós Sinayermós</i>)
DMP	: Democratic Struggle Party (<i>Democratic Mücadele Partisi</i>)
DP	: Democratic Party (<i>Demokrat Parti</i>)
DP-UG	: Democratic Party-National Forces (<i>Demokrat Parti-Ulusal Güçler</i>)
DSP	: Democratic Left Party (<i>Demokratik Sol Parti</i>)
ECHR	: European Court of Human Rights
EOKA	: National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (<i>Ethniki Organosis Kypriou Agoniston</i>)
EU	: European Union
GAU	: Kyrenia American University
GKK	: Security Forces Commandership (<i>Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı</i>)
KSP	: Cyprus Socialist Party (<i>Kıbrıs Sosyalist Partisi</i>)
MBP	: Nationalist Peace Party (<i>Milliyetçi Barış Partisi</i>)
MHP	: Nationalist Movement Party (<i>Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi</i>)
OIC	: Organisation of Islamic Conference
ORP	: Freedom and Reform Party (<i>Özgürlük ve Reform Partisi</i>)
RoC	: Republic of Cyprus
TBP	: Turkish Unity Party (<i>Türk Birliği Partisi</i>)
TEPAV	: The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey
TFSC	: Turkish Federated State of Cyprus
TKP	: Communal Liberation Party (<i>Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi</i>)
TMT	: Turkish Resistance Movement (<i>Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı</i>)
TRNC	: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

TUSIAD	: Turkish Industry and Business Association
UBP	: National Unity Party (<i>Ulusal Birlik Partisi</i>)
UNFICYP	: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
USSR	: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
YDH	: New Birth Movement (<i>Yeni Doğuş Hareketi</i>)
YDP	: New Birth Party (<i>Yeni Doğuş Partisi</i>)
YKP	: New Cyprus Party (<i>Yeni Kıbrıs Partisi</i>)

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1. INTRODUCTION

Cyprus reunification negotiations entered a stagnant phase after the failure of Annan Plan in 2004. With the failure of the plan due to Greek-Cypriot rejection, internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus (RoC) became an EU member representing the whole island. Turkish-Cypriots were excluded from the EU accession process as a community, but became EU citizens as individuals. As another important step, the borders between the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot zones were opened by the Turkish-Cypriot administration in April 2003 and freedom of movement through the island was reinstated. This move relatively facilitated the intermingling of the two communities which had been very limited in the previous 29 years.

In the post-Annan era, Turkish-Cypriot pro-solution groups managed to gain control and enjoyed public support for half a decade which coincided with the economic boom experienced before the 2008 Financial Crisis. However, this period ended due to economic hardships, alleged mismanagement and unfulfilled promises of the EU on isolations; thus conservatives regained power in 2009. Greek-Cypriots, who were much more connected to the world economy, suffered a severe economic crisis during 2012/2013 due to the European debt crisis. Nonetheless, they managed to exit from the EU bailout programme in 2016 after strict austerity measures and implementation of reforms.

The post-Annan era also witnessed the failure of the “osmosis” policy of hard-line Greek-Cypriot president Tasos Papadopoulos who was staunchly against Annan Plan. Papadopoulos expected that Turkish-Cypriots would give up their communal identity and become individuals in the RoC, largely due to the merits of EU membership. Although many Turkish-Cypriots have obtained RoC passports and travelled to the south for various reasons including education and healthcare, self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) remained intact. In addition, immigration from mainland Turkey to TRNC continued.

After a decade of stagnation, a new momentum was gained in 2015 with the election of pro-solution Mustafa Akıncı as the president of TRNC. Akıncı and his counterpart Nicos Anastasiades, who was elected as the Greek-Cypriot president in 2013, had both supported Annan Plan in 2004. Two leaders are the only pair of Cypriot leaders in the post-Annan era who are in power at the same time and who were in favour of the plan. A secondary reason for the momentum was the discovery of

natural gas resources in the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone in 2011. The economic potential and the possible transfer of the natural gas supply to EU countries via Turkey, as well as the sharp Turkish objection to any unilateral agreement by Greek-Cypriots with 3rd parties on these resources, necessitates a solution in Cyprus.

Negotiations between Akıncı and Anastasiades were ongoing as of November 2016. A possible solution plan agreed by two leaders will have to be approved by separate referendums on both sides. Apart from the two leaders' decisions, the referendum process and its outcome will definitely be shaped by other political actors in two communities, including political parties. In this study, we try to explore the Turkish-Cypriot political parties' attitudes towards the solution of Cyprus problem and discover any major differences between their positions; which will be helpful for predictions about their future positions in a referendum.

This study is divided into ten sections. In the introduction, we present recent developments concerning the post-Annan era in Cyprus. In part two, we provide information on literature specific to ethnic accommodation, party systems and referendums. The method used in the study is explained in part three. In part four, in order to give an idea about the background of Cyprus problem, we present a short history of Cyprus and the partnership republic which collapsed in 1963. The state structure of the republic and the reasons for collapse are discussed in this part. Europeanisation of Cyprus problem, which is essential to understand the background for the current status, is also explained in part four. In part five, we explain the important parameters of Cyprus problem which are the main areas of dispute between Turkish and Greek-Cypriots. In part six, we present important diplomatic attempts to solve the problem and how these attempts tried to deal with these areas of dispute, which will be helpful to understand the parameters of a future solution. In the following part seven we analyse the Turkish-Cypriot political landscape and give information on TRNC regulations concerning political parties, TRNC election system and the Turkish-Cypriot democracy. In part eight, we briefly explain the history of mainstream Turkish-Cypriot political parties as well as their historical and current stances on Cyprus problem. Since it is perceived as a "litmus test" for understanding the attitudes of political parties on a possible solution, we also analyse the political parties' positions prior to the 2004 Annan Plan referendum. Taking into account that they have strong influence on the result of a possible referendum, we give some information on the background and political behaviours of Turkish-immigrants in part nine. In the

final part, we explain the results of our findings and discuss the possible positions that Turkish-Cypriot political parties may adopt in a future referendum

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2. LITERATURE ON ETHNIC ACCOMMODATION, PARTY SYSTEMS AND REFERENDUMS

Cyprus and its 20th century history has always been a subject of consociational theory and studies about constitution-making in divided societies. Arend Lijphart, the leading authority on consociationalism, states that sharing of executive power and group autonomy are the two primary characteristics of consociational democracy (Lijphart 2002, p.39). He describes executive power and group autonomy as follows:

Power sharing means the participation of the representatives of all significant groups in political decision making, especially at the executive level; group autonomy means that these groups have the authority to run their internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture.

1960 Constitution of Cyprus -with all its provisions on power-sharing, legislative and internal affairs of two communities- intended to form a democracy described by Lijphart above. The constitution also included the “two additional ingredients” recommended by the consociational theory: “secondary characteristics” of proportionality and mutual veto (Lijphart 2002, p.39). The constitution established community chambers apart from the National Assembly. These community chambers had the right to run community affairs on education, culture etc. and even had the right to impose taxes to some extent; exactly suiting Lijphart’s description of non-territorial autonomy (Lijphart 2002, p. 51).

In 1960 Constitution, the sharing of assembly seats and ministries was pre-determined in a 7:3 ratio. According to Lijphart (Lijphart 2002, p. 50):

Pre-determination is inevitably discriminatory: in favour of the groups that are included, and against groups, especially smaller groups that are recognized. (...) It also means that there is no place for individuals or groups who reject the premise that society should be organized on an ethnic or communal basis.

These concerns about pre-determination were experienced in Cyprus, where minority groups of Maronites, Armenians and Romas were asked to decide which group they would belong to after independence (Dayıoğlu 2014, p.104). Armenians and Maronites chose to be included in the Greek-Cypriot community, whereas Muslim Romas joined the Turkish-Cypriot community. The population was so strictly divided that even the formation of mixed couples was not possible, since a married woman would belong to the community to which her husband belonged.

Community level representation was also implemented in Cyprus during the British colonial rule. The Legislative Council was consisting of nine Greek-Cypriot, three Turkish-Cypriot members elected by the communities and six members appointed by the British administration. According to Yash Ghai, most British colonies abolished this system after independence, where Cyprus and Fiji were outstanding exceptions (Ghai 2002, p. 145).

Critiques of consociationalism argue that one of its weaknesses is relying on the political elite and their desire of entering coalitions. As Donald Horowitz puts it (Horowitz 2002, p.20):

In his (Lijphart-B.K.) view, leaders are motivated by a desire to avert the danger of mutual destruction. But why should majority-group leaders, with 60 per cent support, and the ability to gain all of the political power in a majoritarian democracy, be so self-abnegating as to give some of it away to minority-group leader? (...) In general, bipolar states, with a majority and minority, are the more seriously conflicted. A theory of conflict reduction that can not cope with hard cases is of limited utility.

Horowitz's worries for majority leaders' motives were realised in Cyprus, where Greek-Cypriots formed 82 per cent of the population at the time of independence. Greek-Cypriot leader Makarios was reluctant to accept the pre-determined rights of the 18 per cent Turkish community and he eventually tried to change the constitution, which led to the collapse of the republic. This collapse and the inter-community clashes are presented as an example for the failure of power sharing democracy. Although he admits that they never worked well in Cyprus case, Lijphart argues that solution formulas to solve the Cyprus problem resemble the basic power-sharing structure of the 1960 constitution. Therefore power-sharing and group autonomy are still best options for a future settlement (Lijphart 2002, p. 43).

Cross voting is another mechanism to accommodate sharp differences in divided societies. In this system, candidates who compete for the seats allocated to their community need to receive votes from the other community as well. The system gives moderate figures an advantage and fosters cooperation between politicians from different communities. As in the example of Fiji, a country with two ethnic groups roughly equal in size, cross-voting was used to politically integrate ethnic groups and promote inter-ethnic parties (Ghai 2002, p. 150). Separate representation for communities makes it exceedingly hard to establish national parties, necessary for political integration (Ghai 2002, p. 153). Loizides and Keskiner suggest that cross-voting will benefit the Turkish-Cypriot community to a much greater extent, especially against a deadlock by hawkish Greek-Cypriot deputies in the lower house of the parliament where Turkish-Cypriot representation is expected to be 25 per cent as provisioned in the Annan Plan (Loizides and Keskiner 2004, p.165).

1960 constitution lacked any cross voting mechanism, which can be counted among many reasons for its collapse. As an insight observer, former Greek-Cypriot president Glafcos Clerides confirms that lack of a cross-voting mechanism caused Greek-Cypriot politicians to turn a deaf ear to Turkish-Cypriots' problems (Kızılyürek 2007, p.108). The 1960-1963 period did not witness the formation of any inter-community political party as well. The only party with members from both communities was the communist AKEL, which had been founded long before independence.

According to consociational theory, federalism offers an excellent opportunity for group autonomy if the groups are geographically concentrated (Lijphart 2002, p.51). Current negotiations on Cyprus issue basically deal with the formation of a federation. Forming a new federation in Cyprus has its unique difficulties. According to Umaner-Duba, a new Cypriot state with two units and two ethnic groups is less likely to contribute to ethnic accommodation and lack of several federal units to have a balance of power within the federation increases the risk of confrontation (Umaner-Duba 2013, p.101).

The debates for a federal solution to the Cyprus problem and political parties' attitudes towards a settlement dominate the Turkish-Cypriot political landscape. The main reason for this domination is the burden of international isolation and its effect on the daily lives of Turkish-Cypriots. In addition, dependence on Turkey's financial sponsorship limits the effect of political parties' influence on key economic issues. Isachenko expresses that sponsor states' engagement limits internal sovereignty of informal states as it is the case in Northern Cyprus and Transdniestra (Isachenko 2012, p. 154). With a large public sector and informal economy, TRNC lacks the local resources to finance state budgetary needs (Isachenko 2012, p.100). Being unable to run domestic affairs independently, the attitudes of political parties towards a settlement become the main point of difference on the political scenery and left/right divide.

Being a sponsored state also affected the party system of TRNC throughout its history. In the two decades following the 1974 Turkish intervention, the party system had a one-party dominant character. A one-party dominant system is the one in which multiple parties operate but only one party has a realistic chance of gaining power (Clark, Golder and Nadenichek Golder 2009, p. 543). The party which enjoyed dominance over the political system was the National Unity Party (UBP- *Ulusal Birlik Partisi*). The party was founded by Rauf Denktaş and was uninterruptedly in power between 1975-1993. One-party dominant systems generally occur in dictatorships; however there are cases where a single party dominates the political landscape by high popularity, divided

opposition, use of patronage systems and electoral fraud (Clark, Golder and Nadenichek Golder 2009, p.544). Although there were concerns about the quality of her democracy during 1980's, TRNC did not experience a pure dictatorship regime; therefore in UBP example it is the second case which kept the party in power for two decades. The main tool for the party used was the patronage system financed by funds from Turkey. The support of Turkey and Turkish immigrants in elections as well as the relative prosperity enjoyed by Turkish-Cypriots after 1974 were other factors that enabled UBP dominance. It was in 1992 when the dominance of UBP was weakened due to a defect of some MP's who founded the DP (Democratic Party). In 1993 elections UBP lost the government to a DP-CTP (Republican Turkish Party) coalition. The party system of TRNC afterwards can be classified as a multi-party system.

The party system of TRNC may also be described from the pattern of alternation model suggested by Peter Mair. Mair (1996, pp. 90-92) identifies three alternation patterns:

- i. wholesale alternation in which a set of incumbents is fully displaced by a former opposition
- ii. partial alternation in which a newly incumbent government includes at least one party that also formed part of the previous government
- iii. nonalternation in which the same party or parties remain in exclusive control of government over an extended period of time

We can argue that TNRC party system after 1993 fits the partial alternation model where short-lived coalition governments mostly included one of the parties which had also participated in the previous government. Since 1990, governments were formed by different combinations or one-party rules of two right-wing and two left-wing mainstream parties, which are the subject of this study¹.

In the third decade after 1974, right-wing DP and UBP leaded coalition governments where leftist parties acted as small coalition partners. 1990's also witnessed the EU process initiated by the Greek-Cypriot side which was the *de jure* government of the whole island. It was also this decade when the appeal of the clientelistic system began to decline and economic crises severely curbed the government's distributive capacity (Sonan 2014, p. 192). As expected, the economic problems in

¹ CTP-BG's (Republican Turkish Party-United Forces) coalition with a controversially established small party during 2006-2009 being an exception.

TRNC were linked with the unstable economic and political conditions in Turkey and they coincided with the prospect of European integration in early 2000's.

The issue of European integration has repeatedly proved to be sufficient salience to create divisions amongst political parties (Agapiou-Josephides 2011, p. 165). The effects of the EU accession on the TRNC party system can be observed from the beginning of 2000's. The issue of solution became attached to the prospects of EU integration for Turkish-Cypriots and "Europeanization" began to influence the public debate. Europeanization is described as a process whereby the EU impacts on the national level, and more specifically domestic politics, policy and polity (Kyris 2012, p. 472). Until 2000's, leftist parties which had a moderate stance for settlement were unable to dominate governments except occasionally becoming small coalition partners. By providing them with competitive policy suggestions, Europeanization increased their appeal in the electorate and affected the distribution of power among political parties (Kyris 2012, p. 480). This advantage of leftist parties resulted in two election victories for CTP-BG in 2003 and 2005. These election figures enabled Mehmet Ali Talat to become prime-minister in 2003, the first leftist party leader to assume this office in Turkish-Cypriot history. The empowerment of the moderate camp by Europeanization reached its peak with the election of Mehmet Ali Talat as the 2nd president of TRNC in 2005. Europeanization had its effects on the inner party policies as well where CTP-UG sets an important example. As a communist party until 1990's, the party gradually switched to a discourse based on social democracy and in 2000's it managed to gain support of the pro-solution and pro-European intellectuals and business circles. However, this alliance formed by the Europeanization process did not continue due to the failure of the Annan Plan (thus the EU prospect) and economic problems; subsequently the bourgeoisie resorted to UBP in 2009 elections which resulted in a decline in CTP-BG votes compared to 2005 (Erhürman 2010, p. 111).

Europeanisation also influenced the hard-line camp. The major party of the hard-line camp UBP often used to claim that Cyprus problem was solved in 1974 and kept a negative attitude towards a settlement (Christophorou 2006; p. 532). However, the high percentage of "Yes" votes for the UN Annan Plan in 2004 forced the party to adopt a more reconciliatory approach (Sözen 2005, p.468). In December 2004, the party accepted the need for further negotiations on Annan Plan, which set a federal government contrary to the confederalist approach previously defended by the party.

The division in Cyprus also caused differences between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot political landscape which could be observed by the euroscepticism followed by opposite groups of parties in two communities. As Agapiou-Josephides (2011, p. 176) explains:

The patterns of euroscepticism observed in the GC community are similar to those observed in Western Europe in the early stages of European integration, with moderate euroscepticism confined to the communist AKEL. On the contrary, the TC community follows East European patterns with euroscepticism prominent among right-wing parties (e.g. DP and UBP).

Political parties' attitude during a campaign prior to a referendum has an important effect on the outcome. A study performed on the 2015 Greek referendum on EU's bailout package to analyse the parties' influence on voter behaviour in each of Greece's 56 voting districts revealed that there was an apparent link between the pro-austerity New Democracy Party's share of votes in January 2015 elections and the percentage of "yes" votes in the July 2015 referendum (Hansen, p. 22). However, de Vreese's study on party-voter alignments during the 2000 Danish referendum on the introduction of the euro and the 2005 Dutch referendum on the European Constitution challenge the linear assumption between the party voters' voting preferences in referendums and the official party policy. De Vreese argues that ambiguous cueing, internal dissidence, electoral volatility and parties' limited impact on citizens' information sources reduce the influence of political parties (de Vreese 2006, p. 581). The results of his study indicate that centrist and catch-all parties are more likely to fail on aligning their voters with party politics where small and ideologically profiled parties are more successful to get their voters to follow the party (de Vreese 2006, p. 589). In addition, elderly voters and individuals with longer education are more likely to deviate from the party recommendation than young voters and individuals with shorter education (de Vreese 2006, p. 591).


The 2016 British "Brexit" referendum and the undesirable outcome of the 2016 Colombian referendum on the peace deal to end the fifty-year civil war raised concerns about the role of referendums on resolving political problems. Some argue that referendums tend to be volatile; their outcomes are affected by unrelated political swings or even, as may have happened in Colombia, on the weather (Taub and Fisher 2016). LeDuc explains these unrelated issues as below (LeDuc 2015, p. 141):

A vote that is supposed to be about an important public issue ends up instead being about the popularity or unpopularity of a particular party or leader, the record of the government, or some set of issues or events that are not closely related to the subject of the referendum. This is more likely to happen in the case of government initiated referendum votes, when a governing party or a sitting president or prime minister automatically becomes associated with the referendum issue.

Referendums which do not require a specific turn-out ratio also raise doubts on the legitimacy of the public decision, where the Colombian referendum set a significant example with its turn-out ratio of thirty-eight per cent.

The uniqueness of the conditions specific to the Turkish-Cypriot political landscape makes the discussions on the potential shortcomings of referendums less relevant. For many Turkish-Cypriots, a solution to the Cyprus problem is perceived as a vital issue. The general public, regardless of education level, wealth and age group differences, is well informed about the parameters of a potential solution plan since these parameters have been discussed repeatedly for several decades and have already been voted in 2004. The turn-out ratio of eighty-seven per cent in Annan Plan referendum is another sign of public interest in the settlement process. LeDuc's concerns about government initiated referendums are unlikely to be observed for Turkish-Cypriots as well. Although the ruling coalition government itself supported the referendum process, the 2004 referendum was mostly initiated by pressures from the UN, EU and Turkey. A future referendum on a solution is also likely to take place with the consent of these outside actors.

The quality of TRNC democracy will also be helpful to initiate a healthy public debate prior to a referendum. TRNC maintains a high level of democracy as explained by Bahçeli and Noel (2010, pp.144-145):



The political behaviour of Turkish-Cypriots exhibits a degree of attachment to democracy that is similar to that found in other well-established democracies. Elections are vigorously contested, with no major barriers to new entrants, as the number and variety of minor parties indicates. Election outcomes are close and typically produce both an effective government (often a coalition) and an effective parliamentary opposition, with a lawful and orderly change of governing party (or parties) if necessary. The details of election rules may at times be hotly disputed since in closely contested elections even the smallest change in the rules can be consequential, but the overriding requirement is that elections must be free and fair. Turkish-Cypriots have absorbed those norms into their political culture. Though problems of inefficiency and corruption persist, these have come under increasing critical scrutiny by opposition members and the media and appear to be in decline.

In Freedom House 2016 Report, TRNC is described as “Free” with a freedom rating of 2 (1 being the best and 7 being the worst) and is ranked 2 for both “civil liberties” and “political rights” (again 1 being the best and 7 being the worst)². The report also suggests that there is academic freedom and open private discussion.

² Details of the report can be found on <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/northern-cyprus> (Accessed: 28.10.2016).

TRNC's democratic level is generally attributed to the country's relative wealth, high education level and its British colonial heritage. Anckar (2002, p. 377) states that the quality of democracy measured by Freedom House ratings correlates significantly with insularity and being small-sized and small island states³ are more inclined to adopt a democratic system ("Free" in terms of Freedom House rating). Although levels of wealth, literacy, British colonial heritage and the length of the British rule correlate with the quality of democracy; this correlation becomes less significant in small island states. For instance, only 7 out of 69 low income states are democracies, however out of 8 low-income small island states 6 are democratic (Anckar 2002, p. 380). The possible reasons for this phenomenon are explained by Anckar as follows (Anckar 2002, p.386):

Proposition no I: More than other units, remote and small units are likely to promote feelings of fellowship and a sense of community.

Proposition no II: A spirit of fellowship and community is further promoted by the citizens being able to orient themselves towards political life and the political apparatus. (...)Small units appear more simple, elementary and easy of access.

Proposition no III: The emergence of feelings of tolerance and understanding is facilitated if and when open channels of communication exist between those who govern and those who are governed. (...)It also promotes the ability of leaders to survey what is going on in their societies.

Proposition no IV: In homogeneous societies one may expect from the society members a high degree of sympathetic identification with each other, implying a willingness to understand beforehand the probable effects of action and a greater effort to anticipate others' feelings.

It may be argued that these propositions are valid for TRNC as well; especially being geographically small facilitates the contact between the politicians and the public (proposition II).

³ Small island states are described as states that are islands or parts of an island or consist of islands and parts of islands with a population below one million (Anckar 2002, p.377). Therefore, TRNC can be classified as a small island state.

3. METHOD

In this study, we evaluated past and current positions of Turkish-Cypriot political parties on Cyprus problem by using qualitative methods. The author paid a visit to the headquarters of all of the mainstream parties, gathered information from the first hand and made short interviews. Apart from direct sources, secondary sources were also used extensively to analyse the parties' positions. These sources included political parties' official websites, party brochures, parties' and party leaders' official social media accounts, interviews given by party officers, congress speeches made during 1990's and books written by party leaders. The archive of the National Library in Nicosia was also used to perform archival research on the past positions of political parties. In order to give information on TRNC party system, election system and elections results; detailed regulations and election statistics presented in governmental websites were used. The reports and surveys prepared by 3rd parties were useful to understand the main dimensions of Cyprus problem, where studies assisted by PRIO (International Peace and Research Institute) need special mention. Academic literature specific to Cyprus and Cyprus problem; especially studies conducted by Turkish-Cypriot academicians Niyazi Kızılyürek and Ahmet Sözen were used to analyse parties' positions and understand the Turkish-Cypriot political landscape. Lastly, other sources like books, memoirs, newspaper articles and TV programmes were used to complete the study.

4. A SHORT SUMMARY OF CYPRUS UNTIL 1975

4.1. OTTOMAN PERIOD (1571-1878)

During the Ottoman-Venetian War of 1570-1573, Ottomans launched an attack on Cyprus in 1570 and the conquest of the island was ended with the fall of Famagusta (Magosa) in 1571. After the conquest, Cyprus was made an Ottoman province. Ottomans established the *millet* system where leaders of religious communities acted as an intermediary between the subjects and the Ottoman rulers. The patriarch of the Cypriot Orthodox Church was entitled as *ethnarch* (nation leader) and the church gained the privilege of collecting taxes. With this structure, the church became a part of the Ottoman state apparatus and obtained political and economic power under Ottoman rule (Kızılyürek 2002, p.74).

Ottomans made population transfers from other parts of the empire and a Muslim/Turkish community was formed in Cyprus.

4.2. BRITISH PERIOD (1878-1960)

After the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-1878 and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire, Cyprus was leased to United Kingdom who promised to intervene in case another attack was launched by the Russians. The British took over the island in 1878 and the 308-year-old Ottoman rule ended; however Cyprus continued to be *de jure* Ottoman territory. The island became a strategic British possession, securing the Suez Canal and the route to India.

In 1882, British formed an assembly (*Kavanin Meclisi*), which was composed of 9 Greek-Orthodox, 3 Muslim and 6 British members. Ottoman Empire declared war on the Allied countries during the First World War, including the British Empire. As a reaction, the British cancelled the lease agreement and annexed the island on November 1914. With the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey confirmed British sovereignty over Cyprus. In 1925, Cyprus was made a crown colony and a governor was appointed. The same year, the number of seats allocated to each group in assembly was revised (12 Greek-Orthodox, 3 Turkish and 9 British). In case of a stalemate, the vote of the British governor was decisive. It is generally believed that the composition of the assembly enabled the British to balance the power of Greek-Orthodox members with the Muslim minority.

In October 1931, widespread uprising took place throughout the island, demanding the island's unity with Greece (Enosis). The uprising was harshly suppressed by the British.

Parallel to the anti-colonial movement after the 2nd World War, Greek-Cypriots' demands for Enosis began to accelerate. This coincided with the election of Makarios III (1913-1977) as the archbishop of Cyprus in 1950. Makarios ambitiously began to work for Enosis and defended that Greek-Cypriots had the right to self-determination and should be free to unite with Greece. In 1955, a pro-enosis armed organization was formed under the name of National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (*EOKA-Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*). EOKA immediately started attacks and sabotages against the British.

Strong Greek and Greek-Cypriot demands of Enosis made Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots nervous. Turkey officially declared that if British were to quit Cyprus, it should be handed over to Turkey, the island's former owner.

In 1958, inter-communal fighting started between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and a Turkish underground organization called Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT-*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*) was established. Meanwhile, Greece carried the Cyprus issue to UN and demanded self-determination for the island. Turkey opposed self-determination claiming that there were two communities on the island and if self-determination were to be implemented, Turkish-Cypriots too had to right to unite with Turkey, which meant the partition of the island. Partition of Cyprus was difficult because Turkish-Cypriots were dispersed around Cyprus and therefore did not form a majority in any specific region. However, opinion-makers in the Turkish-Cypriot community believed that it could be organized taking India-Pakistan partition as an example (Stelya 2015, p. 136).

4.3. INDEPENDENCE OF CYPRUS (1960)

Negotiations between Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom eventually led to a solution which outlawed both Enosis and partition: independence for Cyprus. Treaties of London and Zurich provided the details of the new republic's constitution. With a separate Treaty of Guarantee; Turkey, Greece and United Kingdom became guarantor states. On 16.09.1960, Cyprus became officially independent; however United Kingdom retained her perpetual sovereignty over two military bases (Akrotiri and Dhekelia).

With the formation of the new state, Makarios was elected as the president and Turkish-Cypriot leader Fazıl Küçük (1906-1984) as vice-president. According to Kızılyürek, both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders were reluctant to the foundation of the new republic. Makarios had not

given up his vision of Enosis while Turkish-Cypriot leaders still found the idea of partition preferable (Kızılyürek 2002, p 266). An independent Cyprus was a solution imposed by Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom; same as the 1960 Constitution which came into effect not in a referendum by popular vote but by international treaties. The new state did not have a national anthem and its independence day was not celebrated as a national holiday. On the other hand, both communities were free to celebrate Turkish and Greek national days. Makarios expressed that the treaties “have created a state, not a nation” (Kızılyürek 2002, p.103). Another famous evidence of this oddity was given by former Greek-Cypriot president Glafcos Clerides, who claimed that Cyprus flag was “the best in the world because no one would die for it”.

4.4. STATE STRUCTURE OF CYPRUS ACCORDING TO 1960 CONSTITUTION

The constitution of 1960 established a bi-communal partnership state composing of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots and strictly emphasized the dual character of the new republic. For instance, the word “Cypriot” was never used alone in the constitution and articles relating to the Cypriot people always contained “Greek-Cypriot” and “Turkish-Cypriot” clauses separately. In order to give a perception of the new Republic’s strict dual character and segregation of state posts among two communities, some provisions and comments on the constitution are summarized in the table below⁴:




Table 4.1: Selected articles from 1960 Cyprus constitution

Article Detail	Article #
The new republic is a presidential state with a president elected by Greek-Cypriots and a vice-president elected by Turkish-Cypriots (this article made it impossible for Turkish-Cypriot to become the president of Cyprus).	1
The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers.	46
Official languages are Greek and Turkish	3
Both the president and the vice-president have the right to veto any decision of	57

⁴ The full text of the constitution is available at [http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756F0023C6AD/\\$file/CY_Constitution.pdf](http://www.presidency.gov.cy/presidency/presidency.nsf/all/1003AEDD83EED9C7C225756F0023C6AD/$file/CY_Constitution.pdf) (Accessed: 18.10.2016).

the council of ministers	
The vice-president has the right final veto on decisions of the Council of Ministers concerning foreign affairs, defence or security	57
The President and the Vice-President shall separately have the right to return any law or decision of the House of Representatives for reconsideration.	50
The house of representatives shall compose of 35 Greek-Cypriots and 15 Turkish-Cypriot members. Separate majorities were needed for changes in laws on taxation, electoral law and municipalities	62, 78
Members of the Greek Community shall only be registered in the Greek electoral list and the members of the Turkish Community shall only be registered in the Turkish electoral list.	94
The President of the House of Representatives shall be a Greek, and shall be elected by the Greek-Cypriot representatives, and the Vice-President shall be a Turk and shall be elected by Turkish-Cypriot representatives. (it should be noted that this article makes it impossible for a Turkish-Cypriot to become the President of the House of Representatives or a Greek-Cypriot to become the vice-president of the House of Representatives even though all members agree on it in a hypothetical situation)	72
Two communities shall elect separate communal chambers amongst their own members which shall deal with matters related to religious, cultural, educational etc. affairs and may impose taxes for the maintenance of these affairs.	86
Attorney-General and the Deputy Attorney-General of the Republic shall not belong to the same Community.	112
Auditor-General and the Deputy Auditor General shall not belong to the same Community.	115
The public service (civil servants) will be 70 per cent Greek-Cypriot and 30 per cent Turkish-Cypriot	123
The army shall consist of two thousand men of whom sixty per cent shall be Greek-Cypriot and forty per cent Turkish-Cypriot	129

One of the Heads of the army, the police and the gendarmerie shall be a Turkish-Cypriot and where the Head of the army, the police and the gendarmerie belongs to one community the deputy head shall belong to the other community.	131
In sound and vision broadcasting there shall be programmes both for the Greek and the Turkish Communities (the constitution further set the detailed rules for the duration and frequency of the broadcasting for the Turkish community).	171
A court exercising civil jurisdiction in a case where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same community shall be composed solely of a judge or judges belonging to that community.	159
In a civil case the plaintiff and the defendant belong to different communities the court shall be composed of such judges belonging to both Communities	159
Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos by the Turkish inhabitants	173
A married woman shall belong to the community to which her husband belongs.	7

Source: www.presidency.gov.cy

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4.5. COLLAPSE OF THE BI-COMMUNAL REPUBLIC (1963)


Frictions between two communities started immediately after independence. Turkish-Cypriots demanded the implementation of the 70:30 principle on public services and founding of separate municipalities⁵. Fazıl Küçük was also discontent with Makarios following a *non-alignment* policy without consulting him (Akgün and others 2005, p. 20). As a reaction to these issues and the general uncooperative attitude of Makarios, Turkish-Cypriot members of the House of Representatives blocked the tax legislation in 1963. Thus, the new republic was left without any effective tax legislation.

Makarios proposed some modifications to the constitution known as the *13 amendments*, which would abolish the veto rights of the president and the vice-president, trim the Turkish-Cypriots' 30 per cent quota on public services and cancel the provisions on separate municipalities. In order to convince Turkey, he visited Ankara in 1963 but did not receive a positive reply for the modifications.

⁵ Greek-Cypriots claimed that this provision was unfair considering the percentage of Turkish-Cypriots in total population, which was around 18 per cent according to the 1960 census conducted by the British.

The tense atmosphere finally resulted in inter-community clashes which started in December 1963. In 1964, a UN peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) was stationed in Cyprus. As a result of the clashes several hundred people lost their lives or went missing, most of whom were Turkish-Cypriots. Seeking for security, Turkish-Cypriots fled to urban and rural strongholds where they formed a majority and started to live in these “ghettos” and enclaves. Turkish-Cypriot statesmen had to withdraw from state institutions and formed a separate administration in these pockets of land. This separate administration was named Provisionary Committee and later declared Turkish-Cypriot Administration in 1967. The map showing the Turkish enclaves is presented below:

Figure 4.1 : Turkish enclaves between 1963-1974. Red colour denotes Turkish-Cypriot areas.



Source: <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/breakdown.html> (Accessed: 27.11.2016)

It can be asserted that the 1960 republic was a missed opportunity for a stable and prosperous country. Cyprus was wealthier than both “motherlands” and had a well-established legal and physical infrastructure inherited from the British colonial rule. In a comparison between Cyprus and Singapore, which also gained independence from the British in 1960’s and was ethnically and

religiously more diverse than Cyprus; Greek-Cypriot businessperson Vassilis Petrides expressed that⁶:

Cyprus was not fortunate enough to have a leader as visionary as Lee Kuan Yew. My generation's future was stolen by politicians on both sides who were unprepared at protecting and nurturing the new found Republic and inept at leading the young nation into the modern world. Instead of working to build the foundations of the new state, the community leaders could not rid themselves of their biases and well-honed convictions that enosis and taksim should be their main focus. The resulting events of 1963 and of 1974 sealed any hope that Cyprus could have become a Middle East Singapore in my generation.

4.6. RELATIVE EASING OF TENSIONS (1968-1974)

In 1967, a new series of attacks were carried out against Turkish-Cypriots by EOKA members. Turkey strongly indicated that she would launch a military operation, which forced USA to intervene and put pressure on Greece and Makarios to halt the assaults. Subsequently, Greece and Makarios had to halt paramilitary operations on Turkish-Cypriots. Relative calm was established and inter-communal talks started in 1968. Some Turkish-Cypriots returned to their former homes and their freedom of movement was reinstated.

After 1967, Makarios changed his policy of immediate Enosis and shifted to a more pragmatist policy. One of the reasons for this policy was the *junta* which came to power in Greece in 1967. Since Makarios did not prefer a union with a military regime, relations between the two became increasingly uneasy (Akgün and others 2005, p. 29). However, Makarios' new stance received the support of the new *establishment* (middle class, businessmen and civil servants) formed around the young republic and he managed to maintain his support among Greek-Cypriots. According to former Greek-Cypriot president Glafcos Clerides, Cyprus was wealthier and had a more functioning bureaucracy than Greece, which convinced some Greek-Cypriots that Enosis is not feasible (Kızılyürek 2007, p. 133). In 1970, Makarios survived an assassination attempt when his helicopter was hit by a missile.

In 1973, Rauf Raif Denktaş (1924-2012) replaced Fazıl Küçük as the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot community.

⁶ "Cyprus in 2025: Singapore or a failed state?" 02.12.2015. <http://www.thecypriotpuzzle.org/cyprus-in-2025-singapore-or-a-failed-state-by-strovoliotis/> (Accessed: 28.10.2016).

4.7. 1974 COUP

On 02.07.1974, Makarios demanded the withdrawal of all Greek officers who plotted covert actions and undermined his authority. As a reaction, members of the Cypriot National Guard led by Greek officers staged a coup against Makarios on 15.07.1974. The coupists installed Nicos Sampson as the new president. Nicos Sampson was an EOKA member and had been accused of atrocities against Turkish villages in 1963. Makarios, who managed to survive the attack on the presidential palace fled to United Kingdom.

The coup initiated by Greece and the installation of an EOKA member as president enraged Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots. Turkish government led by Bülent Ecevit sought to overthrow Sampson regime together with the other guarantor power United Kingdom. Following the British indifference to the situation, Turkey alone started a military invasion on the island on 20.07.1974 and occupied a small area around Kyrenia.

4.8. 1974 AND AFTERMATH

Failing to predict Turkish reaction to the coup, the Greek junta collapsed immediately and civilian rule was restored in Greece. In addition, Nicos Sampson was forced to resign. In the Geneva meetings aftermath, Turkey stated that returning to the previous status quo was not possible and she insisted on a bi-zonal federal Cyprus. Turkey made two proposals, one including a multi-cantonal Turkish zone and the other one including a single Turkish zone in the north of the island. In both proposals, the area of the Turkish zone would cover 30 per cent of the island. Turkish proposals were eventually rejected by Greek-Cypriots. On 16.08.1974, Turkey began the 2nd operation and took control of 36 per cent of the island including some important towns like Famagusta, Morphou and Lefka.

By the Turkish operation in August 1974, Cyprus was *de facto* partitioned into two. In following years, Turkish-Cypriots remaining in the south moved to the Turkish controlled area while Greek-Cypriots gradually left to the south.

On 01.10.1974, Turkish-Cypriot Administration was transformed to Turkish-Cypriot Autonomous Administration. In February 1975, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus was proclaimed.

Makarios returned to Cyprus in December 1974 and served as president until his death in 1977. In 1977, Makarios and Denktaş signed a High Level Agreement for a federal bi-zonal Cyprus.

4.9. EUROPEANISATION OF CYPRUS PROBLEM

In the second half of the 1990's, Cyprus problem began to enter the agenda of EU-Turkey relations. Greek-Cypriot Administration had applied for EU membership in July 1990 and EU's positive reply in 1993 received protests from Turkish government. Turkey claimed that according to Zurich and London agreements Cyprus could not become a member of a union of which Greece and Turkey were not both members. In 1995 a joint declaration was issued by Turkish president Süleyman Demirel and Rauf Denktaş stating that (Manisalı 1995, p. 60):

- i. Joining the EU without finding a solution cannot be considered
- ii. Turkey's role as a guarantor will continue
- iii. The Turkish-Cypriots will enjoy equal sovereignty with the Greek-Cypriots
- iv. Cyprus cannot join the EU while Turkey is outside of the Union

Amid Turkish objections, Cyprus' candidacy was approved with other 5 countries (Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) in 1997 Luxemburg Summit. This move angered the Turkish government and some bi-lateral agreements were signed in order to strengthen the cooperation between Turkey and TRNC. Some Turkish officials also openly declared that TRNC would be annexed by Turkey in case Greek-Cypriots enter EU without a solution. As a result of the developments, Turkey gave up the traditional federalist approach and suggested a solution based on a confederation, which had been supported by TRNC president Denktaş for a long time (Ulusoy 2008, p. 90). Meanwhile, Greek-Cypriot president Glafcos Clerides suggested that representatives of Turkish-Cypriots should take part in the membership talks between EU and Cyprus; however this offer was rejected by Denktaş who feared that joining the Greek-Cypriot delegation would mean accepting the legitimacy of Greek-Cypriot administration. In 1999 Helsinki Summit, Turkey officially became a candidate country and tensions between EU-Turkey were eased. In this summit, EU declared that "a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union" and it will take account of "all relevant factors" if no settlement has been reached by the completion of Cyprus's accession negotiations⁷. This emphasis on "all relevant factors" was perceived as a warning to Greek-Cypriots; meaning that if Turkish-Cypriots were an obstacle to the solution membership process will continue, but EU will re-consider membership if Greek-Cypriot side is responsible from non-settlement. In further declarations, EU repeatedly

⁷ http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hell1_en.htm 2001 (Accessed: 18.10.2016)

emphasized its support for a settlement on the island. On the other hand, Denktaş strongly opposed Cyprus's EU membership before Turkey became an EU member.

1999 legislative elections in Turkey were won by the DSP (Democratic Left Party) led by Bülent Ecevit and Ecevit became the prime-minister of a coalition formed by DSP, MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) and ANAP (Motherland Party). As the prime-minister who initiated the 1974 military intervention, Ecevit enjoyed the popularity and respect gained by the success of the operation. He had conservative views on the Cyprus issue and repeatedly claimed that the current status quo itself was a reasonable solution as well. Thus, Turkey maintained her tough stance on Cyprus' EU membership during DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition government. In 2001, Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem stated that (Güven 2003, p.77):

In case Greek-Cypriots enter the EU they will have won a Pyrrhus victory. They may be happy in the short term but this will be the beginning of a process which would bring pain to Turkish and Greek people. Our reaction will not have any limits. Everybody will be harmed by this.

Europeanisation of the Cyprus problem also affected Turkey's internal politics. The negotiation process at the beginning of 2000's between Denktaş and Greek-Cypriot president Glafcos Clerides was not producing any results. In November 2000, Denktaş who insisted on a confederation left the talks after UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested a federal state with single sovereignty (Güven 2003, p.65). The stalemate made the supporters of EU membership in Turkey nervous and some influential opinion makers began to question whether Denktaş was showing a reasonable reconciliatory approach. In November 2001, president of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) Tuncay Özilhan stressed that "Denktaş's uncompromising attitude should not be supported", which caused reaction from conservative figures in Turkey⁸.

The rise of AKP (Justice and Development Party)'s to power with 03.11.2002 elections in Turkey coincided with the release of the Annan Plan on 11.11.2002. Kofi Annan proposed that after a short period of negotiations, the plan should be put on a referendum on both sides on 30.03.2003 and if it was approved EU would sign a Treaty of Accession with the newly founded United Republic of Cyprus on 16.04.2003. While setting the details of the referendum process, Kofi Annan designed the question so that it included two questions in fact but a single answer. A voter would have to approve the plan if he/she approved the EU membership of Cyprus, or if someone voted against the plan, he/she would have rejected the plan as well (Mehmetçik 2008, p.196).

⁸ "TUSIAD blames Denktas: Intransigent" <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/> 27.11.2001 (Accessed: 14.11.2016)

Eventually Rauf Denktaş refused to negotiate the plan although Greek-Cypriot President Clerides affirmed that it can be a base for negotiations. Since one of the parties rejected the plan, Annan's schedule could not be implemented and newly elected Greek-Cypriot president Tassos Papadopoulos signed the Treaty of Accession on 16.04.2003, representing the whole island⁹¹⁰. Pro-resolution opponents of Denktaş claim that a great opportunity was missed in 2003 and the "yes" vote from the Turkish-Cypriots in 2004 was too late. They argue that with the signing of the Treaty of Accession, Greek-Cypriots guaranteed EU membership and their only motive for accepting an internationally supported plan was lost. As a result, Papadopoulos could resist the pressure from international powers and felt free to spoke out against the plan in 2004. Glafcos Clerides says that UN was late to present Annan Plan (Kızılyürek 2007, p. 200). However, whether the result could be different had plan been put on referendum in 2003 is doubtful considering the very high "no" rate (76 per cent) in Greek-Cypriot side.

In January 2004, Turkish prime-minister Erdoğan delivered his request for renewed talks to Kofi Annan. After a round of negotiations, both sides agreed to present the final version of the plan to referendum on 24.04.2004, just before Cyprus became an official EU member. These efforts to have a solution before the accession of Cyprus and persuade both sides to accept the Annan Plan failed with the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the plan. Cyprus officially became a member of the EU on 01.05.2004, making the whole island *de jure* EU territory. Although Turkish-Cypriots are excluded from the decision making structures, they became citizens of the EU.

⁹ Clerides, a moderate figure on Cyprus issue, had lost the February 2003 presidential elections to hard-liner Tassos Papadopoulos. Prior to the 2004 referendum, Clerides and his party DISI supported a "yes" vote.

¹⁰ Another reason for the delay was Denktaş's cardiac surgery in October 2002 and his remission period which lasted until December.

5. MAIN DIMENSIONS OF CYPRUS PROBLEM

5.1. STATE STRUCTURE AND POWER SHARING

The essence of a possible solution to the Cyprus problem is the nature of the new state's structure. It should be noted in advance that returning to a unitary state as it was the case in the founding of 1960 republic is not in the agenda of any side. The debate is mainly about whether a federal or confederal system of government will be established; including power sharing between two sides, the amount of authority the central government/constituent states will have, sovereignty etc. As it can be expected, the more populous Greek-Cypriot side is in favour of a strong central government, whereas Turkish-Cypriot side desires a relatively looser government structure. During the 1977 High Level Agreements, Denktaş and Makarios agreed upon a federal government structure. In the mentioned agreement it is stated that¹¹:

- i. We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.*
- ii. The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.*

The federal structure of a united Cyprus was confirmed by both parties during subsequent declarations and solution plans. In 1986 UN Secretary-General De Cuellar proposed a federal system whose legislature will be composed of two chambers: a lower chamber with a 70-30 Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot representation, and an upper chamber with a 50-50 representation. The proposal also suggested that:

- i. The Federal Republic will have a presidential system of government. The president and the vice-president will symbolize the unity of the country and the equal political status of the two communities.*
- ii. The president will be a Greek-Cypriot and the vice president will be a Turkish-Cypriot. The president and the vice president will, separately or conjointly, have the right to veto any law or decision of the legislature and the Council of Ministers in areas to be agreed upon, it being understood that the scope will exceed that covered by the 1960 constitution.*
- iii. The Council of Ministers will be composed of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot ministers on a 7 to 3 ratio. One major ministry will be headed by a Turkish-Cypriot, it being understood that the parties agree to discuss that the Minister for Foreign Affairs will be a Turkish-Cypriot. The Council of Ministers will take decisions by weighted voting, that is a simple majority including at least one Turkish-Cypriot*

¹¹[http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/1974B2EDA77F8D0DC22571D30034D344/\\$file/February%201977.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/1974B2EDA77F8D0DC22571D30034D344/$file/February%201977.pdf)
(Accessed: 10.01.2016).

minister. It is understood that the parties agree to discuss that weighted voting will apply to all matters of special concern to the Turkish-Cypriot community to be agreed upon.

- iv. *The powers and functions to be vested in the federal government of the Federal Republic shall comprise:*
- a. *Foreign affairs.*
 - b. *Federal financial affairs (including federal budget, taxation, customs and excise duties).*
 - c. *Monetary and banking affairs.*
 - d. *Federal economic affairs (including trade and tourism).*
 - e. *Posts and telecommunications.*
 - f. *International transport.*
 - g. *Natural resources (including water supply, environment).*
 - h. *Federal health and veterinary affairs.*
 - i. *Standards setting: weights and measures, patents, trademarks, copyrights.*
 - j. *Federal Judiciary.*
 - k. *Appointment of federal officers.*
 - l. *Defence (to be discussed also in connection with the treaties of guarantee and of alliance): security (as it pertains to federal responsibility)*

Ghali Set of Ideas as well suggested a federal system and proposed some details about the power-sharing issues, some of which are mentioned below:

- i. *The bi-communal and bi-zonal federation will be established freely by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities. All powers not vested by them in the federal government will rest with the two federated states.*
- ii. *The federal republic will be one territory composed of two politically equal federated states.*
- iii. *The legislature will be composed of a lower house and an upper house.*
- iv. *The lower house will be bi-communal with a 70:30 Greek-Cypriot / Turkish-Cypriot ratio.*
- v. *The upper house will have a 50:50 ratio representing the two federated states.*
- vi. *All laws will be adopted by majority in each house. A majority of the Greek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot representatives in the lower house may decide, on matters related to foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship, that the adoption of a law in the lower house will require separate majorities of the representatives of both communities.*
- vii. *The federal executive will consist of a federal president, a federal vice-president, and a federal council of ministers. The president and the vice president will symbolize the unity of the country and the political equality of the two communities.*
- viii. *There will be a council of ministers composed of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot ministers on a 7:3 ratio.*
- ix. *The president and the vice-president will, separately or conjointly, have the right to veto any law or decision of the legislature concerning foreign affairs, defence, security, budget, taxation, immigration and citizenship.*

- v. *The federal judiciary will consist of a supreme court composed of an equal number of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot judges appointed jointly by the president and vice-president with the consent of the upper house. The Supreme Court will sit as the federal constitutional court and the highest court of the federation. Its presidency will rotate between the senior Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot members of the Supreme Court.*

In late 1990's, TRNC president Rauf Denktaş and Turkey changed their official policy of a federal solution and began to demand a confederal state, thus a solution would be reached not by the agreement of two-communities and but two "sovereign states"¹². As mentioned before, this policy shift was a reactionary move against the Greek-Cypriots' application for EU membership. During the talks on Ghali Set of Ideas, Rauf Denktaş justified this policy shift by referring to the 1963 events (Tamçelik 2015, p. 419):

(...) if a priest (read: Makarios-B.K.) says that this constitution is invalid and starts an attack in the future, the world would not regard this as an internal coup d'état. The world would know that the Greek side is attacking the sovereignty of the Turkish side. The Greek-side cannot shout 'my country is under invasion' when Turkey comes to help us. The world would know that Turkey is not coming to occupy but to protect Turkish sovereignty.

However, the policy shift towards a confederation did not receive widespread support from Turkish-Cypriots. This became clear with the approval of Annan Plan by Turkish-Cypriots, which suggested federal power-sharing structures like De Cuellar proposal and Ghali Set of Ideas.

In 2000's, both Christofias-Talat, Anastasiades-Eroğlu and Anastasiades-Akıncı negotiations resulted in agreements on basic parameters which included a federal government with two constituent states, one international identity and single citizenship.

One of the issues on the nature of the new federation is the succession problem; whether the newly established state will be the direct successor of the Republic of Cyprus or it will be considered as a totally new legal entity (which is called "virgin birth"). The Greek-Cypriot side stresses that new state should just be a rehashed new version of the republic that the two peoples, Britain, Turkey and Greece established on the island with the 1959-1960 treaties¹³. They also claim that creating a new state by a virgin birth could require the necessity of reapplication to UN and EU membership. Turkish-Cypriots on the other hand are sceptical about a direct succession. Turkish columnist Yusuf Kanlı explains the tendency of Turkish-Cypriots as follows:

¹² "Denktas: If confederation not accepted, Cyprus will remain divided" <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/> 09.04.1998 (Accessed: 14.11.2016)

¹³ Yusuf Kanlı: "The story of Cyprus' 'virgin birth'" 03.12.2008 www.hurriyetdailynews.com (Accessed: 01.11.2016).

The Turkish-Cypriot side, on the other hand, was stressing that although the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – as well as the preceding Turkish-Cypriot autonomous administration and the “federated state” – was “unrecognized” since it was declared, the Turkish-Cypriot Parliament adopted many resolutions, government has taken many decisions, courts have passed many verdicts, there have been marriages and divorces. Thus, if the new state was not considered a successor of the Turkish-Cypriot state and before the creation of the new state even for one second the Turkish-Cypriot state was recognized, there would be a serious legal vacuum.¹⁴

Another current dispute on the power-sharing issue is on determining the head of state of the future federation. Greek-Cypriot side suggests that the president of the republic should always be a Greek-Cypriot; on the contrary the Turkish side demands a rotational presidency arguing that the political equality of two sides necessitates this structure. TRNC president Akıncı repeatedly emphasizes that depriving a Turkish-Cypriot from the chance of ever becoming the head of state of his/her country is against the essence of political equality. The cross-voting issue is another potential source of dispute both between and within the two communities.

5.2. TERRITORY

The territory issue is the result of the imbalance between two community’s population and the percentage of territory they control. Currently the population of TRNC consists nearly a quarter of the island’s total population, which is around 1.2 million. However, the area controlled by TRNC is approximately 36 per cent of Cyprus (and %55 per cent of its shorelines), as shown in the table below:

Table 5.1: Current distribution of territory on Cyprus

Area	Km ²	%
Greek-Cypriot Control	5.510	59,56
Turkish-Cypriot Control	3.242	35,04
British Sovereign Bases	244	2,76
Buffer Zone	256	2,64
Whole Island	9.252	100


Source: Kalaycı (2004, p.182)

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

Throughout the post-1974 negotiations, the Turkish side principally accepted that territorial compromises would be made in a comprehensive solution¹⁵. However, Turkish-Cypriot side is concerned about the number of people who will have to be re-located and the amount of fertile land to remain in Turkish-Cypriot control after the adjustments. On the contrary, the Greek-Cypriot side desires an adjustment which will enable the maximum number of refugees to return to their former land.

Provisions of Ghali Set of Ideas on territorial adjustments and the map proposed were as follows:

Figure 5.1: Map of territorial adjustments in Ghali Set of Ideas



Source: <http://myweb.cytanet.com.cy>

68. The map attached hereto sets out the territories of the two federated states. The territorial agreement shall be respected and will be included in the federal constitution.

69. Persons affected by the territorial adjustments will have the option of remaining in the area concerned or relocating to the federated state administered by their own community.


¹⁵ For instance, TRNC President Rauf Denktaş accepted to maintain 29+ per cent of the land during the negotiations of Ghali Set of Ideas. According to Turkish businessman Şarik Tara, a friend of former Greek-Cypriot president George Vasiliou, Turkish president Turgut Özal unofficially agreed to 29 per cent and even to 27 in 1990 (Kızılyürek 2014, p. 101).

70. All necessary arrangements for the relocation of persons affected by territorial adjustments will be satisfactorily implemented before resettlements are carried out. The fund to be established related to displaced persons will be available for this purpose.

71. The territorial adjustment will not affect the water resources available to each federated state. The water resources available throughout the federation will be allocated to the two federated states at a proportion at least equal to their respective current demand.

In 2004, Annan Plan proposed the below map which would gradually reduce the Turkish-Cypriot controlled area to 28,5 per cent of the island¹⁶.

Figure 5.2: Map of territorial adjustments proposed by Annan Plan



Source: www.globalsecurity.org

The most contested region for territorial adjustments is the Morphou (Güzelyurt) region which is currently under TRNC control. The region was almost entirely inhabited by Greek-Cypriots before the 1974 and now it has a mixed population of Turkish-Cypriots who immigrated from the south and Turkish immigrants (Serdaroğlu 2012, p. 531). Although the region is one of the least

¹⁶ Turkish-Cypriot journalist Başaran Düzgün claims that during 2004 Annan Plan negotiations in Bürgenstock, Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül was ready to agree to a 20 per cent ratio; thus enabling a smaller but ethnically more homogenous Turkish state (Düzgün 2008, p. 146).

developed parts of TRNC, its agricultural potential and water resources make it the most contested region during negotiations. In Annan Plan, the region was among the places which will be handed over to the Greek-Cypriot constituent state. Although its residents would have to be relocated had the plan been implemented, percentage of “yes” votes in the Güzelyurt region was surprisingly 65 per cent, which was perceived as a clear sign of the pessimism or limbo of its residents.

5.3. PROPERTY

The property issue is one of the most complex dimensions of the Cyprus problem. The issue is the consequence of the inter-communal clashes which started in 1963 and the population swap between the north and the south that took place in the aftermath of 1974. During 1963-1964 periods, some 25.000 Turkish-Cypriots and 700 Greek-Cypriots were displaced. (Güler, Özersay 2006, p.1). After the Turkish operation in 1974, some 145.000 Greek-Cypriots fled to the Greek controlled south and some 65.000 Turkish-Cypriots moved to the Turkish controlled areas from the south. The total number of displaced people was around 30 per cent of the island’s total population at that time.

The property issue takes its roots in this massive population movement. During the turmoil, both Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots had to leave their immovable properties behind. Turkish-Cypriots who immigrated from the Greek-Cypriot side were given properties in the north which were abandoned by their Greek-Cypriot owners. In addition, 1985 Constitution of TRNC had a provision that declared abandoned Greek-Cypriot properties in the north as “the property of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”. Turkish-Cypriot properties left on the south were administered by the Greek-Cypriot state where the Minister of the Interior was appointed as “custodian” (Gürel, Özersay 2006, p. 21). It can be argued that the burden of the population exchange and loss of property was on Greek-Cypriots, since the Turkish-Cypriots who made up around 20 per cent of the population began to control 35 per cent of the island.

The property issue and the claims of Greek-Cypriots became a legal problem for Turkey after the *Loizidou v. Turkey* case when Greek-Cypriot property owner Titina Loizidou filed an application against Turkey in ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) in 1989. Loizidou claimed that she was denied access to her house in Kyrenia by the Turkish Army. ECHR decided that Turkey was responsible for the human rights violations in the northern part of Cyprus and therefore should compensate for the denial of ownership and use of property. The *Loizidou v. Turkey* case became a landmark case and many other applications by the Greek-Cypriots continued. In 2006, Turkey

eventually established an Immovable Property Commission (*Taşınmaz Mal Tazmin Komisyonu*), in order to deal with Greek-Cypriot claims for restitution, compensation and exchange. In 2010, ECHR decided that Immovable Property Commission was an effective internal remedy for claims relating to properties in Northern Cyprus. Total compensation paid upon the Commission's decisions in as of November 2016 is GBP 227.954.904¹⁷. As a reflection of the issue on practical life, it should be noted that in TRNC real estate market sellers/dealers prefer to emphasize the origin of a real estate in advertisements, especially if the original owner is a Turkish-Cypriot.

The solution to the property issue is related to Greek-Cypriots' and Turkish-Cypriots' expectations for a future settlement. The Greek-Cypriot side emphasises the rights of individuals on the issue, which means giving all displaced persons the unqualified right to repossess and return to their former homes and properties (Gürel, Özersay 2006, p. 20). On the contrary, Turkish-Cypriots highlight the principle of bi-zonality and suggest a global exchange and compensation (Gürel, Özersay 2006, p. 12). It can be stated that Turkish-Cypriots, who are smaller in population, wish to maintain the homogeneity of their zone to some extent and therefore they are sceptical to a right of return for all property owners.

Past and future parameters for a solution to the property issue consider the rights of the legal owner, current user and the principle of bi-zonality. It is clear that a significant portion of the problem will be solved by the territorial adjustments which will increase the Greek-Cypriot controlled area, thus facilitating the return of properties to their former owners after the adjustments. However, it will not be easy to settle down the whole issue; since the estimated residual value (even after a global exchange with Turkish properties in the south and territorial adjustments) of Greek-Cypriot properties in the north is estimated to be around €8 billion¹⁸. This figure makes a possible solution dependent on international financial support.

5.4. GUARANTEES

Another disputed issue between two sides is the guarantees of Greece, Turkey and United Kingdom as provisioned in the founding treaties of the Republic of Cyprus. The Treaty of Guarantee dated 16.08.1960 states that “in so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the

¹⁷ Detailed statistics are downloadable at the Commission's official website <http://www.tamk.gov.ct.tr> (Accessed: 14.11.2016).

¹⁸ “Akıncı: Çözümün maliyeti 8 milyar euro [Akıncı: Cost of Solution is 8 Billion Euros]” <http://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/akinci-cozumun-maliyeti-8-milyar-euro,0kHvFisiPUiCbik5yh6Pww> (Accessed: 11.11.2016).

three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty”. Turkey depended on this provision of the treaty when launching a military operation after the 1974 coup.

Turkish-Cypriots see the guarantee issue as “insurance” in case unilateral change of the constitution by Greek-Cypriots or repeating of 1963 aggressions on Turkish-Cypriots reoccur. On the other hand, Greek-Cypriots perceive the guarantees as a permanent threat to Cyprus’ sovereignty and suggest that 1974 invasion was a clear result of the unjust Treaty of Guarantee. In addition, Greek-Cypriot side claims that “there is no room for anachronistic guarantee systems, nor can a modern state and in particular an EU member state, be under the tutelage of guarantors or guardians¹⁹”. The solving of guarantee dispute cannot be achieved between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaderships where the ultimate decision lies with the guarantors themselves (especially it is difficult for a hypothetical Turkish-Cypriot leader who personally agrees the abolishment of guarantees to convince Turkey on the issue). Greece and United Kingdom do not seem to be insistent on guarantees whereas Turkey is against any change. It should also be noted that a final solution where Turkey gives up her rights as a guarantor will be very tough to sell to the Turkish public by any Turkish government.

The logo consists of the letters 'TCE' in a white, serif font, with a small 'TM' trademark symbol to the upper right of the 'E'. The text is centered within a solid red rectangular background.

5.5. DEROGATIONS

A reason of dispute is the compliance of any agreement with EU laws (*acquis communautaire*). The Greek-Cypriot side rejects any permanent derogation, whereas Turkish-Cypriots demand limitations on the freedom of settlement and right to property in order to maintain the bi-communal nature of the federation. Annan Plan suggested some provisions on the freedom of settlement which would be lifted gradually²⁰.

¹⁹ “Anachronistic guarantees need to end “. Statement by Greek-Cypriot Defense Minister Christoforos Fokaides <http://www.sigmalive.com/en/news/politics/139389/anachronistic-guarantees-need-to-end-say-cyprus-and-greece> (Accessed: 28.10.2016).

²⁰ “All Cypriot citizens shall also enjoy internal {component state} citizenship status. Like the citizenship status of the European Union, this status shall complement and not replace Cypriot citizenship. A {component state} may tie the exercise of political rights at its level to its internal {component state} citizenship status, and may limit the establishment of residence for persons not holding this status in accordance with this Agreement. Such limitations shall be permissible if the number of residents hailing from the other {component state} has reached 1% of the population in the first year and 20% in the twentieth year, rising by 3% every three years in the intervening period. Thereafter, any limitations shall be permissible only if one third of the population hails from the other {component state}.”

6. IMPORTANT ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Cyprus is generally described as a graveyard for peacemakers or the Rubik's Cube of diplomacy. During a conference in 2015, Turkish-Cypriot politician Kudret Özersay sarcastically said that Cyprus negotiations taste like a "coke with no gas". Considering that negotiations to find a solution to Cyprus problem have been going on for more than half a century, these descriptions are definitely not exaggerations. Negotiations between Cypriot communities, the former colonial power UK, Greece and Turkey started in 1950's and resulted in the formation of the independent Republic of Cyprus. However, the break-up of the republic necessitated new negotiations, which still continue as of today. According to Turkish-Cypriot academician Kızılyürek (2009, p. 7), the main reason for being late for a solution is

the incompetence of political elites on evaluating the given conditions and balance of powers, not being able to distinguish between the 'desired' and 'achievable' or being late to distinguish between them.

It should be noted that negotiations give Cypriot leaders visibility in the international scenery and diplomacy arena that normally they would not be enjoying as leaders of a small and stable Cyprus. As one Cypriot explained "*if there were a solution, we would be like Malta, which does not interest anyone. But this way our politicians are regularly received by representatives of the UN, the EU and the US*" (Isachenko 2012, p.2).

In order to give a general perception of the dispute, some attempts to solve the Cyprus problem are explained in this section. Since a detailed history of Cyprus negotiations is not in the scope of this study, we selected significant plans and proposals prepared after the break-up of the partnership republic in December 1963.

6.1. ACHESON PLAN I

After the collapse of the 1960 Republic, former US Secretary of State Dean Acheson came up with a plan in June 1964 to solve the Cyprus issue which was threatening the stability of NATO's south-east wing. Main suggestions of the plan were as follows:

- i. Cyprus would be united with Greece
- ii. Turkish-Cypriots would have a certain degree of autonomy in 3 specific parts of the island, where they form the majority

- iii. Other Turks living outside these autonomous regions would enjoy all kinds of minority rights, where the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne would be taken as a benchmark
- iv. Turkey would be granted a military base with convenient size and location. The base would be under perpetual Turkish sovereignty similar to British Sovereign Bases
- v. Greece will leave the island of Kastellorizo (*Meis*) to Turkey

Dean Acheson was one of the significant followers of US containment strategy and uniting Cyprus with a NATO member would make the island with a strong communist party (AKEL) immune from Soviet influence. Greece and Turkey signalled that they would accept the plan; but Makarios who favoured a “pure” Enosis rejected it (Kızılyürek 2002, p.120).

Makarios’s rejection of Acheson Plan put him at odds with USA who was nervous about his rapprochement policy with the Communist bloc and Non-Aligned countries. Makarios was also able to get support from the USSR, who preferred a non-aligned Cyprus instead of an island under NATO control.

6.2. ACHESON PLAN II

After the rejection of his proposal by Makarios, Acheson revised his plan so that the base area would be leased to Turkey instead of granting perpetual sovereignty. Turkey insisted on full sovereignty and rejected the plan.

Turkey and Greece continued negotiations by excluding Makarios. A proposal which would give Turkey one of the Aegean islands or a part of Western Thrace in return for Turkish green-light on Enosis went nowhere due to the political instability in Greece (Kızılyürek 2009, p. 29)

6.3. 1968-1974 INTER-COMMUNAL NEGOTIATIONS

After the crisis of 1967, relative calm was achieved on Cyprus. In this climate direct negotiations between two communities started in 1968, which is accepted the very beginning of the long-winded story of inter-communal Cyprus talks. The negotiations were on amendments which aimed to trim the rights of Turkish-Cypriots granted by 1960 Constitution. Turkish side made some concessions including the approval of 13 amendments proposed by Makarios in 1963 but Makarios refused Turkish-Cypriot demands for limited regional autonomy and an official denouncing of Enosis (Kızılyürek 2009, p. 33). In this period, Makarios had the upper-hand against Turkish-Cypriots and had nothing to lose by foot dragging for a final agreement.

6.4. 1977 AND 1979 HIGH LEVEL AGREEMENTS

After the military intervention of Turkey in 1974, the balance of power on the ground shifted towards Turkish-Cypriots. In 1974, *de facto* partition of the island was achieved and Turkish-Cypriots, who were enjoying the newly established security, had no motive to rush for a solution. During this period Turkish-Cypriots insisted on a federative government whereas Greek-Cypriots showed a reconciliatory approach on granting the Turkish-Cypriots all their rights according to the 1960 Constitution. In 1975, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) was proclaimed. After all, Greek-Cypriots had to accept a federal solution, but two-sides had big differences on their understanding of a federal state structure. Greek-Cypriots suggested a multi-cantonal federation with a strong government; however Denktaş demanded a bi-zonal federation with a relatively weak central government. Greek-Cypriots also feared that Denktaş desired a confederation.

The most important document on which even today's negotiations are based is the High Level Agreement of 1977 between Makarios and Denktaş. In this agreement two sides expressed that:

- i. *We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.*
- ii. *The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.*
- iii. *Questions of principles like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property and other specific matters, are open for discussion, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish-Cypriot Community.*
- iv. *The powers and functions of the central federal government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.*

However, the negotiation process afterwards did not succeed due to different opinions on dimensions like power-sharing, land and freedoms (especially freedoms of settlement and property). Makarios died in 1977 and he was replaced by Spyros Kyprianou. Denktaş and Kyprianou signed another high level agreement in 1979 confirming that 1977 High Level Agreement will be a basis for further negotiations. The 1979 High-Level Agreement also stated that:

- i. *There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all citizens of the Republic.*
- ii. *It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote goodwill, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.*
- iii. *The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed.*
- iv. *The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.*

6.5. NEMITZ PLAN

Nemitz Plan was prepared by US diplomat Mathew Nemitz and it was revealed in 1978. The plan proposed a bi-zonal federation with significant land concessions from the Turkish-side. This plan was accepted by Turkish-Cypriots; however Greek-Cypriot side rejected it. According to Kızılyürek, it was communist AKEL's objection to the US-sponsored solution which caused the rejection of the Nemitz Plan (Kızılyürek 2009, p. 67).

6.6. KURT WALDHEIM'S PROPOSALS

In 1981, UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim proposed a 3-region federal structure (Turkish-Cypriot region, Greek-Cypriot region and a federal district) which was rejected by both parties (Kızılyürek 2009, p. 69).

6.7. DE CUELLAR DOCUMENT

Perez De Cuellar, who was the UN Secretary-General during 1982-1991 made numerous attempts to solve the deadlock in Cyprus talks. In 1985, his proposals for a solution were rejected by Greek-Cypriot president Kyprianou. In 1986, De Cuellar proposed another document which was also found unacceptable by Greek-Cypriots. According to De Cuellar's proposal:

- i. There would an upper-house with a 50:50 representation and a lower-house with a 30:70 representation
- ii. The president of the state would be a Greek-Cypriot and the vice-president a Turkish-Cypriot
- iii. The government would be formed on a 7:3 basis
- iv. The Turkish Federated State would keep 29+ per cent of total territory
- v. The calendar for non-Cypriot soldiers and other groups' (read: Turkish immigrants-B.K.) withdrawal would be agreed by two-sides before the founding of the interim federal government.

Greek-Cypriots rejected the proposal due to insufficient provisions on guarantees, Turkish soldiers, immigrants and "3 freedoms" (movement/residence/property).

6.8. GHALI SET OF IDEAS

Another diplomat who attempted to solve the Cyprus dispute was Boutros-Boutros Ghali, who was the UN Secretary-General during 1992-1996. In June 1992, Ghali presented a 100-article framework solution plan which is known as the Ghali Set of Ideas. Greek-Cypriot president Yorgos Vasiliou signalled a positive attitude towards the plan and Turkish-Cypriot president Rauf Denktaş accepted 91 of the 100 articles. However, the 9 articles objected by Denktaş was about the very essence of power-sharing, powers transferred to the federal government, right of return of Greek-Cypriot refugees and the map attached to the Set of Ideas (Kızılyürek 2009, p. 86).

In 1993 Greek-Cypriot presidential elections, Yorgos Vasiliou was replaced by Glafcos Clerides. Since Clerides refused to negotiate the Set of Ideas, the process ended with no significant progress.

6.9. ANNAN PLAN

Another plan proposed by UN is the Annan Plan, presented by Secretary General Kofi Annan on 11.11.2002. It is the most significant solution plan so far, since it had the chance to be voted in separate referendums by both sides. Compared to previous plans like De Cuellar proposals and Ghali Set of Ideas, Annan Plan proposed nothing new and extraordinary; but its coincidence with Cyprus' EU accession process caused turmoil on both sides and international powers were able to exert pressure on Cypriot leaders for a referendum. The plan, which was revised several times during negotiations was eventually rejected by Greek-Cypriots and therefore could not be implemented. However, it caused an earthquake in Turkish-Cypriot politics and pro-solution parties; especially CTP-BG increased support among the Turkish-Cypriot electorate. In addition, 65 per cent approval rate on the Turkish-Cypriot side badly damaged the reputation of Rauf Denktaş, who was severely against the plan.

6.10. GAMBARI PROCESS

In 2006, Kofi Annan's political adviser Ibrahim Gambari started a new initiative which is known as the Gambari Process. Greek-Cypriot president Papadopoulos and Turkish-Cypriot President Talat agreed on a politically equal, bi-zonal and bi-communal federation. The process also included the formation of technical committees to deal with practical issues. However, there was no consensus on the details of the committees' working program and the process ended without any results.

6.11. ANASTASIADES-EROĞLU JOINT DECLARATION

On 11.02.2014, Greek-Cypriot president Nicos Anastasiades and Turkish-Cypriot president Derviş Eroğlu agreed on a joint declaration which set the basic parameters of a solution. The highlights of the declaration are presented below:

- i. The status quo is unacceptable and its prolongation will have negative consequences for the Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots.
- ii. The leaders expressed their determination to resume structured negotiations in a results-oriented manner. All unresolved core issues will be on the table, and will be discussed interdependently. The leaders will aim to reach a settlement as soon as possible, and hold separate simultaneous referenda thereafter.
- iii. The settlement will be based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality, as set out in the relevant Security Council Resolutions and the High Level Agreements. The united Cyprus, as a member of the United Nations and of the European Union, shall have a single international legal personality and a single sovereignty
- iv. There will be a single united Cyprus citizenship, regulated by federal law.
- v. The negotiations are based on the principle that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed
- vi. The bi-zonal, bi-communal nature of the federation and the principles upon which the EU is founded will be safeguarded and respected throughout the island.

6.12. AKINCI-ANASTASIADES NEGOTIATIONS

As stated in the relevant sections, with the election of pro-solution politician Mustafa Akıncı as the president of TRNC in April 2015, a new momentum for the solution of Cyprus problem has been achieved. Both Akıncı and his counterpart Anastasiades had supported the Annan Plan in 2004, which is the main reason for the relative optimism on both Cypriot and international pro-solution circles. Since two leaders principally agree on power-sharing and the state structure, practical issues like land and property are the main difficulties need to be overcome. Although their extraction in the short term is questionable, hydro-carbon resources discovered in Eastern Mediterranean are believed to be an incentive for a solution. Extensive negotiations between two leaders were ongoing as of November 2016; however a deadlock occurred in the Mont Pelerin Summit at the end of November, mainly due to the number of refugees who will be allowed to settle in the Turkish-Cypriot constituent state in after a solution.

7. STRUCTURE OF TRNC DEMOCRACY

TRNC is a multi-party parliamentary democracy with a president and a 50-member unicameral assembly. The president is elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term. He/she acts as the head of state and represents the Turkish-Cypriot community in the international arena. Like presidential elections, parliamentary elections are repeated every five years. Since four main parties dominate the political system after 1993, it can be stated that TRNC has a consolidated party system. According to the 2009 and 2013 legislative election results, effective number of parties is calculated as 3.33 and 3.55 respectively²¹.

Although there have been parties founded by Turkish immigrants, there is no influential party based on ethnic differences. Parties which can be considered ultra-nationalist have a very marginal support. Religiously fundamentalist parties also were not able to gain ground since Turkish-Cypriots are one of the most secular Muslim communities in the world. Acts of political violence are rare, which include some threats and bomb attacks aimed at leftist opposition during 1990's, the assassination of the opponent journalist Kutlu Adalı in 1996 and a few incidents prior to 2004 Annan Plan referendum.

Women representation in TRNC is currently very low. In 2013 legislative elections, only 4 women were elected to the 50-member parliament. However, during 2015 amendments on the *TRNC Law on Political Parties*, a 30 per cent women's quota was made compulsory in both legislative and municipal elections.

²¹ The "effective number of parties" concept is introduced by Laakso and Taagepera. The concept provides for an adjusted number of political parties in a country's party system according to their number and relative strength in elections (Clark, Golder and Nadenichek Golder 2009, p.548).

7.1. TRNC PARTY SYSTEM ACCORDING TO TRNC CONSTITUTION AND LAWS

TRNC party system is regulated by the 1985 TRNC Constitution and the Law on Political Parties. Main provisions of TRNC Constitution on political parties are summarized below:

Table 7.1: Selected provisions from TRNC constitution on political parties

Provision	Article #
Citizens have the right to form political parties and have the right to enter and leave political parties	70/1
Political parties can be founded without prior permission and act freely	70/2
Political parties are essential elements of democratic political life, either they are in power or in opposition	70/3
Judges, prosecutors, members of the armed forces, police officers, civil servants and persons under the age of 18 can not found political parties or become members	70/5
Regulations, programs and activities of political parties can not be against the state's indivisible unity with its land and people, human rights, rule of people, principles of democratic and secular republic and Atatürk principles	70/1
Internal activities and decisions of political parties can not be against democratic principles	71/3
Political parties can not receive financial aid from foreign countries and they can not approve foreign countries' decisions against the independence and unity of TRNC.	71/6
Financial audits of political parties are performed by the Supreme Court	71/4
Political parties who act against the mentioned rules may be banned by the Supreme Court	71/7

Source: www.mahkemeler.net

According to the *Law on Political Parties*, parties which gain more than 3 per cent of the votes can receive financial aid from the government. Examples of other provisions stated in the law are summarized below:

Table 7.2: Selected provisions from TRNC Law on Political Parties

Provision	Article #
A citizen cannot be a member of more than one political party at the same time	5
In order to join elections for the first time, a political party must be organized in all election districts and must have performed all regional and general congresses	8
No discrimination can be made for religion, language, race, colour, gender, sexual orientation, sect, ethnic origin or place of birth while assessing a membership application	10
In order to form a group in the parliament, parties should have at least 5 MP's	20
An MP resigning from his/her party cannot join another party; become a minister or chairman of a parliamentary committee until the end of the legislative period	25
Political parties must perform appropriate bookkeeping	35
There is a tax exemption for political parties' incomes	40
Political parties cannot receive loans	43
Political parties cannot adopt the same name with a political party founded in Turkey	55
Political parties acknowledge the guarantee rights of the Republic of Turkey	55
Political parties cannot perform military and defence trainings for their members. They cannot design uniforms or dressings similar to uniforms for their members	56

Source: www.mahkemeler.net

Some articles in the law are aimed to address conditions specific to TRNC. Including “place of birth” in the article on discrimination can be perceived as a measure to protect Turkish immigrants. The article banning the use of same name with a Turkish party aims to prevent any party openly

claiming to be the “subsidiary” of a political party in Turkey and seeking support among Turkish immigrants. Due to the small size of the TRNC parliament, a few individuals defecting their parties can cause the ruling government lose the majority. As in the case of ORP (*Freedom and Reform Party*) explained in following sections, defecting MP’s can found new political parties to become coalition partners or can switch to another party. To block these kinds of political tricks, the law requires defecting MP’s to stay independent and deprives them from taking part in a government.

It is widely accepted that Turkish-Cypriot political parties have lost public trust. Mismanagement, favouritism, nepotism, alleged corruption, coalition governments founded and broken-up repeatedly etc. are main reasons for the loss of reputation among voters²². In a 2013 report issued by *The Economic Policy Research Foundation of Turkey* (TEPAV), the ratio of confidence in political parties was 10,9 per cent (TEPAV 2013, p. 42). In a more recent survey conducted by Kyrenia American University (GAU), only 1 interviewee among 486 expressed confidence in political parties²³. One of the concrete evidence of mistrust is the results of the 2014 referendum on some constitutional amendments. The voters rejected the amendments although they were supported by all parties in the parliament, which was described as an embarrassing result for the political elite.

Another sign of mistrust is the turnout ratios which were below 70 per cent in 2013 legislative elections (69,4), 2014 presidential elections 1st round (62,35) and 2014 presidential elections 2nd round (64,12). It should be noted that the turnout ratio in the 1st round of 2014 presidential elections was a record low in TRNC history. In these elections, academician Kudret Özersay (1973) managed to get 21 per cent of the votes. Özersay was figure without any political background and was not supported by any of the parties. Although he could not make it to the 2nd round, his significant share of votes was interpreted as the public’s discontent with current political figures²⁴.

²² American academician Eddie James Girdner, who taught in Eastern Mediterranean University during 1992-1998, describes the management culture at that time as follows (Girdner 2015, pp. 13-14): “*Before the forests burned in the big fire on the Girne Range in 1995, I was told that fire watches were set for only a part of the day, from eight in the morning until five in the afternoon during weekdays. It was as if the fire would be so considerate as to break out only during the hours that was convenient for Cypriots to work. (...) And what about the public sector? There is little demand and scant delivery of services. One wonders about the obliviousness to the needs of the populace when it comes to public administration. And there seemed to be minimal accountability in any area*”.

²³ “GAE ‘2014 Beklenti Anketi’ni Kamuoyu ile Paylaştı [GAE shared 2014 Expectations Survey with the Public] ” <http://www.gau.edu.tr> (Accessed: 20.01.2016).

²⁴ Kudret Özersay eventually founded a political party called Halkın Partisi (*People’s Party*) on 06.01.2016. The party is receiving a promising interest from the Turkish-Cypriot public.

7.2. TRNC ELECTION SYSTEM

TRNC applies an election system based on proportional representation with an election threshold of 5 per cent. Until 2016, there were five multi-member districts whose number of voters, number of seats (according to the 23.07.2013 legislative elections) and locations are shown on the table and map below:

Table 7.3: Former election districts of TRNC

District	# of Voters	Seats Allocated
Lefkoşa	54.487	16
Gazimağusa	45.184	13
Girne	33.703	10
Güzelyurt	21.130	6
İskele	18.299	5
TRNC Total	172.803	50

Source: TRNC Higher Election Board web site (<http://ysk.mahkemeler.net/>)

Figure 7.1: Map of former election districts of TRNC



Although Iskele was very slightly over-represented compared to its number of voters, it can be stated that no malapportionment²⁵ occurred with the distribution of seats among constituencies before 2016.

Having a multi-district election system for a small country like TRNC had been being debated. Some argued that having five constituencies paved the way for “township politics”, where individuals with close personal contacts with the electorate have the chance of being elected and try to maximize the benefit of their constituency. Eventually in April 2016, the election law was changed and a single district system was adopted.

The election system applied is preferential voting with a free party list where voters can cast their votes

- for a party list as a whole
- indicate their preferences within a single party list
- indicate their preferences either within a party list or across different party lists.

As a result of this complex system, the percentage of invalid votes is relatively high (6,6 per cent in 2013 elections).

The logo consists of the letters 'TCE' in a bold, white, serif font, with a small 'TM' trademark symbol to the upper right of the 'E'. The text is centered within a solid red rectangular background.

Presidential elections are held by using the two-round system. In case no candidate passes the 50 per cent threshold, a second round is held among the two candidates with the highest votes.

The political scene in TRNC (and former TFSC) can not be considered stable. Between 1975-2016, 26 different governments have been founded and average life of a government is less than 20 months. The current parliamentary and election system is sometimes blamed for political instability and some groups, including the Democratic Party suggest switching to a presidential system. However, system change is not a hot topic in TRNC politics as of today.

²⁵ Malapportionment occurs when the distribution of political representation between constituencies is not based on the size of each constituency's population (Clark, Golder, Nadenichek Golder 2009, p. 626).

8. MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES AND THEIR OPINIONS ON A SOLUTION TO CYPRUS PROBLEM

8.1. REPUBLICAN TURKISH PARTY (CTP)

Republican Turkish Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi*) has a unique place among Turkish-Cypriot political parties since it is the oldest political party with its foundation back to 1970, during the period Turkish-Cypriots were mostly living in isolated enclaves²⁶. The party was founded on 27.12.1970 by Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu (1921-2002), a lawyer and one of the opponents of the nationalist policies of Rauf Denktaş (Sözen 2009, p.343). Before the establishment of CTP, Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu was an MP of the Turkish-Cypriot Administration Parliament and he supported that Turkish-Cypriots should hold on the institutions as provisioned in the 1960 Constitution, from which they preferred to withdraw due to 1963 events.

8.1.1. Historical Stance of CTP on Cyprus Problem

As a party placed in the far-left spectrum of Turkish-Cypriot Politics, CTP supported a federal solution to the Cyprus problem from the very beginning of its foundation and opposed any policy towards ENOSIS or TAKSIM. In its official website, the party declares that

Since its foundation CTP struggled for a federal solution to the Cyprus problem and for the development of democracy, freedom, social justice and solidarity within the country; in line with the goals of socialism and under the guidance of socialist principles”²⁷.

This policy was continued after the de-facto partition of the island in 1974. The party’s vision for Cyprus as of 1975 stated by its founder Berberoğlu was “*a sovereign, independent, non-aligned, territorially integrated, a bizonal Federal Cyprus Republic*” (Özuslu 2011, p.57). In accordance with its political agenda, the party strongly opposed any declaration of independence for Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

²⁶ By stating that CTP is the first Turkish-Cypriot political party, we do not outlaw previous Turkish-Cypriot political institutions which were founded under the name of “party” but operated as ideological clubs. (Eg: Kıbrıs İttihat ve Terakki Klübü [Cyprus Union and Progress Club], Türkiye ile Birleşme Partisi [Union with Turkey Party], Kıbrıs Türk Birliği İstiklal Partisi [Cyprus Turkish Union Independence Party, Genç Türk Partisi [Young Turk Party]). These political institutions were short-lived and did not have a lasting effect. Moreover, before the relations between two communities deteriorated, there were many Turkish-Cypriots who were active members of the communist AKEL party.

²⁷ CTP official web site, <http://www.ctp-bg.org/parti-tezleri.html>, date of visit 23.06.2015.

After 1974, a solution based on a confederation was supported among some right-wing opinion makers. CTP opposed the idea of confederation since it feared that a confederation may eventually lead to the partition of the island in the future (Özuslu 2011, p.74). In addition, it criticised Greek-Cypriot proposals of a cantonal federation since it did not meet the party's bi-zonal criteria (Özuslu, 2011, p.73). Removal of the two sovereign British bases and return of their territories to Cypriot sovereignty was also in the party's agenda (Özgür 1992, p.24).

It can be claimed that CTP promoted a socialist set of ideas and desired to distance Cyprus from the two guarantor "motherlands", Greece and Turkey; as well as from United Kingdom which were both NATO members. In line with its socialist approach, the party insisted that Cyprus society included two classes (workers and the bourgeoisie) as well as two ethnic groups. It also claimed that imperialist forces were using Cyprus as an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" and had no worry for the sufferings of Cypriots (Özgür 1992, p.116). The party maintained its contact with Greek-Cypriot labour unions and the Greek-Cypriot communist party of AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People), with whom it shared similar ideas on Cyprus problem²⁸. Those on the far left of the ideological spectrum perceived the idea of independence as a right wing nationalist trick designed to prevent the 'working classes' (Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot) from uniting (Bahçeli 2010, pp.139-148). This approach explains the negative attitude of CTP towards the declaration of independence for Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

During 1974-1983, CTP failed to gain popular support among Turkish-Cypriot community. In 1976 presidential elections of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, party leader Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu gained 21,8 per cent of the total votes, which was far beyond Rauf Denktaş's 76,4 per cent. In the parliamentary elections which took place same year, CTP gained 12,7 per cent of the votes and had 2 seats on the 40-member parliament. In 1981 parliamentary elections, its share of votes was 15,05 per cent and the party managed to gain 6 seats.

In 1976 Özker Özgür (1940-2005) replaced Ahmet Mithat Berberoğlu as party chairman. Özker Özgür entered the 1981 presidential elections as the party candidate and received 12,7 per cent of the votes against the 51,7 per cent of Denktaş, who was re-elected with a narrower margin compared to 1976 presidential elections.

²⁸ It should be noted that some of the founders of CTP were former members of AKEL party.

The main aspects of CTP's stance on Cyprus problem at the end of 1990's and the party's perception of Denktaş policies at the time show the big gap between CTP leadership and president Denktaş. Highlights of CTP's opposition to Denktaş and TRNC administration as of 1997 can be summarized as follows (Talat 2005, pp.9-30).:

- i. The current situation in Cyprus is against the benefits of both sides and a solution will be reached definitely.
- ii. The delay of a solution grows the distance between two communities.
- iii. Cyprus problem is becoming more internationalized and the power of two communities' influence on a possible solution is fading.
- iv. TRNC administration does not trust its own citizens. It is trying to stop Turkish-Cypriots from attending inter-communal organisations, thus preventing them to reach outside world from the semi-prison situation and keeping the isolation.
- v. TRNC administration also tries to stop Turkish-Cypriot NGO's from contacting EU institutes
- vi. Reaching a solution is vital for Turkish-Cypriots since the economic situation in TRNC is extremely bad and Turkish-Cypriot people are broken off from production. A solution will result in lifting the economic embargoes²⁹ and return to a production economy. In addition, a solution will end the difficulties related to transport and receiving credits from abroad.
- vii. It is no longer possible to satisfy the needs of Turkish-Cypriots by mere security rhetoric.
- viii. A solution can only be reached by mutual concessions and any solution will not be the victory of any side.
- ix. Only viable solution to the problem is a federation since it meets the Turkish-Cypriots' demands for a bi-zonal, politically equal formula where Turkey's role as a guarantor will continue.
- x. A federation will also satisfy Greek-Cypriot concerns like freedom of movement, settlement, acquisition of property, a single international identity and a ban on secession.

²⁹ In July 1994, upon the applications of Greek-Cypriots, The Court of Justice of the European Union made a decision which banned direct imports of agricultural products from TRNC to European Union, causing considerable damage to already stressed TRNC economy. These restrictions were eased by the Green Line Regulation dated 29.04.2004. According to the regulation, Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce was recognized as the legitimate authority for the certification of goods exported from TRNC.

- xi. Turkish-Cypriot community's and Turkey's interests should be mutually respected. However, Turkish-Cypriots' interests should not be placed behind Turkey's strategic interests.
- xii. EU membership for Cyprus should come after a final solution to the problem. Greek-Cypriots' accession to the EU before a final solution is reached is a very serious threat for Turkish-Cypriot community

8.1.2. Declaration of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983 and CTP's Reaction

After the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus gained stability, the ruling UBP and president Denktaş began to support the idea of declaring independence unilaterally (Kızılyürek 2011, p.283). As mentioned above, CTP was against any form of government other than a federal system for Cyprus. The options of ENOSIS, TAKSIM, confederation or an independent Turkish state were out of the party's political agenda. The opponents of independence were also suspicious that Denktaş will use the occasion to regain his popularity which was proved to be far beyond 1976. However, due to pressures from Denktaş and Turkey, CTP eventually voted in favour of independence together with other opposition parties. Mehmet Ali Talat, a young leftist at the time and a long-time leader of CTP claims that Denktaş threatened the opposition leaders by stating that "any party who rejects the creation of the state will not be able to survive and will be banned" (Güven 2009, p. 46). After confirming that Turkey also supported the declaration of independence, CTP management decided to vote in favour of independence which was declared on 15.11.1983. The new state was named Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).

Although declaring independence unilaterally, TRNC administration inserted a section in the text of declaration which still kept the door open for a federal solution, in order to temper with foreign protests (Kızılyürek 2011, p.284).

8.1.3. CTP Policies After 1983

After the independence of TRNC, CTP continued to advocate a federal solution based on two equal states. It also maintained its policy of socialism and emphasized the common interests of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot working classes. The independence declaration of TRNC coincided with the end of the military regime and the rise of Turgut Özal's Motherland Party (ANAP) to

power in Turkey. The ruling UBP worked to adopt the economic liberalisation policies of ANAP, which were strongly criticised by CTP. CTP also opposed the new constitution of TRNC, which it perceived as an “imported” constitution in order to weaken the leftist movement in Cyprus, as the military rule intended to do the same in Turkey (Özgür 1992, pp.194-195). In the referendum of 1985, new constitution was approved by 70 per cent “yes” votes against 30 per cent “no”.

In 1985 legislative elections, CTP managed to get the 21, 4 per cent of total votes and gained 12 seats in the 50-member parliament.³⁰ In the presidential elections that took place the same year, CTP party chairman Özker Özgür gained 18,3 per cent, which was far beyond Rauf Denktaş’s 70,2. The 1985 presidential election results indicated that Denktaş managed to gain his depreciated popularity after the declaration of TRNC, as feared by left-wing parties. However, the election results indicate that Turkish-Cypriots were discontent by the way domestic affairs were run³¹, although they continued to support Denktaş as the owner of the national struggle.

In 1990 legislative elections, all opposition parties including CTP formed an election alliance against the ruling UBP which adopted a majoritarian election system. The alliance managed to get 45 per cent of the votes against the 55 per cent of UBP and UBP formed a single-party government. Claiming that Turkey intervened in the elections, the MP’s of the opposition parties boycotted the parliament and did not swear in.³²

After the end of the Cold War, CTP shifted its policy towards a more market-oriented approach. In the 1993 elections, the party changed the colour of its flag from red to green. After the 1996 party congress, CTP became a social democratic party (Sözen 2011, p.343).

1990’s were a period that stagnation on Cyprus negotiations was observed and the hope of a solution was weak. However, CTP maintained its policy of a federal solution and criticised Turkey’s growing political, economic, cultural and demographic influence on the island. Mismanagement, social disintegration, nepotism and favouritism were other issues that CTP based its opposition against the ruling UBP and president Denktaş.

³⁰ After the declaration of independence, the number of seats in the TRNC parliament which was previously 40 was raised to 50.

³¹ Although keeping its position as the winner party, the ruling UBP’s share of votes were dropped from 42,5 per cent in 1981 to 36,7 per cent in 1985.

³² The attitude of the UBP and Denktaş against the opposition was also criticised in Turkey’s press by liberal-tended opinion-makers (Altan 2003, pp. 24-26).

8.1.4. CTP In Government

In 1993 early parliamentary elections, none of the parties were able to form a single-party government. This gave CTP an opportunity to form a coalition government with DP, a breakaway right-wing party from the UBP³³.

This government was the first time CTP occupied a position in a TRNC government. However, this move created a gap with the Greek-Cypriot leftist parties. As Hatay (2005, p.18) stated;

The forming of this government caused the relations between Greek-Cypriot communist party AKEL and CTP to strain since for AKEL, the CTP's willingness to abandon its position as an opposition party and enter into the government of what Greek-Cypriots in general see as a 'pseudo-state' on 'Turkish-occupied territories' – and, moreover, in coalition with the adamantly pro-Denktaş DP – was hard to stomach.

DP-CTP coalition government lasted until 1996 and broke up due to disputes both within the coalition and CTP itself. One of the main causes of dispute was CTP's opposition to the privatisation of electric production which was supported by leading coalition partner DP (Güven 2009, pp.52-53). After the resignation of the government, Mehmet Ali Talat (1952) was elected as the 3rd chairman of CTP.

During 1990's TRNC economy faced severe economic difficulties as a result of its isolation, mismanagement, structural problems and the unstable economic situation in Turkey. In 2000, a banking crisis erupted which was related to the economic problems in Turkey. 7 banks bankrupted with approximately 300 million US dollar deposits and more than 50.000 depositors were affected. In August 2000, some two thousand depositors furious with the government stormed the TRNC parliament and managed to enter the meeting hall, breaking glasses and damaging some furniture³⁴. The scale and nature of protests was a clear reflection of the public's frustration with government policies.

In these circumstances, a solution in Cyprus became a necessity rather than an idea for Turkish-Cypriots (Kızılyürek 2003, p.34).

In 2000, an opposition organisation called "This Country is Ours Platform [Bu Memleket Bizim]" was formed by the alliance of some NGO's, unions and intellectuals, which CTP maintained close cooperation.

³³ One of the founding members of DP was Rauf Denktaş's son Serdar Denktaş.

³⁴ "Adada isyan [Revolt in the island]" 25.07.2000 www.milliyet.com.tr (Accessed: 27.11.2016).

In the presidential elections of 2000, CTP leader Mehmet Ali Talat received 10 per cent of the votes.

Table 8.1: CTP-BG election results in legislative elections

Legislative Election	Party Leader	Share of Votes (%)	MP's Gained \pm	Ranking in the Share of Votes
1976	Özker Özgür	12.8	2	3
1981	Özker Özgür	15.1	6	3
1985	Özker Özgür	21.4	12	2
1990	Özker Özgür	Did not participate		
1993	Özker Özgür	24.2	13	3
1998	Mehmet Ali Talat	13.4	6	4
2003	Mehmet Ali Talat	35.17	19	1
2005	Mehmet Ali Talat	44.5	24	1
2009	Ferdi Sabit Soyer	29.2	15	2
2013	Özkan Yorgancıoğlu	38.38	21	1

\pm After the declaration of independence in 1983, number of MP's in the parliament was raised to 50 from 40. (Source: Aydoğdu 2005).

8.1.5. Annan Plan and CTP

As we mentioned in the relevant section, *Europeanisation* of Cyprus problem gained momentum at the end of 1990's. CTP strongly defended that the island should be united before the Greek-Cypriot Administration joined the EU representing the whole island. The party promoted European values and in 2003 it embraced a larger group of NGO's, which it labelled "united forces" [Birleşik Güçler-BG]", campaigning for the same values (Christophorou 2006, p. 533). CTP-BG was started to be used as the party's official name.

Annan Plan which was presented in November 2002 was a major turning point for the Cyprus problem and internal politics of TRNC. President Denktaş's reluctance to negotiate the plan enabled

liberal/leftist TRNC opposition and CTP-BG to mobilize masses to demonstrate in favour of a settlement. This momentum of pro-settlement policies granted the party an election victory in 2003 with 35 per cent of the votes. Compared to 13 per cent in 1998, there was a significant rise in the party's electoral basis. The party formed a coalition government with Democratic Party and for the first in time in its history a CTP-BG leader (Mehmet Ali Talat) became the prime minister.

The turmoil and mass demonstrations in TRNC caused by Annan Plan also affected Turkey. Until then, Turkish public was used to perceive and follow President Rauf Denktaş as the “owner” of the Cyprus case and the opposition in TRNC was practically “invisible” in Turkey's mainstream media. The large scale of protests, some slogans/banners used and the apparent resentment of some Turkish-Cypriots towards Turkey's policies stunned the Turkish public. Cyprus problem once again rose as a hot topic in Turkish politics and became an issue of debate between the ruler AKP and opposition parties, as well as between liberal tended intellectuals and nationalist circles. In this climate, Mehmet Ali Talat emerged as a prominent voice of Turkish-Cypriots and began to frequent Turkish TV debates and newspapers.

During the negotiations on Annan Plan, CTP-BG's ideological partner AKEL had declared its support for the plan. However, prior to the referendums AKEL declared its reservations to the plan and demanded the postponement of the referendums until some concerns of Greek-Cypriots were satisfied. This sudden shift in AKEL's opinion caused a shock and disappointment for CTP-BG leadership, who thought that AKEL votes were crucial for a “yes” vote in Greek-Cypriot side. Last minute efforts to convince AKEL to support the plan by CTP-BG leadership were not successful (Düzgün 2008, p. 212).

CTP-BG's fears for Greek-Cypriot side's unilateral EU accession and Turkish-Cypriots' exclusion from EU were realised by the rejection of Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots. In the aftermath of the referendums, Mehmet Ali Talat tried to break the isolation of TRNC using the positive attitude of the international community towards Turkish-Cypriot community as leverage. However, these efforts and expectations of Turkish-Cypriots after casting a yes vote did not materialize. For instance, no progress was achieved for direct flights from Ercan Airport which was a critical need for TRNC tourism sector.

In 2005 early elections, CTP-BG broadened its support by receiving 44,5 per cent the votes and gaining 24 seats in the 50-member parliament. A new government with former coalition partner DP

was formed. In the presidential elections of the same year, party leader Mehmet Ali Talat was elected as the 2nd president of TRNC by receiving 55 per cent of the votes in the first round. Former trade unionist Ferdi Sabit Soyer (1952) replaced Mehmet Ali Talat as party chairman and prime-minister.

CTP-BG's rise to power coincided with AKP's rise in Turkey. During its first years in power, AKP actively put EU membership in its agenda and supported pro-settlement policies and Annan Plan. Global (and Turkish) economy was in an expansionist period which also helped CTP-BG to enlarge its support in 2005 elections. TRNC economy also benefited from the positive economic environment and this economic growth helped CTP-BG to reach out to liberal circles and business communities which were not among its traditional electoral base. In 2006, Freedom and Reform Party (ORP) replaced DP as the coalition partner. ORP was controversially established by four MP's who defected from right-wing parties and partnership with this party badly damaged CTP-BG's image and credibility (Sözen 2009, p. 339).

In 2008, AKEL leader Demetris Christofias was elected as the president of the Greek-Cypriots. This resulted in another wave of hope for a settlement due to the similarity of Talat and Christofias' ideological backgrounds. However, direct talks between two leaders did not produce a solution. The main issues that caused the failure of the talks were Turkey's role as a guarantor³⁵, the nature of the state in a federal solution (a strong vs. weak federal government) and property issues.

8.1.6. Decline of CTP-BG's Popularity

The global economic crisis, fruitless negotiations, unmet expectations of the Turkish-Cypriots from EU and alleged mismanagement resulted in a decline of support for CTP-BG. In 2009 legislative elections, party's share of votes dropped to 30 per cent and "old guard" UBP formed a single-party government by receiving 44 per cent of the votes and 26 seats. In 2010 presidential elections, Mehmet Ali Talat lost the race to UBP leader Derviş Eroğlu in the first round by receiving 45 per cent of the votes³⁶. After the election defeat of 2009, party leader Ferdi Sabit Soyer announced that he would not run for a second term in the next party congress. In 2011, Turkey-educated political scientist Özkan Yorgancıoğlu (1954) was elected as party chairman.

³⁵ Greek-Cypriot side claimed that Cyprus as a EU member no longer needed guarantors, on the other hand Turkish-Cypriots insisted that guarantee treaties will help to maintain internal balance of power in Cyprus (Kızılyürek 2009, p. 105)

³⁶ For a self-evaluation of CTP-BG's decline see: <http://www.ctp-bg.org/parti-tezleri.html> Date of visit: 26.09.2015.

8.1.7. Recent Developments

After the resignation of UBP government due to the defection of some UBP MP's, CTP-BG MP Sibel Sider formed an interim government during June 2013-September 2013 and became the first woman prime minister of TRNC.

In 2013 legislative elections, the party once again ranked first by receiving 38 per cent of the votes and gained 21 seats. CTP-BG formed a coalition government with its long time coalition partner DP and Özkan Yorgancıoğlu became prime minister.

Party candidate and Speaker of Parliament Sibel Sider came in third out of seven candidates and defeated in the first round with 22.5 per cent of the votes in the presidential elections of 2015. In line with CTP-BG policies, Sibel Sider confirmed her vision for a federal solution during her campaign.

In June 2015, Mehmet Ali Talat once again assumed the leadership of CTP-BG and subsequently Prime Minister Özkan Yorgancıoğlu resigned. Since Mehmet Ali Talat is not an MP, CTP-BG Kyrenia MP Ömer Kalyoncu was appointed as prime minister and became the 5th CTP-BG member to hold this position in eleven years. Kalyoncu formed a coalition government with UBP which received the vote of confidence on 27.07.2015. This government was unique since it was the first time two biggest parties of the left and right form a coalition. However, the coalition broke up on April 2016 due to the disputes between UBP and CTP-BG on issues like the management of fresh water brought from Turkey and the economic reform program demanded by the AKP government in Turkey.

8.1.8. Current Position of CTP-BG on Cyprus Problem

CTP-BG repeatedly expresses the need for a solution and supports President Mustafa Akıncı's efforts to unite the island. Mehmet Ali Talat states that Turkish-Cypriots are excluded from international law which is not sustainable; therefore a solution is vital for Turkish-Cypriots. He also defends that the negotiations should be finalized and a plan should be presented to the public as soon as possible due to the proximity of 2018 Greek-Cypriot presidential elections. CTP-BG also insists on a rotating federal presidency.

Academician Tufan Erhürman (1970), who replaced Mehmet Ali Talat as the party's new chairman on 13.11.2016 pledged full support for Akıncı and Anastasiades and their teams the ongoing negotiations³⁷.

8.2. NATIONAL UNITY PARTY

National Unity Party (UBP-*Ulusal Birlik Partisi*) was founded in 1975 by Rauf Denktaş and other prominent nationalist figures including former TMT members. UBP has an exceptional place in TRNC politics because it dominated the Turkish-Cypriot political scene for years and managed to stay in power longer than any other political party. In addition, it is the only party which was able to form single-party governments. Until 2000's, UBP was perceived by many observers as the party of the "establishment" in TRNC.

In 1976, UBP founder Rauf Denktaş became the TFSC head of state.

UBP managed to win the first multi-party elections in Turkish-Cypriot history in 1976 and obtained 30 seats in the 40-member parliament. Party leader Nejat Konuk (1928) became the first prime-minister of TFSC.

During 1976-1981, UBP governments had to deal with the problems caused by the 1974 war. TFSC was proclaimed but the area controlled by the Turkish army lacked an intact state organization at that time. Settling of Turkish-Cypriots from the south and immigrants from Turkey, setting up and coordinating state institutions and stimulating economic activity were the main challenges that UBP governments had to face. Another difficulty was the shortage of Cypriot lira due to the lack of contact with the south of the island. UBP decided to adopt Turkish lira as the official currency and all Cypriot lira bank accounts were changed to Turkish lira. The official exchange rate (1 CL=36 TL) used in this operation was below the market rates (around 1 CL=60 TL), causing discontent among depositors (Mehmetçik 2008, p. 160).

Inability to address these problems and alleged corruption caused uneasiness in the party itself. Some UBP MP's resigned and Nejat Konuk government lost the majority in parliament (Mehmetçik 2008, p. 163). Due to intra-party problems and health reasons, Nejak Konuk resigned and was replaced by lawyer Osman Örek (1925-1999) (Aydoğdu 2005, p.30). Osman Örek also resigned in 1979 and lawyer Mustafa Çağatay (1937-1989) replaced him as prime-minister and party leader.

³⁷ "Erhürman ile yeni CTP [New CTP with Erhürman]" <http://www.yeniduzen.com/> 13.11.2016 (Accessed: 15.11.2016).

1981 legislative elections were a defeat for UBP. The party's percentage of votes was 42,5 and its number of seats dropped to 18 (from 30 in 1976). Mustafa Çağatay formed a minority government, but this short-lived government had to resign after losing a vote of confidence in March 1982. Çağatay then formed a coalition government with the small parties, which was the first coalition government in Turkish-Cypriot history.

8.2.1. Declaration of Independence and UBP

UBP strongly supported the declaration of independence in 1983. The party claimed that Turkish-Cypriots had the right to self-determination and therefore establishment of TRNC was a natural step towards achieving this goal. During the interim period of 1983-1985, former UBP leader Nejat Konuk formed a government with the support of UBP representatives and independent members of the Constituent Assembly. In 1983, medical doctor Derviş Eroğlu (1938) was elected as the party leader.

8.2.2. UBP after Independence

First legislative elections in TRNC after the declaration of independence took place in 1985 and resulted in a UBP victory. UBP gained 36.7 per cent of the votes and obtained 24 seats. Eroğlu formed new coalition government with the leftist TKP but this government did not last long due to the disagreement on economic issues. Until 1990, Eroğlu formed two coalition governments with YDP (New Birth Party-*Yeni Doğu Partisi*) and independents.

According to Kızılyürek, during UBP rule in this period Turkish-Cypriot society was divided into three: Turkish-immigrants, UBP supporters and “others”. The “others” were the leftist-opposition, intellectuals who support a federal solution and the youth. (Kızılyürek 2005, p.261)

Prior to 1990 legislative elections, UBP adopted a majoritarian election system which was criticized by opposition parties. As a reaction to this move, all opposition parties (including the Turkish-immigrant party YDP) joined 1990 elections under an umbrella party named DMP (Democratic Struggle Party-*Demokratik Mücadele Partisi*). UBP defeated this umbrella party and was able to form a single party government by obtaining 54.67 per cent of the votes. 12 CTP and TKP MP's elected from DMP's list claimed that Turkey interfered in the elections and boycotted the parliament. In 1991, a by-election was performed for the mentioned 12 seats and UBP managed to gain 11 additional seats.

1991 by-elections results gave Derviş Eroğlu an undisputable power in the legislative. UBP now had 45 seats in the 50 member-parliament. However, this “one-party rule” was harming the image of TRNC democracy and disturbing Denктаş as well as Turkey (Mehmetçik 2008, p. 188). Meanwhile, some frictions between Eroğlu and president Denктаş began to emerge. The main reason for the uneasiness was Eroğlu’s uncompromising and nationalist discourse on Cyprus issue which was not approved by Denктаş (Mehmetçik 2008, p. 189). For instance, while Denктаş was negotiating on Ghali Set of Ideas in 1993, TRNC National Assembly unequivocally rejected Ghali’s package, putting Denктаş in an odd position by a *fait accompli* (Bölükbaşı 1995, p. 475).

In 1993, 9 MP’s resigned from UBP to form a new party called Democratic Party. The new party managed to obtain a significant portion of UBP votes and UBP votes dropped to 29,9 per cent in 1993 early elections. After the elections, DP and CTP formed a coalition government and ended the uninterrupted rule of UBP since 1976. However, in 1996 UBP returned to power by forming a coalition government with DP.

In 1995, UBP leader Eroğlu contested in presidential elections against Denктаş and obtained 24 per cent (and 37 per cent in the 2nd round) of the votes.

1998 elections marked another victory for UBP. The party gained 40,4 per cent of the votes and 24 seats. Derviş Eroğlu headed the subsequent coalition governments with TKP and DP until 2003. This period was shadowed by the severe banking crisis of 2000 and other economic difficulties related to the economic crisis in Turkey, causing erosion in UBP’s popularity. Personal confrontation between Denктаş and Eroğlu continued and Eroğlu once more contested against Denктаş in 2000 presidential elections. In the 1st round, Denктаş gained 43.67 per cent of the votes where Eroğlu could receive 30 per cent. Public support for Eroğlu was higher than it was in 1995 and he retained the chance of winning by the support of Denктаş opponents in the 2nd round. However, 2nd round never took place since Eroğlu withdrew his candidacy a few days prior to elections. Without any other candidate, Denктаş was automatically elected president. The reasons of Eroğlu’s withdrawal remain a very controversial issue. To the perception of many, it was Turkey’s influence which eventually determined the outcome of the presidential race (Güven 2003, p. 25).

In 1990’s, UBP defended that a confederation should be established in Cyprus between two sovereign states. However; economic hardships, political limbo and ongoing isolation made TRNC voters accept a federal solution as well. The result of this tendency was reflected in 2003 legislative

elections. In these elections UBP votes fell to 33 per cent from the 40,4 per cent in 1998. Parties supporting Annan Plan, especially CTP-BG made significant gains and CTP-BG became the leading party. 2003 elections were the first in Turkish-Cypriot history which UBP could not come first. UBP did not join any government until 2009.

The result of the 2004 referendum was a clear victory for Annan Plan supporters. However UBP leader Eroğlu said that he was confident with the result since UBP was the only party which was against the plan and the 35 per cent “no” vote showed that UBP maintained its support among the electorate³⁸.

2005 legislative elections were another defeat for UBP. The party’s votes fell to 31,7 per cent and the number of seats dropped to 16 from 18 in 2003. After this defeat, Derviş Eroğlu resigned and UBP leadership was assumed by Hüseyin Özgürgün (1965) and Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu (1953). Ertuğruloğlu was a figure known for his hard-line stance on Cyprus issue. In November 2008, Eroğlu returned as party leader.

8.2.3. “Re-Birth” of UBP

In the early elections of 2009, UBP was born out of the ashes and obtained a landslide victory against CTP-BG with 44 per cent of the votes. The victory enabled Derviş Eroğlu to form a single party government. According to Ahmet Sözen, CTP-BG’s poor domestic performance and losing hope for a solution to Cyprus problem caused voters to vote for UBP as the only strong alternative (Sözen 2009, p.347). In addition, voting for hard-line UBP was a message to the EU for unfulfilled promises after 2004 and to the Greek-Cypriot AKEL for failing to compromise for a solution (Sözen 2009, p. 348).

In 2010 presidential elections, Derviş Eroğlu won the race in the 1st round by getting 50.38 per cent of the votes and he became the 3rd president of TRNC. His election in the 1st round marked a significant defeat for pro-solution circles.

After Eroğlu’s election to presidency, İrsen Küçük (1940) became the party leader and prime-minister³⁹. İrsen Küçük’s government faced difficulties on implementing the economic reforms and austerity measures requested by Turkey. Widespread demonstrations occurred and some slogans

³⁸ “Eroğlu, %35,1’lik ‘Hayır’ Oyundan Memnun [Eroğlu content with %35,1 no vote]” <http://www.kibrisgazetesi.com/?p=230095> 25.04.2004 (Accessed: 23.01.2016).

³⁹ İrsen Küçük is a relative of former Turkish-Cypriot leader Fazıl Küçük.

used by the demonstrators against Turkish government caused a crisis. In 2011, Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan openly criticised demonstrators and said that “it is rather meaningful that those who are fed by our country have taken such a way”. The wording of Erdoğan’s criticism caused resentment among some Turkish-Cypriots and was protested by unions and left-wing politicians. In addition, during this period there was a tendency to support religious education institutions and to increase the number of these institutions; which alienated some Turkish-Cypriots from UBP. In 2013, Ankara pressured the TRNC to adhere to an economic protocol that demanded austerity measures and privatizations.

Unpopular austerity measures resulted in a sharp decline in UBP’s votes in August 2013 elections. The party came 2nd after CTP-BG and received 27.33 per cent of the votes. Interestingly, party leader and prime-minister İrsen Küçük could not be elected as an MP and eventually Hüseyin Özgürün once again assumed party leadership.

According to current UBP leader Hüseyin Özgürün, UBP was very well aware that austerity measures would decrease their votes but they were inevitable due to the catastrophic situation of public finances inherited from CTP-BG governments⁴⁰.

After a short CTP-BG/DP-UG coalition government, UBP and CTP-BG formed a coalition government in July 2015. However, this coalition collapsed on April 2016 due to the disputes on economic and managerial issues. UBP then formed a new coalition government with DP-UG with the support of some independents.

In 2015 presidential elections, incumbent Derviş Eroğlu lost the race to leftist Mustafa Akıncı in the 2nd round by a 40:60 ratio.

8.2.4. Historical Stance of UBP on Cyprus Problem

UBP is known for its uncompromising and nationalist approach to Cyprus problem. The party always insisted on Turkish-Cypriots’ right of self-determination and supported the independence of TRNC. In the party’s official website, the first aim of the party is stated as follows⁴¹:

Preserving the existence of TRNC, which was founded by our people using their right and authority to self-determination; its national, social integrity and the unity of the country

⁴⁰ Interview on Diyalog TV 05.11.2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TygRIQmElg> (Accessed: 25.01.2016).

⁴¹ UBP Parti Tüzüğü www.ubpkktc.com (Accessed: 24.01.2016).

UBP always aimed the international recognition for TRNC. This aim is stated as “making the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus a powerful, respectable, reliable (...) member of the world states family” in the party regulation. As early in 1991, party leader Derviş Eroğlu asserted that they were “fighting a war for the recognition of TRNC” and claimed that “borders could be drawn by blood and can not be abolished⁴²”.

As Hatay (2005, p. 50) puts it, “in general, the UBP has tended to identify with Turkey and with the concept of a larger Turkish nation that includes the ‘Turks in Cyprus’ while opposition parties have been more inclined towards a predominantly Cypriot identity”. The party always defended strong ties and integration with “motherland” Turkey. The remarks on the “motherland hood” of Turkey can be repeatedly observed in the statements of party officials. Derviş Eroğlu, whose family immigrated to Cyprus in the first half of 19th century, particularly emphasizes his Anatolian roots. During the campaign on 2015 presidential elections, Eroğlu stated that “someone who does not regard Turkey as motherland can not represent the TRNC⁴³” In the party regulation, the party declares that one of the aims is⁴⁴:

Developing our relations with Republic of Turkey in a privileged approach; with whom we share the Turkish Nation's all historical, cultural, religious and linguistic heritage and integrating in all aspects by sincerely acknowledging that the Turkish-Cypriot Community is an indivisible part of the Turkish Nation.

As mentioned above, Eroğlu's hard stance on Cyprus issue sometimes put him at odds with President Rauf Denktaş. For instance, while President Denktaş was negotiating on Ghali Set of Ideas which also included some Turkish compromises on territory, Eroğlu wowed that “no single inch of” land can be returned to the Greek-Cypriots, undermining Denktaş's position (Tamçelik 2015, p. 27).

8.2.5. Annan Plan and UBP

As a party who favoured an independent TRNC or a confederal solution, UBP opposed Annan Plan from the very beginning and claimed that the plan would dissolve TRNC and her people. During the campaigns for the 2004 Annan Plan referendum, UBP propagated for a “no” vote. UBP even boycotted the National Assembly meeting where the details of the referendum process were decided, claiming that such a referendum was against TRNC constitution (Düzgün 2008, p.101).

⁴² Speech in VIII. Party Congress, 07.04.1991.

⁴³ “Derviş Eroğlu: Türkiye'yi anavatan bilmeyen KKTC'yi temsil edemez [Eroğlu: Anyone who does not regard Turkey as motherland can not represent TRNC]” www.zete.com (Accessed: 24.01.2016).

⁴⁴ For the party's regulation see www.ubpkktc.com

The party also opposed the opening of borders with the south in April 2003. According to DP leader Serdar Denktaş; the TRNC Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time Tahsin Ertuğruloğlu strictly opposed the opening of borders and during a meeting on the issue he proposed Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gül that Turkey would annex TRNC (Gürkan 2012, p. 87).

After the rejection of the Annan Plan by Greek-Cypriots, UBP leader Eroğlu stated that the plan was dead and should not be brought to the Turkish-Cypriots again. However, the high percentage of “yes” votes seemed to convince UBP to adopt a more moderate position, at least publicly (Sözen 2005, p.468). Another reason for this position was the Turkey’s opposition to a halt or shift of policy in the negotiations. After the UBP victory in 2009 legislative elections, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan said that⁴⁵:

It would be very wrong for the new government to end the negotiations or to continue the negotiations on a basis different than the one that has been followed so far. The process must continue exactly as before ... We will never support a move that would weaken the hand of Turkish-Cypriot President and chief negotiator Mehmet Ali Talat.

During the Eroğlu-Anastasiades negotiations, a joint declaration was issued on 11.02.2014. In the declaration, the leaders agreed on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with political equality, with a single legal international identity and single sovereignty. Although Eroğlu expressed that he did not accept some parts of the declaration so eagerly, he denied that there was a change from his previous position⁴⁶.

8.2.6. UBP’s Current Position on Cyprus Problem

UBP maintains a sceptical approach to Anastasiades-Akıncı negotiations and claims that Greek-Cypriots’ attitude would not facilitate a solution where Turkish-Cypriots’ rights are protected. On August 2016, UBP leader Hüseyin Özgürkün openly criticized the way negotiations are conducted and expressed that President Mustafa Akıncı was “begging for a solution”⁴⁷:

We have always bent our head, we have always insisted for an agreement. “We are obliged, if there is no agreement, we are finished, we are burnt”. There is no such thing, if there is not an agreement, why have we burnt? The agreement should be an agreement that will show that the Greek-Cypriots need it as much as we do. It’s like we beg for an agreement and the Greek-Cypriots do us a favour.

⁴⁵ “Erdoğan warns Cyprus on peace” 22.04.2009 www.hurriyet.com (Accessed: 24.01.2016).

⁴⁶ “KKTC Cumhurbaşkanı Eroğlu ve Dışişleri Bakanı Nami Hürriyet’e konuştu [TRNC President and Minister of Foreign Affairs Nami spoke to Hurriyet]” 17.02.2014 . www.hurriyet.com.tr (Accessed: 24.01.2016).

⁴⁷ “Ozgurgun criticises T/C Leader's stance at Cyprus talks” www.sigmalive.com 12.08.2016 (Accessed: 16.11.2016).

I see a destitute atmosphere in the talks...one where we are begging for a solution and this deeply upsets me. We under no circumstance accept this...if there are those who support this they should walk that path with Akıncı.

The party firmly declares that it will not approve any settlement which would not preserve Turkey's right as guarantor. Hüseyin Özgürgün expresses that the elimination of the veto right of Turkish-Cypriots, a simple majority decision-making structure of the lower chamber in a solution are among the concerns of UBP⁴⁸. He also mentions that the return of Güzelyurt (Morphou) to Greek-Cypriots can never be considered.

Table 8.2: UBP elections results in legislative elections

Legislative Election	Party Leader	Share of Votes (%)	MP's Gained [±]	Ranking in the Share of Votes
1976	Nejat Konuk	53.8	30	1
1981	Mustafa Çağatay	42.4	18	1
1985	Derviş Eroğlu	36.7	24	1
1990	Derviş Eroğlu	54.7	34	1
1993	Derviş Eroğlu	29.9	17	1
1998	Derviş Eroğlu	40.4	24	1
2003	Derviş Eroğlu	32.89	18	2
2005	Derviş Eroğlu	31.7	19	2
2009	Derviş Eroğlu	44.1	26	1
2013	İrsen Küçük	27.3	14	2

[±] After the declaration of independence in 1983, number of MP's in the parliament was raised to 50 from 40. Source: (Aydoğdu, 2005).

⁴⁸ "Özgürgün: Müzakere heyetinde hükümet temsilcisi de olmalı [Özgürgün: A government representative should be in the negotiation team]". 24.08.2016 www.kibrispostasi.com (Accessed: 28.10.2016)

8.3. COMMUNAL DEMOCRACY PARTY

One of the main political parties in the left-spectrum of TRNC politics is Communal Democracy Party (TDP-*Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi*). Officially, the party was founded with the merger of Communal Liberation Party (*Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi*-TKP) and Peace and Democracy Movement (*Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi*-BDH) in 2007; however it is widely accepted that the party is the continuation of TKP and the core of its electoral basis is the same⁴⁹. Therefore, we will focus on TKP's history and politics while analysing TDP.

TDP is generally accepted as a non-Marxist or social-democratic leftist party. In its official website, the party is described as

a libertarian, peaceful, communal, participatory and modern leftist party based on the principals of social-democracy, defending a social state with rule of law and human rights, aiming to make 'democracy and social justice ideal' the life style of Turkish-Cypriot Community with all its aspects.

TKP was founded in 1976 by opponents of TFSC President Rauf Denktaş, including some members of the TFSC Constituent Assembly. The first chairman of the party was engineer Alpay Durduran (1942), who was also a member of the Constituent Assembly.

In 1976 elections, TKP received 20.2 per cent of the votes and 6 seats in the 40-member parliament⁵⁰. The elections resulted in a single-party UBP government and TKP remained the main opposition party. In 1981 elections, the party's votes increased to 28.5 per cent and it gained 13 seats. 1981 marked the decline of UBP and President Denktaş's popularity after 1974 and UBP lost its majority in parliament. Opposition parties, including TKP agreed to form a coalition government; however, due to pressure from Turkey formation of an opposition coalition was prevented and UBP formed a minority government (Kızılyürek 2005, p. 256). In 1981, this government was forced to resign as a result of a non-confidence vote initiated by all opposition parties.

TKP was against the declaration of independence for TFSC, however the party MP's voted in favour of the independence in 1983. Many argue that like CTP, TKP was forced to cast a yes vote in the parliament since Denktaş threatened the opposition by stating that any party who opposed the

⁴⁹ In TDP's 2015 congress, a candidate proposed that the party should be named TKP again. "*Emiroğluları'nın Kurultay vaadi: TDP den TKP'ye dönüş* [Congress promise of Emiroğluları: return to TKP from TDP] 04.12.2014 www.yeniduzen.com (Accessed: 16.11.2016).

⁵⁰ 1976 elections were the first multi-party elections in Turkish-Cypriots' history

new state will be banned from political activities (Kızılyürek 2005, p. 260). Prior to the declaration of independence, İsmail Bozkurt replaced Alpay Durduran as the party chairman. The reason of this change was the disagreement with Durduran who opposed the declaration and other party officials who decided to support independence. Alpay Durduran says that he did not vote in favour of independence during the voting, thus claiming that the general perception that independence of TRNC was approved unanimously in TFSC parliament is wrong⁵¹.

The first elections after the TRNC was founded took place in 1985. TKP's votes dropped to 15.8 per cent and the party gained 10 seats in the parliament. Since no party was able to form a single party government, TKP and UBP formed a coalition government. In this government, TKP assumed 3 ministries and party chairman İsmail Bozkurt became the minister of Tourism and Culture. This government lasted for 14 months until TKP withdrew from the coalition in August 1986. According to TKP, the main reason for the break-up of the government was TKP's opposition to the economic measures "imposed" by the Özal government in Turkey and adopted by UBP.

In 1989, architect Mustafa Akıncı (1947)⁵² replaced İsmail Bozkurt as the party chairman.

After 1990 elections, TKP boycotted the parliament due to the alleged intervention of Turkey prior to elections. As a sign of protest, TKP and CTP also refused to join the 1991 by-elections.

In 1993 elections, TKP gained 13,3 per cent of the votes and had 5 seats in the parliament. In 1995 presidential elections, party candidate Mustafa Akıncı gained 14,2 per cent of the votes.


In 1998 elections, the party's the share of votes and the number of seats were 13,4 per cent and 6 respectively. After the elections, TKP joined the coalition government leaded by UBP and party chairman Mustafa Akıncı became deputy prime-minister.

UBP-TKP government lasted until June 2001. The main reason for the break-up of the government was the crisis and public quarrel between TKP leader Mustafa Akıncı and the head of the Security Forces Commandership (GKK-*Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı*). The commander of the GKK is a Turkish-citizen and a member of the Turkish Army appointed by Turkey; reporting to TRNC prime-

⁵¹"Alpay Durduran: *Darbeyle Gittim* [Alpay Durduran: I was ousted by a coup]" 24.06.2012 www.yenicag.com.cy (Accessed 25.01.2016)

⁵² Mustafa Akıncı was the first elected mayor of Turkish Municipality of Nicosia and served during 1976-1990. During his tenure, he cooperated closely with the Greek Municipality of Nicosia on the Nicosia Sewerage Project and the Nicosia Master Plan. Nicosia Master Plan gained the 'World Habitat Award' in 1989 and the Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 2007.

minister. According to TRNC laws, police department is tied to GKK. This organizational structure makes the appointed Turkish general in charge of the police department, fire brigade and civil defence as well. Some Turkish-Cypriots support that the police should be put under civilian authority. During the UBP-TKP coalition, two parties proposed a law which will put the police forces under the rule of the Ministry of Interior. However, in July 2000, the then GKK commander Ali Nihat Özeyranlı objected this attempt; claiming that the current organisational structure was keeping the police forces safe from political interference. Mustafa Akıncı said that the commander's remarks were not acceptable in a democracy and publicly protested Özeyranlı. After that, the polemic evolved into an unpleasant quarrel. Commander Özeyranlı went further on criticising the government and argued that “if those who are responsible for protecting the state do not protect it, GKK will do it” (Güven 2003, p.32). Akıncı criticised Özeyranlı and said that “The commander overstepped the mark”⁵³. Akıncı received the backing of other leftist parties, several unions and NGO's who demanded the commander's dismissal. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu refrained from making a public comment on the crisis.

To the perception of many, this crisis was another sign of some Turkish officials' looking down on Turkish-Cypriots, causing resentment among Turkish-Cypriot community. On 18.07.2000, shortly after the crisis, this resentment was reflected in a mass demonstration in Nicosia under the slogan of “This Country is Ours”. 

According to Mustafa Akıncı, the reason for the break-up of UBP-TKP coalition was Turkish military's pressure on UBP leader Derviş Eroğlu⁵⁴. In the party's official website, “the party's adherence to its principals” and “lack sensitivity of its counterparts [read: UBP-B.K.] to the party's respect for Turkish-Cypriots' self-governing structures” are mentioned as the reasons for the break-up of UBP-TKP coalitions in 1986 and 2001.

In October 2001, Hüseyin Angolemlı (1944) replaced Mustafa Akıncı as the party chairman.

⁵³“*Komutan çizmeyi aştı*”

⁵⁴ “*Türk ordusunun denetimini başta biz istemiyoruz* [We do not want the control of the Turkish Army in the first hand]” Interview with Turkish journalist Neşe Düzel, 15.01.2007 <http://www.radikal.com.tr> (Accessed: 24.11.2016).

8.3.1. Historical Stance of TDP on Cyprus Problem

TKP historically maintained a pro-settlement position regarding Cyprus problem. Main arguments of the party in the mid-90's can be followed in the speech of party chairman Mustafa Akıncı in TKP's 14th congress on November 1994 (TKP, 1994). In his speech, Mustafa Akıncı states that:

- i. Both Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot leaderships do not sincerely work for a solution.
- ii. Greek-Cypriots aim to join EU. However, Turkish-Cypriot management adopts a reactionary policy which will make TRNC more attached and dependent on Turkey⁵⁵.
- iii. While right-wing parties perceive becoming more dependent in Turkey as a way out of the stalemate, the other left-wing party CTP tries to capture “chairs” in the bureaucracy and waits for a solution to adopt any clear policy.
- iv. TRNC should neither become a province of Turkey nor a patch to the Greek-Cypriot state.
- v. The basic problem of TRNC is to enhance the Turkish-Cypriots' survival on the island because Turkish-Cypriots are under erosion. Immigration is an undeniable reality. Young individuals were immigrating in the past, now whole families are immigrating. There are even cases of asylum seeking.
- vi. As TRNC solves its internal problems, Greek-Cypriot side will be more eager for a solution.
- vii. TRNC should avoid strategy which will result in the Greek-Cypriot's unilateral entry in the EU by representing the whole island⁵⁶.

8.3.2. Annan Plan and TDP

During the turmoil on Annan Plan, TKP joined an umbrella party named Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH-*Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi*) together with United Cyprus Party (BKP-*Birleşik Kıbrıs Partisi*), Cyprus Socialist Party (KSP-*Kıbrıs Sosyalist Partisi*) and several NGO's. In 2003 legislative elections, BDH received 13.2 per cent of the votes, gaining 6 seats. Prior to the referendum on Annan Plan, BDH supported the plan and propagated for a “yes” vote.

TKP left the umbrella party BDH and made an alliance with United Cyprus Party (BKP) in 2005 elections. This split was due mostly to personal conflicts between the upper administration of the

⁵⁵ In 1990, as a reaction to Greek-Cypriot EU application TRNC government decided to allow Turkish citizens to enter TRNC by showing their ID cards instead of passports.

⁵⁶ Preventing Greek-Cypriots from unilaterally joining EU before a solution was among the main arguments of Annan Plan supporters as well.

BDH (former TKP chairman Mustafa Akıncı was BDH's chairman) and TKP (Sözen 2005, p. 470). In the elections, TKP received 2.4 per cent of the votes and thus failed to pass the 5 per cent election threshold. BDH managed to 5.8 per cent and gained 1 seat in the parliament. The drop in the combined total of TKP and BDH compared to 2003 elections was around 5 per cent. According to Turkish-Cypriot academician Ahmet Sözen, Turkish-Cypriot electorate punished the small left-wing parties for failing to form a united front and marginalized them (Sözen 2005, p. 472).

In 2007, both BDH and TKP dissolved themselves and formed the current TDP. Mehmet Çakıcı (1966) became the new party's first chairman.

In 2009, TDP received 6,8 per cent of the votes and gained 2 seats. In 2013 elections the party's votes and seats did not change much, which were 7,8 per cent and 3 respectively.

In November 2013, Cemal Özyiğit (1960) became the new party chairman.

The biggest success of TDP recently was the election of former party chairman Mustafa Akıncı as the 4th president of TRNC in April 2015. Akıncı entered the election as an independent but received support from TDP.

8.3.3. TDP's Current Position on Cyprus Problem

TDP supports a federal solution to Cyprus problem and suggests that the new federal state should have one international identity and single sovereignty. The party is also sceptical about a solution under NATO umbrella and defends a demilitarized solution. Main arguments of the party on Cyprus problem, confidence building measures and relations with Turkey are stated below:

- i. TDP's vision for a solution is a bi-community and bi-zonal United Federal Cyprus Republic founded on the basis of Turkish-Cypriot's political equality with Greek-Cypriots.
- ii. TDP rejects all historical or actual pro-enosis, pro-partition, separatist or hegemonic approaches.
- iii. Turkish-Cypriots have community rights stated in 1960 Constitution of Republic of Cyprus; which are still valid but were not demanded until now. TDP believes that an early solution can be found by reclaiming and using these rights.
- iv. TDP believes that solution efforts which exclude social processes are bound to be incomplete. Therefore, the party supports the social and intellectual cohesion of the two communities and it is against any actions which aim to prevent inter-communal contacts.

- v. The party admits the role of international actors on Cyprus problem but states that focusing on formulas imposed from outside will lead to a deadlock or a solution coded according to external powers' interests.
- vi. TDP believes that continuous population inflow from Turkey damages the socio-economic and political balances of Turkish-Cypriot community and prevents the formation of the community's free political will. All laws on the citizenship issue and existing citizen lists should be reviewed regarding the Geneva Conventions and other international treaties⁵⁷.
- vii. Relations with Turkey should be re-arranged based on mutual benefits and respect, at the same time considering the Turkish-Cypriot community's existence, identity and free will. The relations should be based on reciprocity.
- viii. As it should be in a modern democracy, Security Forces Commander (GKK) should be a Turkish-Cypriot soldier. The police forces should be under civilian authority.

The party keeps a positive attitude towards Anastasiades-Akıncı negotiations and supports Akıncı's efforts for a solution. In October 2016, party chairman Özyiğit met with Greek-Cypriot leader Anastasiades and expressed that Turkish-Cypriots' concerns about security and guarantees should be addressed for a "yes" vote. In addition, he emphasized the importance of rotating federal presidency for Turkish-Cypriots⁵⁸.

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⁵⁷ We should note that referring to Geneva Conventions (which bans population transfers to occupied territories during wars) on immigrants issue and suggesting the review of citizen lists is quite interesting and maybe "courageous" for a Turkish-Cypriot party. This is another sign of the TDP's distanced approach to Turkish immigrants, dissimilar to CTP-BG's stance on the issue.

⁵⁸ "Anastasiades'le görüşen Özyiğit: 'Referandumda iki 'evet'e ihtiyaç var [Özyiğit met with Anastasiades: We need two "yes" votes in referendum]" <http://www.kibrispostasi.com/anastasiadesle-gorusen-ozyigit-referandumda-iki-evete-ihitiya> (accessed: 28.10.2016)

Table 8.3: TDP election results in legislative elections

Legislative Election	Party Leader	Share of Votes (%)	MP's Gained [±]	Ranking in the Share of Votes
1976	Alpay Durduran	20.18	6	2
1981	Alpay Durduran	28.53	13	2
1985	İsmail Bozkurt	15.82	10	3
1990	Mustafa Akıncı	Did not participate		
1993	Mustafa Akıncı	13.3	5	4
1998	Mustafa Akıncı	15.4	7	3
2003 (under the umbrella party BDH)	Hüseyin Angolemli	13.2	6	4
2005	Hüseyin Angolemli	2.4	0	4
2009	Hüseyin Angolemli	6.9	2	4
2013	Mehmet Çakıcı	7.4	3	4

[±] After the declaration of independence in 1983, number of MP's in the parliament was raised to 50 from 40. Source: (Aydoğdu, 2005).

8.4. DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The other main party on the right spectrum of party politics in TRNC is Democratic Party (DP- *Demokrat Parti*). The party was founded in 1992 as a splinter party by 9 MP's (including President Denктаş's son Serdar Denктаş) who defected from UBP and other individuals. There is a consensus among political observers that DP was founded due to the rift between President Rauf Denктаş and UBP leader and Prime Minister Derviş Eroğlu. The main reason for this conflict between the two was their approaches on Cyprus issue. In the early 1990's, Eroğlu adopted a more hard line position on Cyprus issue. Eroğlu's stance was supported by some hard line nationalist groups in Turkey arguing that Denктаş did not support Turkish interests strong enough. (Bora 1995, p.25).

Meanwhile, Eroğlu was increasing his support in the ruling UBP, making him a potential rival for Denктаş. However, party chairman Serdar Denктаş claims that Rauf Denктаş was not involved during the foundation of DP; in fact he opposed the formation of a new party (Gürkan 2012, p. 53).

Hakkı Atun (1935-2009), an architect and high engineer was elected as the first chairman of Democratic Party. Atun was an UBP MP since 1976 and he was among the team of bureaucrats organizing Anatolian agricultural labourers' immigration and settlement in North Cyprus. After the party's foundation, New Birth Party (YDP) founded by Turkish immigrants dissolved itself and joined DP.

Since its foundation, the main question asked about DP is what makes it different from the main right-wing party UBP⁵⁹. Party chairman Serdar Denктаş answers this question as follows (Gürkan 2012, p.58-59):

This comparison is a big unfairness. UBP has been conservative and DP has always been a social liberal party. This is an important distinction. But some people insistently did not want to see this. DP is a more liberal party on economy but at the same time defending that social state should work more effectively. Since its foundation, it has always kept a position which made many issues discussed, formed a balance and ended the "traitors" literature. Even in our visits to villages in 1993 elections, when we were newly founded, we used to oppose the labelling of CTP as "traitors" by saying "How can you declare a party which gained 24 per cent of the votes as traitor". This is breaking the taboos. DP is the party the country needs. DP had this difficulty from the beginning: Firstly the founding team is from UBP. We showed our difference in practice and in our position but the first team's UBP background set the way for a "they have no differences" speech.

1993 legislative elections were a success for newly founded DP. The party became the 2nd party by receiving 29,2 per cent of the votes, slightly below UBP's 29,9 per cent and gained 15 seats in the parliament. After the elections; President Denктаş by-passed UBP leader Eroğlu and appointed DP chairman Hakkı Atun as prime-minister. By-passing of the biggest party in parliament, which was against the traditions, was perceived as President Denктаş's clear support for DP. Atun formed a coalition government with left-wing CTP where Serdar Denктаş became the Minister of Youth, Sports and Environment. The formation of DP-CTP government marked the end of UBP's hold on power since 1976. In addition, it was the first government that CTP ever participated since its foundation in 1970.

The first DP-CTP coalition was short-lived and it broke apart due to two parties' conflict over an amendment on the *Law for Housing, Allocation of Land, and Property of Equal Value*, which

⁵⁹ In our visit to DP headquarters, one of the party officials described UBP-DP relationship as "people who criticize each other in day time and dine together in the evening".

granted title deeds to Turkish immigrants for the properties allocated to them upon their arrival in Cyprus⁶⁰. CTP favoured that the amendment should be discussed after the presidential elections of 1995. Amid the objection of its coalition partner, DP was able to pass the law through the parliament in 1994 with support from UBP. This move resulted in the break-up of the government on February 1995 (Aydoğdu 2005, p.50). Some analysts argue that this move aimed to strengthen President Denktaş and DP's electoral support among Turkish immigrants, as well as immigrants' attachment to TRNC (Mehmetçik 2008, p. 191).

After the presidential elections of 1995, two successive DP-CTP coalition governments were formed until 1996⁶¹. These governments did not last long due to two party's differences on Cyprus issue, failing to implement the coalition protocol and debates on privatisation of national electric company KIB-TEK.

In 1996, Serdar Denktaş (1959) replaced Hakkı Atun as party chairman.

After the last DP-CTP government resigned, DP formed a coalition with UBP and Serdar Denktaş became Deputy Prime-Minister. This government lasted until 1998 legislative elections.

In 1998 legislative elections, DP's votes fell to 22,6 per cent and its number of seats dropped to 13 from 15. The winner UBP formed a coalition government with TKP and thus DP became the main opposition party.

In 2000, DP faced a severe reputational crisis related to the banking crisis in TRNC. *Kredi Bankası* was among the banks which became insolvent during the crisis. The owner of the bank was Serdar Denktaş's father-in-law Salih Boyacı, who was arrested due to alleged wrongdoings in the management of the bank⁶². In addition, Serdar Denktaş himself was among the executives of the Bank until 1990. This resulted in the resignation of Serdar Denktaş and former bureaucrat Salih Coşar (1938) replaced him as the party chairman. Although admitting a financial reporting discrepancy, Serdar Denktaş claims that government take-over of *Kredi Bankası* was a plot organized by Derviş Eroğlu to damage President Denktaş and his reputation (Gürkan 2012, p.81-82).

⁶⁰ Turkish immigrants were granted properties upon their arrival but they were not given title deeds, so they were not able to sell the property they hold.

⁶¹ Their periods on duty are 22.05.1995-11.12.1995 and 11.12.1995-16.08.1996.

⁶² Salih Boyacı was later convicted for siphoning the Bank's resources.

In 2001, DP once again formed a coalition government with UBP which lasted until 2003 legislative elections. As one can observe, DP played the role of a key party many times during the formation of governments. In 2002, Serdar Denktaş reclaimed the party leadership.

2003 legislative elections coincided with the turmoil caused by the debate on Annan Plan. In this election, the party's share of votes dropped to 12,9 per cent and it managed to gain 7 seats in the parliament. The party formed another coalition with CTP-BG, the clear winner of the election with 35 per cent of the votes.

The coalition government established after 2003 elections lasted until early 2005 legislative elections⁶³. After the elections, DP formed another coalition with CTP-BG. In 2006, CTP-BG broke-up the coalition government and formed a new coalition with the newly founded Freedom and Reform Party (ORP-*Özgürlük ve Reform Partisi*). The ousting of DP and formation of a coalition government with ORP remains a controversial issue. ORP was founded by MP's defecting from UBP and DP. The party then replaced DP as CTP-BG's coalition partner without having contested in any election⁶⁴. Observers believe that ORP was founded with backing from the AKP government in Turkey. The main reason for such a move was AKP's discontent with Rauf Denktaş. After he left presidency in 2005, Rauf Denktaş continued to criticize AKP's Cyprus policy publicly. He regularly started to write a column in the nationalist and AKP opponent Turkish newspaper *Yeniçağ*⁶⁵. He even appeared in a very popular TV serial *Kurtlar Vadisi* for several minutes to criticize Annan Plan (and AKP indirectly)⁶⁶. Many agree that this political "operation" was a move of AKP in order to strip off Denktaş and his family, including DP from all executive powers in TRNC. Serdar Denktaş also confirms that AKP was disturbed by Rauf Denktaş's criticisms but claims that it was CTP-BG leader Ferdi Sabit Soyer who encouraged AKP to initiate such a move (Gürkan 2012, p. 107). To protest the way the new government was formed, DP and UBP boycotted the parliament until 2009.

⁶³ DP's share of votes in 2005 elections was 13,5 and the party gained 5 seats.

⁶⁴ However, in 2009 elections ÖRP managed to get 6 per cent of the votes and gained 2 seats. The party eventually dissolved itself and joined UBP.

⁶⁵ Prime Minister at the time Ferdi Sabit Soyer confirms that Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan personally complained him for Denktaş's political activities in Turkey. "DP ile koalisyon neden bozuldu [Why did the coalition with DP break-up?]" 16.02.2013 <http://www.havadiskibris.com> (Accessed on 13.12.2015)

⁶⁶ For a video of Denktaş's appearance on *Kurtlar Vadisi* see: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h64nSdBosUw> (Accessed on 06.12.2015)

In 2009 legislative elections, DP received 10,7 per cent of the votes and gained 15 seats. The winner of the election was UBP, who managed to form a single party government with 44,1 per cent of the votes and 26 seats.

In 2010 presidential elections, Serdar Denktaş mentioned that they will support a third candidate other than incumbent President Talat and UBP leader Derviş Eroğlu. However, the party eventually decided to support its old time rival Derviş Eroğlu, who won the election in the first round of elections by 50,38 per cent.

In 2013, DP changed the name of the party to Democratic Party-National Forces (*Demokrat Parti-Ulusal Güçler*, DP-UG). In 2013 legislative elections, the party gained 23,16 per cent of the votes and 12 seats which meant a significant rise from the 10,7 per cent of 2009 elections (it was the party's second best result after its first election [1993: 29 per cent]). After the elections, DP-UG formed a coalition government with CTP-BG, which lasted until May 2015. In 2015 presidential elections, DP-UG again declared support for Derviş Eroğlu.

After the collapse of UBP/CTP-BG coalition government in April 2016, DP-UG formed a coalition government with UBP with the support of independent MP's where party chairman Serdar Denktaş assumed the roles of deputy prime-minister and finance minister.

8.4.1. Historical Stance of DP on Cyprus Problem

It can be stated that DP adopted a conservative stance on Cyprus issue. DP's first chairman Hakkı Atun was a hard-line conservative who favoured a solution based on a confederal state instead of a federal one and stated that a federal structure will turn Cyprus into war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina (Atun 1995, p. 69). However, the party did not favour some hard line opinions like breaking ties with the Greek-Cypriots and abandoning negotiations. In a pessimistic way, Serdar Denktaş openly declared that (Gürkan 2012, p. 135):

I am not opposed to a solution, but I do not believe it will happen. It will never happen. In fact, both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots are happy with this separate life. Which is lacked is coordination [between the two sides].

8.4.2. Annan Plan and DP

After the announcement of the Annan Plan in November 2002, DP objected an early referendum in 2003 as provisioned by Kofi Annan. The party justified its opposition by expressing that the details and the final version of the plan is unknown to the public. Meanwhile, coalition partner CTP-BG

was strongly supporting the plan and a referendum. However, DP did not oppose a referendum on 2004 and it supported a special law on the projected referendum together with CTP-BG, TKP and BDH (UBP boycotted the parliament session stating that the law was against TRNC constitution). The party also initiated the opening of the borders in 2003 with the south, which reinstated freedom of movement for all Cypriots throughout the island since 1974.

In 2004, Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and Minister of Foreign Affairs Serdar Denktaş together represented Turkish-Cypriots in UN-brokered Bürgenstock talks on Annan Plan⁶⁷. Bürgenstock talks did not end with a positive outcome. Although the Turkish side supported the plan, international pressure failed to persuade Greek-Cypriot leader Papadopoulos for a solution.

Prior to the referendum, DP adopted a neutral policy. As Turkish-Cypriot academician Ahmet Sözen states (2005, p. 469):

The party had explained both the pros and cons of the Annan Plan and let its supporters decide at the polls, unlike all the other parties, which took party decisions either for or against the Plan. The DP claimed that the left-wing parties failed to acknowledge the weaknesses of the Annan Plan, while the right-wing parties exaggerated its weaknesses and ignored its strengths.

DP' official party policy in the referendum was neutral, however Serdar Denktaş expressed that personally he casted a "no" vote (Gürkan 2012, p. 98):

I said "no", because I agreed with Papadopoulos on one point: This plan is not a durable and workable in practice. There were many points which we needed to study in detail and fix. But those days it was not possible to discuss these in public. Nobody was listening anyway.

8.4.3. Current Position of DP-UG on Cyprus Problem

Although DP-UG does not approve the hard liner discourse, it does not agree with the pro-solution argument that recognition for TRNC is impossible due to UN resolutions. The party believes that Turkish-Cypriots should seek for alternative ways to end their isolation in case a permanent solution could not be found. The party condemns the ongoing isolation and criticises EU's indifference to Turkish-Cypriots' conditions even they approved the Annan Plan. The party claims that Turkish-Cypriot's situation in case of a rejection from Greek-Cypriots, as it happened in 2004 should be decided in advance by the UN, EU and OIC⁶⁸. In an official party document it is stated that⁶⁹:

Turkish-Cypriot side's future should be decided firstly in case a deal could not be reached at the end of the specified time frame or a referendum results with a negative outcome.

⁶⁷ President Rauf Denktaş had refused to attend the talks in Bürgenstock .

⁶⁸ Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Geleceğimiz [Cyprus Problem and Our Future], DP-UG

⁶⁹ Geleceğin Yol Haritası [Roadmap to the Future], DP-UG

DP-UG also opposes open-ended talks or a referendum without sufficient public debate on details.

The party promises to implement an intensified foreign policy aimed at breaking the isolations on TRNC. In this context, it gives special importance to become a full member in Organization of Islamic Conference⁷⁰ and direct flights. Kosovo case is also given as an example to prove that TRNC's recognition is possible if the right international conjuncture is available⁷¹. Party chairman Serdar Denktaş even suggests that TRNC can be a separate member of the EU as in the example of Czech-Slovak split. In order to reach these goals, Serdar Denktaş emphasizes that Turkish-Cypriots should firstly implement their own internal political and social reforms in order to make their separate independent structure sustainable (Gürkan 2012, p. 133). As a way of by-passing the isolations; Serdar Denktaş does not exclude the option of joining Turkey as a “worst case” scenario (or plan B), not as province of Turkey but as a kind of autonomous region (Gürkan 2012, p. 134).

DP-UG argues that Varosha district of Famagusta should be opened under TRNC authority and former owners should be able to repossess their properties provided that they accept TRNC laws and regulations.

DP-UG has many reservations about the share of power, property, land, security and especially economy and tax issues on Anastasiades-Akinci negotiations. Serdar Denktaş complains that UBP/DP-UG government is excluded from the process and their requests to include someone from the government in the negotiation team were turned down by the president. Contrary to common prejudices, he states that DP-UG is not categorically against a solution but they are sensitive about Turkish-Cypriots' political equality on government structures. The party strongly opposes the continuation of the 1960 Republic under a federal structure and demands the formation of a completely new state (virgin birth) in a possible solution.

⁷⁰ Currently TRNC is an observer state in the OIC under the name of “Turkish-Cypriot State”

⁷¹ Kıbrıs Sorunu ve Geleceğimiz [Cyprus Problem and Our Destiny], DP-UG

Table 8.4: DP election results in legislative elections

Legislative Election	Party Leader	Share of Votes (%)	MP's Gained	Ranking in the Share of Votes
1993	Hakkı Atun	29.2	15	2
1998	Serdar Denktaş	22.6	13	2
2003	Serdar Denktaş	12.92	7	3
2005	Serdar Denktaş	13.5	6	3
2009	Serdar Denktaş	10.64	5	3
2013	Serdar Denktaş	23.16	12	3

Source: Aydoğdu (2005).

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9. TURKISH IMMIGRANTS AND THEIR POLITICAL INFLUENCE

A very important “fact on the ground” in Cyprus problem is Turkish immigrants⁷² who have settled in the northern part of the island since 1974. Their presence and role in northern Cyprus constitute one of the most debated issues on the island (Hatay, 2005). Their status is not only an issue of debate between Turkish-Cypriot-Greek-Cypriot negotiators; but also in the internal politics of TRNC.

Turkish immigrants in TRNC are a heterogeneous group who differ in their arrival date, purpose, citizenship status etc. In this study, we will focus on immigrants who have acquired TRNC citizenship since they are capable of effecting elections, policy-making processes and the outcome of a referendum.

9.1. THE NUMBER OF TURKEY-ORIGIN CITIZENS IN TRNC

The exact number of Turkish immigrants in TRNC was an issue of speculation since many native Cypriots feared that they will be outnumbered by Turkish immigrants (*Türkiyeliler*) and their political will be distorted by their votes. These speculations were understandably fed by the lack of any census of population in TRNC until 1996. Under pressure from the international community and opposition parties, the administration in the north finally conducted a census in 1996, which included the birthplace for all TRNC citizens (Hatay, 2007, p.6). According to 1996 census, out of 164.460 TRNC citizen population, 23.924 were born in Turkey (14,5 per cent).⁷³

The most recent census in TRNC took place in 2011. According to this census, distribution of TRNC citizen population according to their birthplaces was as follows⁷⁴:

⁷² Some citizens of the Republic of Turkey who currently live in TRNC can be labelled “settlers” since they came and settled in the island in large groups by a systematically implemented policy immediately after 1974. Others can be labelled immigrants who chose to come and live in TRNC individually. We will use the word immigrant in order to describe both “settlers” and “immigrants” to facilitate easy reading.

⁷³ We are aware of the fact that one’s birthplace does not necessarily indicate the origin of one’s family. However, there is a strong relation between birthplace and country of origin in Cyprus case for Turkey-born individuals. In addition, it should be kept in mind that a TRNC-born citizen may be a second-generation Turkish immigrant.

⁷⁴ Census results are downloadable at www.devplan.org

Table 9.1: TRNC citizen population according to their birthplaces as of 2011

TRNC	124.643	65,43%
Greek-Cypriot Administration ⁷⁵	28.731	15,08%
Cyprus Sub-Total	153.374	80,51%
Turkey	31.234	16,40%
UK	2.913	1,53%
Other	2.973	1,56%
Total	190.494	100,00%

Source: www.devplan.org

A table showing the de-facto population of TRNC according to citizenship status in 2011 is presented below:



⁷⁵ Although not in the scope of this study, we should note that in 2006 census, the number of Greek-Cypriot Administration born TRNC citizens was 32.538 (18,28 per cent). This number has fallen to 28.731 (15 per cent) in 2011 census, indicating that the number of citizens who experienced a common life with Greek-Cypriots in the south is falling as time passes.

Table 9.2: TRNC de-facto population according to their citizenships as of 2011

DE-FACTO POPULATION	286.257	100%
TRNC TOTAL	190.494	66,55%
-ONLY TRNC	136.362	47,64%
-TRNC-TURKEY	38.085	13,30%
-TRNC-OTHER	16.047	5,61%
Turkey	80.550	28,14%
UK	3.693	1,29%
Turkmenistan	1.760	0,61%
Nigeria	1.280	0,45%
Iran	1.152	0,40%
Pakistan	1.075	0,38%
Bulgaria	920	0,32%
Azerbaijan	835	0,29%
Other	4.498	1,57%

Source: www.devplan.org

As we can observe from the table, Turkish non-citizen population of TRNC make 28 per cent of the total population. These Turkish citizens consist of immigrant workers, Turkish army staff's dependents, university students and tourists. Although they do not have any influence in the inner politics of TRNC, this non-citizen Turkish population is a matter of concern for many Turkish-Cypriots regarding unregistered employment, pressure on public services, security and preserving of Cypriot-Turkish cultural identity.

9.2. THE CATEGORIES OF TURKEY-ORIGIN CITIZENS OF TRNC

The mainland origin TRNC citizens can be classified in four main groups (Hatay 2005, p.10-11):

- white-collar workers, technical staff and skilled workers
- soldiers and their families
- agricultural labourers
- persons who migrated on individual basis

The first group consist of Turkish citizens who came to the island to give technical assistance to the newly founded TFSC and which were offered citizenship. The second group consist of military staff who served in the 1974 war and their families who were also given the right to become citizens of TFSC.

The third group is the most debated group of Turkish immigrants who can also be categorized as “settlers” since they arrived in the island as large groups in a state-facilitated organization. Many of these persons did not come of their own volition, and quite a few knew little about Cyprus when they arrived; thus they do not resemble settlers in other colonial nationalist projects such as Israel (Bryant, Yakinthou 2012, p. 27). They were immediately granted houses and lands which were abandoned by Greek-Cypriots. The need for such a large scale population movement from Turkey to Northern Cyprus was the result of the demographic change following the 1974 war. Due to the war, some 145.000 Greek-Cypriots fled to the Greek controlled south and some 65.000 Turkish-Cypriots moved to the Turkish controlled areas from the south. The gap between outgoing and incoming population resulted in abandoned villages, neighbourhoods, farms and fruit ranches. In order to end the lack of agricultural labour and become demographically stronger against Greek-Cypriots, TFSC signed a protocol with Turkey in 1975 which facilitated population transfer from Turkey. As a result, some 82.500 Turkish immigrants were settled in TFSC (including individual immigrants) during 1975-1979. These immigrants were selected from relatively poor villages in Anatolia which lacked sufficient land, needed to be relocated due to dam constructions and risk of landslide, forest/mountain villages etc. (Kurtuluş, Purkis, 2014, p.60-62). However, roughly 20-25 per cent of these immigrants could not adapt to Cyprus and preferred to go back in one year due to harsh conditions, hot weather, drought and mosquitos (Kurtuluş, Purkis, 2014, p. 60). This flow of agricultural immigrants and free granting of land and property ended in 1981.

The forth group of Turkish immigrants consists of individuals who immigrated to Northern Cyprus on their own initiative, seeking work or engaging in trade (Hatay 2005, p.13). This category is a heterogeneous group including white collar professionals (bankers, tourism experts), semi-skilled workers, shopkeepers and non-skilled workers. Their number has risen after Turkish citizens were allowed to enter TRNC with their ID cards in 1991. Development of casino tourism in TRNC, violence in south-east Turkey which intensified during 1990's, opening of private universities in TRNC and the construction boom during the first decade of 2000's were other reasons which contributed to development of this group. According to the Citizenship Law of 1992 anyone who remained legitimately in TRNC for five years or more was entitled to citizenship (Hatay 2005, p.13). Thus, some of these individuals managed to obtain TRNC citizenship and formed another sub-group of Turkey-origin citizens.

9.3. ISSUES RELATED TO THE INTEGRATION OF IMMIGRANTS

It is widely accepted that integration of Turkish immigrants and their cohesion with native Turkish-Cypriots is a failed task. Prejudices towards the other community and stereotyping are common both in immigrants and Turkish-Cypriots. Some Turkish immigrants complain about being treated as second-class citizens, exclusion from government jobs and underrepresentation in the political system⁷⁶. On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriots express that their society's demographic survival is under threat and their democratic will is suppressed by immigrants who become citizens and gain the right to vote⁷⁷. In addition, they perceive Turkish immigrants (especially non-skilled workers who came to the island recently for low-level jobs) as a reason of social problems, crime, changing norms and erosion of Turkish-Cypriot identity.

İnal Batu (1936-2013), who was a veteran Turkish diplomat and Turkey's ambassador in TFSC (and later TRNC) during 1979-1985, claims that Turkey's settlement policy regarding agricultural immigrants was far from being well-managed (İnanç 2007, p.96-97):

Turkey's settlement policy was extremely unsuccessful; in other words, we messed up this task. (...) If people with a bit of vision, culture and with an ability to read the past and foresee the future were sent to Cyprus in 1974, the social structure there would be very different today. As I mentioned before, mostly people with low incomes went there. Thus, the Turkish image on

⁷⁶ On the other hand, some Turkish-Cypriots have the same complaint towards Turkish immigrants, claiming that some Turkish immigrants are favoured during recruitments for government jobs after receiving citizenship. (Güngör 2004, p. 103, 133)

⁷⁷ Academician Ali Dayıoğlu, who wrote a book about minorities and minority rights in TRNC, stated that some of his Turkish-Cypriot friends jokingly asked him to include Turkish-Cypriots in his book. "Dayıoğlu: 'Reactions against Turkish migrants exceeded the limit'" www.kpdailynews.com 10.11.2014 (accessed: 24.01.2016).

Cypriots' mind was completely damaged. (...) Still today, Cyprus's poorest villages are the villages of Anatolian-origin people. They are unhappy and have no place to return. If they could, they would have returned a long time ago. They have burned the bridges. They have left nothing in Turkey. They went there for a life struggle but could not find what they had hoped.

Since agricultural immigrants moved to Cyprus altogether with their villagers, they formed closed social groups and depended on their fellow countrymen for solidarity. This resulted in a lack of contact with Turkish-Cypriots. In addition, Turkish immigrants and Turkish-Cypriots who moved from the south had disputes while sharing abandoned Greek-Cypriot properties. However, the level of integration for some agricultural immigrants may not be so “dark” because they have married Turkish-Cypriots, incorporated into the community and their children speak the Turkish-Cypriot dialect.

The opening of borders in 2003 with Greek-Cypriot Administration resulted in an unexpected appearance of the division between immigrants and Turkish-Cypriots. Greek-Cypriot side accepts only people whose presence precede 1974 (and their descendants) as the citizens of RoC. Due to this policy, Turkish immigrants who moved to the island after 1974 and their children are not allowed to travel to the south of the island. This situation formed two groups of people in TRNC; members of the first group being able to travel, work, receive education and settle in whole Cyprus and the second group who have never seen the south part of the island⁷⁸. There are implications of this reality on the daily life of TRNC citizens. For instance, travelling to the south for shopping and entertainment has become a new way of socialization among Turkish-Cypriot youth; however their classmates who are children of Turkish immigrants cannot join these activities. (Kurtuluş, Purkis 2014, p. 271). Flying abroad via airports in the south, medical treatment, banking services, joining sporting events in the south etc. are other tasks that Turkey-origin TRNC citizens cannot access. We should also note that the first group can get RoC passports in demand, giving them a freedom of movement throughout the Schengen area and providing other benefits of being an EU citizen⁷⁹.

Observations of French academicians Etienne Copeaux and Claire Mauss-Copeaux will be helpful to understand the level of cohesion between immigrants and Turkish-Cypriots (Copeaux E., Mauss-Copeaux C. 2009, p.246):

There are examples of personal links and examples of living in harmony and we have met many “mixed” couples. But these kinds of friendships are generally presented as an exception. While

⁷⁸ It should be noted that some Turkish-Cypriots were allowed to work in the south well before 2003 after receiving approval from TRNC authorities.

⁷⁹ Turkish immigrants who have married Turkish-Cypriots can become RoC citizens by naturalisation and access to the south of the island.

inviting us to a restaurant run by an Anatolian; a Cypriot said “he is a Turkish [Türkiyeli], but a nice guy”. This “but”, which expresses that the second part of the sentence does not fit the first part is frequently used. When we ask “Are there Anatolians in your village?” we generally receive this response: “There are but we do not have any problems” or ‘There are but we get on well’. In fact, this is a response for an unasked question, but this question is always on the agenda of other conversations or it is being asked by all Cypriot people: “Can we live together with them?”

According to Cypriot-Turkish academician Niyazi Kızılyürek, Turkish immigrants and Turkish-Cypriots form two “parallel” societies due to lack of integration and intermingling. He claims that this lack of integration was the result of nationalist policies which were blind to cultural and sociological differences between the members of the same ethnic group; on the other hand being ethnically Turkish does not grant a common culture.⁸⁰

9.4. TURKISH-CYPRIOT LEFT’S VIEWS ON IMMIGRANTS

As we mentioned above, Turkish immigrants have always been a subject of debate in the internal politics of TRNC. Parties in the right of the political spectrum, especially UBP supported immigration from Turkey and generally overlooked the problems and the tensions caused by it. Leftist parties were sceptical on the easy granting of citizenships, which they perceived as president Denktaş’s and UBP’s trick to form an artificial electoral base and often criticized the change in the demographics of TRNC.

Mustafa Akıncı, the current president of TRNC and who was the head of the BDH (Peace and Democracy Movement) in 2008 expresses his opinions about immigrants as follows (Uras 2008, p. 41-44):

There are approximately 40 million voters in Turkey. Would Turkey accept that 30 million immigrants were allowed to Turkey for example from the Caucasus or Azerbaijan and made citizens?

Today there are 50.000 registered workers and these are the potential citizens of the future. If it goes on like that, the people who have been living here for centuries and who call here “homeland” will unfortunately become a minority in the near future. Today Turkish-Cypriots are a minority in terms of population and may become a minority as citizens and voters as well. As a result, we should determine the exact number of Turkish-Cypriots in the island.

If we need labour from abroad, people who are experts in the required fields should be brought systematically and according to the laws. We are talking about immigration from a country with a population of 70 million to a country with a population of 200.000. We cannot regard this immigration flow as we regard to the immigration of several million from Turkey to 80 million Germany.

⁸⁰ TV interview with Atif Müezzınler on 13.09.2014 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oEayb4uWruA> Accessed: 20.01.2016

Today Turkey questions the population of Kerkuk and Turkish prime minister proposes visa requirements for Istanbul. In these circumstances, Turkish-Cypriots too have the right to question their own future.

Akıncı warns that the trend of immigration poses a threat to the sovereignty of Turkish-Cypriots (Uras 2008, p. 41-44):

Turkish-Cypriots should be the sovereigns of their own country. This loss of sovereignty may take place in the future. Turkey-origin citizens are open to Turkish governments' influence in their political decisions; in other words their antennas are open. As in the example of New Birth Party, Turkey always interfered in the internal politics of North Cyprus.

Due to this, granting citizenships should be done carefully so that Turkish-Cypriots can protect their sovereignty on the island.

Özker Özgür, CTP's leader during 1976-1996 claimed that Turkish agricultural labourers who were given Greek-Cypriot properties upon their arrival were under constant pressure from Turkey to vote for Denktaş and UBP under the threat of deportation. In addition, basic demands of immigrant villages who vote for opposition parties were turned down by UBP governments. He also adds that (Özgür 1992, p.273-275):

Humans should not be thrown from place to place like objects just because politics require it. Illegal labour inflow from Turkey and immigration of our own people are worrying us, however if a young man who came to Cyprus from Turkey in 1975 at the age of 3 and who is going to vote in the upcoming elections says that "I am a Cypriot"; do we have the right to tell him "No, you cannot become a Cypriot"?

CTP-BG's official views on Turkey-origin citizens and immigrant workers as declared in its official website can be summarized as follows:

- i. the issue of Turkey-origin people should be discussed without falling into the trap of *micro-nationalism*
- ii. citizenships of Turkey-origin people who immigrated to Cyprus after 1974 can never be questioned.
- iii. Turkish-Cypriots' fear of becoming a minority in their own country is understandable.
- iv. 5-year residence rule should be tightened and granting new citizenships should be stopped immediately. Working and residing in a country does not necessitate becoming a citizen.
- v. like other leftist parties in the world, CTP will defend the rights of immigrant workers/their families and try to prevent their abuse by employers. However, even the

citizens who settled in the island after 1974 are worried about the uncontrolled immigration from Turkey

In 2015, the public outcry against easy granting of TRNC citizenships resulted in the proposals for tightening of citizenship requirements and process of granting citizenships was deliberately slowed by TRNC authorities. In December 2015, Turkish prime-minister Ahmet Davutoğlu requested that TRNC citizenships be granted to persons who comply with the requirements; however this was rejected by Mustafa Akıncı who feared that this move would harm the negotiation process⁸¹. The new UBP/DP-UG coalition government founded in 2016 started to grant citizenships by decree claiming that past governments' reluctance to grant citizenships even to persons who fulfilled necessary conditions created backlogs and caused the suffering of people.

As a conclusion, we can assert that none of the Turkish-Cypriot political parties ever suggested the cancellation of citizenships and deportation of immigrants. The internal debate was usually about citizenship laws, granting new citizenships prior to elections and a limit to the flow of immigrant workers. Tensions and prejudices never caused incidents of violence. We should also note that even opposition parties used a cautious language on immigrants who “already” acquired citizenships, in order to avoid possible alienation of potential voters.


9.5. IMMIGRANTS' POLITICAL BEHAVIOURS

It is generally perceived that Turkish immigrants, especially agricultural labourers had an unconditional support for Denktaş and UBP. It is true that support for Denktaş during some presidential elections in immigrant villages was near to ninety per cent (Mehmetçik 2008, p. 166). However, a study made by Turkish-Cypriot academician Mete Hatay on immigrants' voting patterns in legislative elections showed a different picture for UBP. In his study, Mete Hatay compared the legislative election results in two different groups of villages, the first group consisting of 53 villages almost exclusively inhabited by “native” Turkish-Cypriot citizens, and the second group consisting of 26 villages almost exclusively inhabited by Turkish immigrants and their descendants. The comparison revealed that in the period 1990 to 2005, support for UBP in “native” villages was generally much higher than it was in immigrant villages and a majority in immigrant villages consistently voted for parties other than UBP (Hatay 2005). This revealed that the main electoral basis of UBP was not immigrants but Turkish-Cypriots themselves. During the

⁸¹ “Davutoglu wants to give ‘citizenship’ to another 26,500 settlers” 04.12.2015 www.cyprus-mail.com (Accessed: 16.11.2016).

same period, the majority of immigrants voted for the Democratic Party, immigrant parties and in smaller scale leftist parties. The figure shows the level of support for UBP in selected “native” and “settler” villages (Hatay 2005, p.51).

Figure 9.1: Level of support for UBP in selected villages




Source: Hatay (2005 p.51.)

Another perception about Turkish immigrants is that they are open to any influence from Turkey when determining their voting choices. Hatay claims that there were occasions where immigrants voted against Turkey’s preferences: In 1990, selected immigrant villages voted overwhelmingly for opposition alliance DMP, although there was an open support for UBP from Turkey. In 2004 referendum on Annan Plan, immigrant villages casted a 56 per cent “no” vote while the Turkish government openly advocated a “yes” vote (Hatay 2005, p. ix).

Iskele district in TRNC has a significant immigrant population and immigrants’ political choices can be followed to some extent by the election results in this district. For example, percentage of “yes” votes in 2004 Annan Plan referendum was 55 per cent in Iskele, while TRNC average was 65 per cent, indicating the immigrants’ suspicions about their position in a united Cyprus. In 2009, a research by Alexandros Lordos, Erol Kaymak and Nathalie Tocci with 1000 interviewees from TRNC and Greek-Cypriot side was conducted to analyse possible voting trends towards any future solution plan. Research results revealed that Iskele district strongly trends a “yes” vote (see figure 10.2 below). This result may be an indication that Turkish immigrants are not categorically against a settlement in Cyprus (Alexandros, Kaymak and Tocci 2009, p. 18).

Figure 9.2: Possible voting trends towards any future solution plan according to districts



Source: Alexandros, Kaymak and Tocci (2009, p. 18).

The reason of a pro-solution tendency among some Turkish immigrants may be their frustration with the limbo they are in, as one immigrant who came as an agricultural labourer expresses (Kurtuluş, Purkis 2014, p. 271):

Is it clear where we will go in case of a settlement? Now there has been "Annan Plan". They said "Some people will remain, the rest will leave". Who is going to remain? Who is going to leave, is it clear? The man has the list in his pocket. Look, my destiny is written on that list. Is my name on the list or not? Uncertain...This is not something new, it is uncertain since 30 years. Even so I voted yes for Annan Plan. I need to know what will happen to me eventually...I voted yes for this reason.

Prior to 2004 Annan Plan referendum, CTP-BG's support among immigrant population increased as a result of the party's efforts to reach out to immigrant community. The rise of the party's votes in İskele district from 7,4 per cent in 1998 to 21,8 per cent in 2003 indicate that these efforts were successful to some extent. Mete Hatay's study also shows that CTP-BG's support in selected immigrant villages rose from 3,4 per cent to 22,4 per cent between 1998 and 2005 (Hatay 2005, p.54). These figures clearly show that support for CTP-BG among immigrants increased in 2000's compared to the previous decades.

Ertuğrul Kumcuoğlu, Turkey's ambassador in Nicosia during 1987-1991 claims that this shift towards CTP-BG among immigrants was mostly pragmatic (İnanç 2007, p. 148):

When I was there it was unthinkable that Turkish immigrants would vote for CTP. Why do they vote now? It's because they adopted CTP's policies? No. Because CTP is nearer to the power. Tomorrow he will demand something from the government for his village, and the other side will

say “Brother, you voted for UBP by 64 per cent, what you expect from me?” Then they will think that “Let’s cast a percentage of our votes for Talat, so when the issue of water is on the agenda tomorrow Talat will not be able to say ‘What did you give and what are you expecting?’” When the AKP government sided with Mehmet Ali Talat, Turkish immigrants and other Cypriots changed their votes, because they are aware that a party which is at odds with Turkey cannot satisfy their daily needs.

While CTP-BG increased its support among immigrants, other main leftist opposition party TDP did not enjoy such a gain from immigrant votes, mainly due to its more outspoken policy towards immigration and “imported” voters. In the 2nd round of 2015 presidential elections, Iskele was the only district that Mustafa Akıncı, the party’s long-time leader came second after Derviş Eroğlu. It should also be noted that in the 1st round of the elections, CTP-BG candidate Sibel Siber gained 27,9 per cent of the votes in Iskele, higher than her share of votes in TRNC general (22,53 per cent).

Turkish immigrants also formed political parties to strengthen their position in TRNC politics; however these parties were short-lived. The first political party formed by immigrants was Turkish Unity Party (TBP, *Türk Birliği Partisi*) which was founded in 1979 and leaded by İsmail Tezer, a retired air force colonel. This party received 5,5 per cent of the votes in 1981 elections and İsmail Tezer managed to become an MP, being the sole representative of the party in the parliament. Prior to 1985 elections, TBP joined YDP. YDP received 8,8 of the votes in 1985 elections and gained 4 seats in the parliament. In 1990 legislative elections, the party formed an election alliance with CTP and TKP under the name of Democratic Struggle Party (DMP) against UBP. DMP received 44,5 per cent of the votes and gained 16 seats. Upon the victory of UBP, 12 MP’s elected from DMP’s list boycotted the parliament. Meanwhile, YDP leader Kenan Akin who was also elected from DMP list preferred to swear in. In 1993, YDP joined the newly established Democratic Party (DP). After that, influential immigrant parties vanished from TRNC political life for a long time. Other attempts to form parties by immigrant individuals failed to gain popular support (Nationalist Turkish Party [1982], New Turkish Union Party [1985], Homeland Party [1992], Cyprus Justice Party [2003], New Party [2005] etc.).

In 2005 presidential elections, Nuri Çevikel, the leader of the TRNC Immigrants Association at the time managed to get 4,8 per cent of the total votes. In Iskele district, the percentage of his votes was 13,82 per cent.

As explained above, political parties established by immigrants were short-lived. Three possible reasons can be suggested for the impermanency of immigrant parties:

- i. Immigrants formed a heterogeneous group and they were not selected from a particular region of Turkey. According to Hatay, first wave immigrants were a group with five different languages and seven different sects (YKP 2008, p.16). Upon arriving in Cyprus, they initially approached different political parties depending on their pre-existing political leanings. (Hatay 2005, p.25) Immigrants also differ in terms of time and conditions of arrival in Cyprus and degree of assimilation (Loizides 2011, p. 395). This may be a reason for lack of political cohesion within the immigrant community. An anecdotal evidence from İnal Batu suggests that: (İnanç 2007, p.97):

The people who moved to Cyprus from Turkey had problems not only with Turkish-Cypriots. During my service, I recall fixing quarrels between people from Black Sea Region and Kurds.

- ii. Turkey and President Denktaş adopted a policy of de-emphasizing differences between Turkish-Cypriots and immigrants. A long lasting and influential immigrant party would cause an unpleasant reflection of social tensions on the political scene. Considering that Turkey was already being criticized for violating the Geneva Conventions by transferring population to Cyprus, a native-immigrant division in party politics would also weaken the Turkish position in negotiations.
- iii. Integrating the immigrant party YDP to newly formed DP in 1993 helped this party to gain an electoral base among immigrants and balance the power of UBP.

In 2015, a new organisation called New Birth Movement (YDH-*Yeni Doğuş Hareketi*) was founded by Turkish-immigrants, who adopted exactly the same name with the previous New Birth Party. The movement claimed that Turkey-origin citizens of TRNC are discriminated and “had the right to vote but not the right to be elected”⁸² The organisation evolved into a political party in 2016⁸³.

9.6. IMMIGRANTS AND A POSSIBLE SOLUTION

Situation of Turkish immigrants has always been a topic of negotiation between two sides. Hardliner Greek-Cypriots demanded that all “illegal settlers” should be repatriated to Turkey after a

⁸² “YDH: *Türkiyeli-Kıbrıslı ayrımcılığını yapan esas bunlardır* [YDH: These are the ones who discriminate between Turkey-origins and Cypriots]” <http://www.detaykibris.com/ydh-turkiyeli-kibrisli-ayrimciligini-yapan-esas-bunlardir-125241h.htm> (Accessed: 29.10.2016)

⁸³ YDP chairman Erhan Arıklı states that YDP is very strict on the bi-zonal, bi-communal nature of a future state and the guarantee of Turkey. He also criticizes other right-wing parties DP and UBP for not adopting a consistent policy after Rauf Denktash. Arıklı suggests that in case of a failure of negotiations, becoming an autonomous republic of Turkey like Nakhchivan-Azerbaijan example may be an option for TRNC. (E-mail correspondence with Erhan Arıklı).

possible solution. On the other hand, Turkish-Cypriot side expresses that the situation of any TRNC citizen is not debatable. Due to the humanitarian dimension of the issue, Greek-Cypriot side adopted a more flexible stance which will enable a significant portion of immigrants to remain on the island. In Annan Plan, 45.000 immigrants were allowed to become citizens of the new federal state, but Turkish-Cypriot side could deliver a list of only 41.700 immigrants (Kızılyürek 2009, p.115). During the internal debates prior to Annan Plan referendum, right-wing parties argued that there are much more Turkish immigrants than the number provisioned in the plan and many would be left-out if it is implemented. On the other hand, pro-settlement parties claimed that the actual number is not so high. It is interesting that both left-wing and right-wing parties' arguments were just the opposite of their past claims on the number of Turkish-immigrants.

In 2008 negotiations, Greek-Cypriot side offered to accept 50.000 immigrants as Cypriot citizens (Kızılyürek 2009, p.115).

The survey of Lordos, Kaymak and Tocci mentioned above tried to understand Greek-Cypriots' ideas on Turkish immigrants' status in a united Cyprus as well. The results indicated that Greek-Cypriots' preferences towards immigrants differ according to the profile of the immigrant as shown below (Alexandros, Kaymak and Tocci 2009, p.83):

The logo consists of the letters 'TCE' in a white, serif font, with a small 'TM' trademark symbol to the upper right of the 'E'. The text is centered within a solid red rectangular background.

Table 9.3: Greek-Cypriots' preferences towards immigrants according to the profile of the immigrant

Type of Immigrant	Interviewees' Preferences			
	Immediate Departure (%)	Gradual Departure (%)	Residence Permit (%)	Citizenship (%)
Individuals who came to the North from Turkey and have been in Cyprus for less than 10 years	72	23	3	2
Individuals who came to the North from Turkey and have been in Cyprus for more than 10 years	48	40	10	3
Children whose parents came to the North from Turkey but who were themselves born in Cyprus	36	30	20	12
Individuals who came to the North from Turkey but have married a Turkish-Cypriot	23	14	37	25
Children who were born in Cyprus, but with one parent Turkish-Cypriot and one parent who came from Turkey	12	10	40	35

Source: Alexandros, Kaymak and Tocci (2009, p. 83)

Pro-settlement Greek-Cypriots claim that a delay to find a solution will further damage the demographics of the island. In 2008, current Greek-Cypriot president Nicos Anastasiades emphasized that continuation of the status quo will allow Turkey and the Turkish settlers ‘to dominate the north while Turkish-Cypriots will return as partners to the south’ (Loizides 2011, p. 394). During Anastasiades-Akinci negotiations, it is speculated that two leaders have agreed on citizenship figures at 220,000 for Turkish-Cypriots and 800,000 for Greek-Cypriots at the time of a solution.

It can be concluded that Turkish immigrants’ presence and their future status in a united Cyprus does not seem to be a major obstacle for reaching an agreement, compared to other issues like property, government structure and guarantees.

The logo consists of the letters 'TCE' in a white, serif, all-caps font, with a small 'TM' trademark symbol to the upper right of the 'E'. The text is centered within a solid red rectangular background.

10. CONCLUSION&DISCUSSION

Past and current discourses of Turkish-Cypriot political parties as well as their solid actions throughout Turkish-Cypriot history indicate that there are major differences in their positions towards Cyprus problem. We should note that none of the mainstream political parties openly defend to terminate negotiations with Greek-Cypriots or suggest that Turkey annexes TRNC immediately in order to by-pass the isolations. Those who are reluctant about the reunification of the island and oppose a federal system express it indirectly by criticizing the specific features of a solution plan.

The main division among four mainstream parties is between the left and right wings, where two left wing parties (CTP/BG and TDP) keep a reconciliatory and pro-solution approach. On the other hand, right-wing parties (UBP and DP/UG) pursue a more sceptical and conservative policy. When we search for a significant difference between the CTP/BG and TDP, we observe that their approaches are not dissimilar to each other. However, our findings reveal that same pattern is not the case for the right-wing. Although UBP and DP/UG have a conservative discourse towards a solution, they adopted different policies at important turning points. In order to give a clear picture, we present the parties' positions during major decisions which include the declaration of independence in 1983, lifting of travel restrictions in 2003 and the Annan Plan referendum:

Table 10-1: Turkish-Cypriot political parties' positions on landmark moments

Wing	Party	Declaration of independence (1983)	Opening of borders with Greek-Cypriot south (2003)	Annan Plan (2004)
Right	UBP	Support	Oppose	Strongly Oppose
	DP-UG	n.a.±	Support	Neutral
Left	CTP-BG	Reluctantly Support	Support	Strongly Support
	TDP (TKP)	Reluctantly Support	Support	Strongly Support

± Declaration of independence is irrelevant for DP-UG in this analysis since the party was founded after independence.

UBP's positions in these turning points indicate that the party is opposing any federal solution. Apart from strongly propagating for a "no" vote in the Annan Plan referendum, the party was even against the referendum process itself.

In order to find out whether "no" votes in Annan Plan referendum can be attributed to UBP's electoral basis, we compared the percentage of "no" votes with the results of December 2003 legislative elections which was held four months before the referendum. Although it does not necessarily indicate that "no" voters are exactly UBP supporters, our analyses showed that combined votes of parties who propagated for a "no" vote (UBP and the small Nationalist Peace Party [MBP, *Milliyetçi Barış Partisi*]) more or less coincided with the percentage of "no" votes in 5 election districts:

Table 10.2 Comparison of anti-settlement parties' votes and the percentage of "no" votes in Annan Plan referendum[±]

Voting District	UBP and MBP Combined in 2003 Elections (14.12.2003) (%)	"No" Votes in Annan Plan Referendum (24.04.2004) (%)
Lefkoşa	31,6	29,26
Magosa	41,6	36,77
Girne	38,1	37
Güzelyurt	31,8	35,45
İskele	46,4	44,86
TRNC TOTAL	36,11	35,04

[±]Statistics are obtained from Aydoğdu (2005)

Currently, UBP keeps that position and party leader Hüseyin Özgürgün frequently criticizes the way Akıncı-Anastasiades negotiations are conducted. The party is dedicated to strengthen the ties with Turkey and it is keen on to make symbolic moves to promote further attachment to the "motherland". As a recent example, UBP-DP/UG coalition government decided not to return to daylight-saving time in 2016 following the Turkish government's decision in Turkey⁸⁴. This move

⁸⁴ "Cyprus to have two time zones, north to follow Turkey in refusing to turn clocks back " 08.09.2016. www.cyprus-mail.com (Accessed: 12.11.2016).

resulted in two time zones on the island and Nicosia became a rare example of a city with two different time zones.

DP-UG is the other right-wing party which is sceptical to a solution but keeps a more pragmatic approach than UBP. Party chairman Serdar Denktaş credits himself for the lifting of travel restrictions between the two sides in 2003. In 2014, he even proposed to operate Greek-Cypriot Cyprus Airways jointly which was about to go into liquidation by a purchase of the 50 per cent of the airline by Turkish-Cypriots⁸⁵. Denktaş often expresses that two sides should increase coordination in various fields instead of waiting for a solution which will never come (Gürkan 2012, p. 135).


CTP-BG, the prominent party on the leftist group continues to support a federal solution. The party's position for a federal solution should be embraced because it consistently defended a federal structure since its foundation in 1970. A federal structure for Cyprus was a very maximalist approach at the time, when Turkish-Cypriots were mostly living in isolated enclaves and this kind of a solution became feasible only after Turkey's intervention in 1974. The party failed to gain support in its first three decades, however it managed to rise to power with the Europeanisation and solution prospect at the beginning of 2000's. Currently, CTP-BG shows strong support for Akıncı's vision for a solution.

TDP, the other party on the leftist group also favours a federal solution and supports the efforts of its former leader Mustafa Akıncı.

⁸⁵ "Serdar Denktaş: Lets fly Cyprus Airways together!" <http://www.thecypriotpuzzle.org/> 26.12.2014 (Accessed: 12.11.2016).

The differences of political parties' attitudes can also be cross-checked from their supporters' intended referendum votes. The figure below quoted from a 2008/2009 survey describes the link between party affiliation and possible voting preference in a referendum:

Figure 10-1 Party affiliation and possible voting preference in a referendum



Source: Alexandros, Kaymak and Tocci (2009, p. 18).

The figures presented in the survey confirm the attitudes of the parties on the opposite sides of the political spectrum where CTP-BG is strongly in favour of a solution and UBP is the main resort of individuals who are sceptical about a settlement. These two parties have the least share of swing voters (*I am currently just as likely to vote Yes as to vote No*) as a result of their sharp position. DP-BG has the largest share of swing voters due to its relatively moderate policy compared to hard-line UBP. TDP has also a significant share of swing voters; however “yes” voters have a much more significant share compared to DP-BG.

Cyprus problem has many parameters as explained in the relevant sections and we also tried to find out whether there are significant differences or similarities on specific parameters between political parties. Our study revealed that one issue which is strictly divisive among parties is the cross-voting system included in a solution plan. While leftist parties strongly emphasize the need for cross-voting moderation, right-wing parties find it unacceptable and claim that it will distort the political will of Turkish-Cypriots. On territorial adjustments, parties do not specify a certain ratio but right-

wing parties refuse the return of Güzelyurt (*Morphou*) to Greek-Cypriots. Nonetheless, there are some parameters on which both political parties are sensitive. One of these parameters is the continuation of Turkey's role as a guarantor. Although Turkish-Cypriot people voted for a solution in 2004, memories of the atrocities of 1960's are still alive and many regard Turkey's guarantee as insurance in case tensions rise after reunification. Therefore, any deal which does not include the effective guarantee of Turkey is unlikely to gain support among Turkish-Cypriots. All mainstream political parties as well as President Mustafa Akıncı have a firm stance on the issue amid Greek-Cypriot objections. In 2016, Mustafa Akıncı proposed a new system of guarantee which Turkey will be the guarantor only for the Turkish constituent state instead of acting as a guarantor of whole Cyprus as designated in 1960 Treaty of Guarantees⁸⁶. Although there may be some nuances on the desired scale and implementation, all political parties also agree that certain restrictions on the freedom of settlement and on the right to property (*derogations*) for Greek-Cypriots in the Turkish constituent state, in order to maintain the bi-communal nature of the federation.

Another parameter which both parties have a uniform attitude is the issue of rotating presidency. As mentioned in the relevant section, 1960 constitution provisioned that the president will be a Greek-Cypriot. Some political and religious actors on the Greek-Cypriot side desire to maintain this provision after a solution meanwhile Turkish-Cypriot side expresses that a constituent state's monopoly over the presidency is against the political equality principle and insists on a rotating presidency.

Although all parties agree on the parameters on guarantees, rotating presidency and derogations as mentioned above, significant differences towards a solution persist. These differences are not on specific parameters but whether a party is categorically against or supportive of a federal solution. The outcome of Akıncı-Anastasiades negotiations and whether the process will end up in a referendum is not clear, but we can claim that Turkish-Cypriot political parties' positions in a referendum will be very similar to their positions prior to the 2004 Annan Plan referendum. Whether their message will be considered by the citizen in the voting cabin is yet to be observed.

⁸⁶ "President suggests new system of guarantees for TCs" <http://www.starturkeynews.com/> 21.05.2016 (Accessed: 12.11.2016)

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