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Recognition Before Talks
Following the meeting with UN's Special Representative for Cyprus, Ms. María Ángela Holguin Cuéllar, as Turkish Cypriots we are delighted at the strong stance of a demand for recognition of sovereignty and equal international status, prior to any trilateral talks.
On the surface it may seem that Turks do not want to negotiate, however once you scratch the surface it becomes increasingly clear the Greeks are the entity working to maintain the status quo.
Ms. Cuéllar, has made comments, as reported, which underline the necessity for ‘responsible leadership’ in the peace negotiations, This emphasis on leadership responsibility is seen not just as a general plea for action but as a direct challenge to Greek Cypriot leaders to engage more constructively and realistically with the realities on the ground of a divided island.
From our Turkish Cypriot viewpoint, the acknowledgement of leadership responsibility by an international figure such as Holguin is vital. It underscores the perception that for too long, the international community has overlooked or minimized the legitimate political and territorial rights of the Turkish Cypriots. The insistence on a leadership-driven approach is interpreted as a call for a more balanced and equitable negotiation process, where Turkish Cypriot voices are not just heard but are ‘influential’ in shaping the outcomes.
It has become clear to everyone including the British, the UN and the international community that the Greek Cypriots have used a double standards, on one hand they have no incentive to settle the ‘Cyprus problem’ so long as they continue to be treated as the "Government of Cyprus," enjoying free trade and EU membership, moreover, they are enabled to keep the Turkish Cypriots for as long as they please under embargo, preventing trade and communications, without any authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
On the other hand, the Greeks have been asking the Turkish Cypriots to go back since 1967, but on terms which totally nullify their basic rights, living under Greek control, which they could not possibly accept, given this is exactly what Makarios was trying to achieve with amending the 1960 constitution which led to the troubles and eventual division of the Island.
Moreover, when we look to the broader international context of the visit of Ms. Cuéllar, requesting these negotiations, it highlights another critical aspect: the role of external powers in the Cyprus issue. Turkish Cypriots often feel that their geopolitical significance and strategic interests are overshadowed by those of the Greek Cypriots, particularly with the UK, USA and within the European Union.
Holguin's comments can be seen as a reminder to global stakeholders of the need to approach Cyprus' problem not merely as a regional or EU issue but as a complex international challenge requiring a clear understanding. This is not simply a narrative of an ‘illegal invasion’ as the Greeks have successfully sold to the international community, there is an entire facet to Cyprus starting from the 1950’s.
In particular the UK and USA need to play a broader role in a resolution. Britain and the USA have, in their own interests, encouraged the world to treat the Greek Cypriots alone as the government of all Cyprus, despite Britain's own acknowledgement that "Cyprus Government" could mean only a government which acts with the concurrence of its Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot members. There has been no concurrence since 1963, and there is no "doctrine of necessity" which allows one partner to assault and terrorise the other and then claim the right to run the State alone which the Greeks have successfully managed to do.
When in 1983 the Turkish Cypriots declared their own Republic, Britain and the USA, acted against them at the UN. They promoted Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550, which purported to declare the Declaration of Independence "legally invalid," and called upon states not to recognise the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. However, the Security Council failed to examine the legal basis for that proposition. It has never been specified whether the constitutional law of Cyprus or international law is said to be the basis of such "illegality." It has never been explained how the 1960 constitution, having been rejected and expressly nullified by the Greek Cypriots as long ago as 1963, could still be binding upon the Turkish Cypriots in 1983. The Greek’s naturally capitalised on this narrative and effectively have unfairly held the Island of Cyprus to ransom ever since.
Another interesting point to note is that Security Council Resolutions 541 and 550 seek to discourage the recognition of more than one State in Cyprus, but they also do not purport to confer recognition upon the Greek Cypriot Administration as the government of that State.
Although the UK Government deals with the Greek Cypriot Administration as if they were the lawful Government of Cyprus, it does not formally recognise them as such. On 25 April 1980, Hansard, the Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs made the following statement in the House of Lords: "We have conducted a re-examination of British policy and practice concerning the recognition of Governments. This has included a comparison with the practice of our partners and allies. On the basis of this review, we have decided that we shall no longer accord recognition to Governments. The British Government recognises States in accordance with common international doctrine."
On 30 July 1980 the Minister of State reiterated that "the British Government recognises States, not Governments" and this was affirmed again on 12th November 1987. The United States takes the same position. Accordingly, if the British and US Governments recognise States not Governments, neither the Greek Cypriot nor the Turkish Cypriot administration is recognised by them as the Government of Cyprus. Given that there is no functional 1960 treaty or government, recognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus will be a viable initiation to break the deadlock and foster a lasting peaceful solution.
The focus on civil society, including the youth and private sectors, also aligns with a key Turkish Cypriot concern—economic stability and development. For the Turkish Cypriot leadership, any viable solution must address economic disparities and ensure sustainable growth for their community, which has historically faced international isolation.
Holguin’s emphasis on these societal elements reinforces the Turkish Cypriot argument that peace must bring tangible benefits, particularly economic, to both communities.
Furthermore, the article's portrayal of the UN's engagement through Holguin suggests a renewed vigour in international mediation efforts, which some Turkish Cypriots might view cautiously yet optimistically.
There is a hope that this renewed focus might lead to innovative approaches that break the long-standing deadlock, particularly by incorporating more directly the principles of equality and sovereign equality as bases for negotiation.
Lastly, the overall tone from Ms. María Ángela Holguin Cuéllar appears to underline a strategic opening. It presents an opportunity to redefine the narrative around Cyprus in a way that positions the Turkish Cypriot community not as secessionists but as equal partners in the search for a durable and just solution. The leadership's response to this challenge, as spurred by Holguin's comments, could very well dictate the pace and direction of future negotiations.
These perspectives, rooted deeply in a desire for recognition and respect for Turkish Cypriot rights, define the community's cautious optimism about the future roles and actions of both local leaders and international mediators in the Cyprus peace process.