Türkiye's Decisive Role in Defending Turkish Cypriots in 1963, let's take a closer Look at Historical Facts.

It is a gross misrepresentation to claim that Türkiye did not come to the aid of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus until 1974, effectively leaving them to endure a genocide. This article aims to dispel such myths, often propagated by advocates of a 'pro-federal solution' rather than a 'pro-two-state solution'.

These politically charged myths not only distort the truth but also fail to recognize the considerable geopolitical, economic, and military challenges Türkiye was facing at the time. Let's clarify the actual situation.

In 1963, Türkiye, often referred to as the "sick man of Europe," was economically vulnerable, with an economy heavily dependent on agriculture and foreign aid, primarily from the West. Our integration into NATO in 1952 had aligned Türkiye closely with Western interests, further increasing our reliance on U.S. support. Notably, even our intelligence services, now known as the National Intelligence Organization or Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı (MİT), were not fully established until 1965, two years after the onset of the Greek genocide started.

At that time, Greece and the Greek Cypriots were allied with Russia, drawn together by their shared Orthodox religious ties—a relationship that has persisted to some extent in Southern Cyprus to this day. Fighting them would mean a huge geopolitical issue of two NATO members at war one of which (Greece) were allied with Russia which could have developed into a major NATO vs. Russia conflict.

Despite striving to overcome its dependence on foreign aid and develop industrial growth, Türkiye still battled chronic inflation, unemployment, and deficits, with a reliance on agriculture. This economic struggle was evident when international pressures and threats surfaced at the onset of the Cyprus crisis in December 1963. Türkiye found itself in a precarious position, balancing its NATO obligations with its commitment to protect the Turkish Cypriots.

Despite these challenges, Türkiye’s response was prompt and determined. The decision to act was hindered by strategic and military advice influenced by the U.S., given the potential for escalation into a NATO vs. Russia conflict due to Greek alliances. UN intervention to de-escalate the situation was pursued, yet even with UN troops arriving in Cyprus in March 1964, little was achieved.

In the face of escalating violence, the Turkish government signalled its readiness to intervene under Article 4 of the Treaty of Guarantee as the situation worsened in 1964. By June 1964, as attacks on Turkish Cypriots intensified, Türkiye adopted a decisive stance. In August, the Turkish air force conducted a significant operation.

On the 7th of August 1964, following an attack on Turkish Cypriot villages, Türkiye deployed four warplanes to conduct targeted strikes on Greek Cypriot military positions in the village of Poli. This show of force continued on the 8th of August 1964 with thirty Turkish jets flying low over Greek Cypriot towns on the north coast, where the famous Captain Cengiz Topel was martyred, in addition to on the 9th of August, when sixty-four Turkish planes flew low over north-west Cyprus.

These actions were crucial in pressuring the Greek Cypriots to reconsider their aggressive stance, carefully balancing the risk of drawing Russia into the conflict. The effectiveness of these operations was highlighted 3 days after on the 12th of August 1964 when the U.S. Ambassador to Greece was instructed to press the Greek government to halt its attacks on Turkish Cypriots.

Crucially at that time, the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev informed the Greek Cypriots that they could not count on support from the Soviet Union if they continued, leading to a temporary de-escalation of the conflict. Without these decisive actions by the Turkish Air Force, few Turkish Cypriots would have survived, they were saved by the Turkish Air Force, not by the UN.

On that same day of the 12th of August 1964, the UK Representative to the UN wrote to his government as follows:

"What is our policy and true feelings about the future of Cyprus and about Makarios? Judging from the English newspapers and many others, the feeling is very strong indeed against Makarios and his so-called government and nothing would please the British people more than to see him toppled and the Cyprus problem solved by the direct dealings between the Turks and the Greeks. Sometimes it seems that the obsession of some people with "the Commonwealth" blinds us to everything else and it would be high treason to take a more active line against Makarios and his henchmen. At other times the dominant feature seems to be concern lest active opposition against Makarios should lead to direct conflict with the Greek Cypriots and end up with our losing our military bases."

It is also critical to note that Türkiye was initially prevented from deploying troops immediately due to a threatening letter from U.S. President Johnson on 5 June 1964, warning that if Türkiye intervened in Cyprus and faced a Soviet invasion, the U.S. would not fulfil its NATO defence obligations. This was not only arrogant but also an illegal threat, as America's strategic interests would never allow a Soviet takeover of Türkiye or the Dardanelles. Nonetheless, this threat delayed a full-scale Turkish intervention for another ten years.

The Turkish Cypriots were forced to withdraw into defended enclaves, and it was therefore in January 1964, not in 1974, that Cyprus was divided. 

On 14 January 1964 "Il Giorno" of Italy reported: "Right now we are witnessing the exodus of Turkish Cypriots from the villages. Thousands of people abandoning homes, land, herds. Greek Cypriot terrorism is relentless. This time the rhetoric of the Hellenes and the statues of Plato do not cover up their barbaric and ferocious behaviour." 

The Turkish Cypriots then had to establish an elected authority to govern themselves whilst confined in their enclaves.

The narrative that Türkiye was indifferent to the plight of Turkish Cypriots until 1974 is categorically false. Türkiye's interventions and strategic posturing in 1964 were pivotal in safeguarding Turkish Cypriot lives and are early examples of our commitment to their rights and safety.

Türkiye pushed diplomatic channels, including the UN which prompted their deployment. Türkiye additionally consistently during this period advocated for the protection of Turkish Cypriots’ rights and security at international forums, aiming to prevent the international community from ignoring the violence against them.

Targeted air strikes to prevent a full-scale NATO vs. Russia conflict, as mentioned previously, operations over Cyprus in 1964 to deter Greek Cypriot aggression. These operations included low flights and targeted strikes intended to signal Türkiye's readiness to intervene more directly if necessary.

We must also remember that Türkiye was instrumental in the establishment and operation of the Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT), providing training, arms, and strategic guidance to help organize the defence of Turkish Cypriot enclaves.

Türkiye during this period additionally provided logistical and financial support to ensure the survival of Turkish Cypriots, who were often isolated in enclaves. Türkiye helped supply essential goods, including food and medical supplies, to Turkish Cypriot communities cut off by the conflict. Financial assistance was also continually extended to help sustain the Turkish Cypriot population during economic hardships caused by the blockade and isolation from the Greek Cypriot administration, which continues to this day.

Overall, Türkiye's involvement was crucial in safeguarding the Turkish Cypriot community during a period marked by significant tension and violence. This support laid the groundwork for the eventual legal intervention in 1974, following the coup that aimed to unify Cyprus with Greece, a move that Türkiye and Turkish Cypriots vehemently opposed.

The push for a two-state solution today is not merely a political stance but a necessity based on decades of complex history. Türkiye has consistently defended Turkish Cypriot interests, emphasizing the need for mutual respect and peaceful coexistence between the two communities in Cyprus.

Understanding Türkiye's early and decisive actions in response to the 1963 crisis is essential for realistic discussions on the future of Cyprus. Dispelling these myths that Türkiye did not support the Turkish Cypriots allows for informed debates and fair, realistic approach to resolving the island's longstanding issues, ultimately fostering a 2 state solution that respects the equal sovereignty and international status of all Cypriots.